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ABSTRACT 
BUILDING MACAU'S AUTONOMY UNDER CHINA'S RULE 
This thesis proposes a comparative analytical framework for ' 
. I 
understanding territorial autonomy Jr'rangements in general. It then uses 
the framework to dissect the People's Republic of China's (PRC) "one 
country, two systems" territorial ':'LIL,onomy policy as it will be applied to 
Portuguese-administered Macau when '.:",e enclave returns to China's. rule on 
20 December 1999. British-controll~(~ Hong Kong, Macau's neighbour, will 
return to Chinese sovereignty in 19~7 under a similar " one country, two 
systems" formula .. 
The analytical framework proposed draws from international law and 
political science studies of sever~l past and current autonomy systems 
including the Aland Islands (Finlal.l), Greenland (Denmark), South Tyrol 
(Italy), southern Sudan (Sudan) and [ritrea (Ethiopia). It argues that 
autonomy systems are dynamic prOCeSJ8S of ongoing political bargaining 
among central a~d local actors in which four key variables in the 
autonomous territory encourage success: (1) dual political identity; (2) 
avoidance of an executive accountable to both central authorities and the 
local electorate; (3) an independerit., impartial judiciary and other 
.central-local dispute settlement ml.;..2/1anisms acceptable to key parties; and 
(4) effective external support. Dur·,3.l.Jle autonomy processes do not freeze 
the balance of powe rand j u risdictl·.)n at some pe rcei ved optimal level, but 
instead channel ongoing central-locJl disputes into institutions and 
processes that encourage habits of I'lutual accommodation and tolerance .. 
The thesis examines these variubles in Macau, in particul~r as they are 
) 
affected by the transition-period r~01icies of the Portuguese, Macau and PRC 
authorities. It concludes that the enclave is ill prepared to survive as a 
distinct liberal and autonomous ter'j"itory within the PRC after 1999 .. The 
enclave's history of feeble Portugu~se authority and correspondingly strong 
mainland Chinese influence, its dear'th of local people in the senior 
government administrati6n and the" legal system, its colonial government's 
"traditional insularity and noninter'ventionist policies and its economic 
dependence on Hong Kong have all contributed to this weakness .. 
Nevertheless, lasting autonomy a rr'angements are not always born intact .. 
They can be built over time. The re 'Forms undertaken by the Portuguese 
authorities in Macau before 1999 have the potential to help make Macau a 
more -internally and externally effective community. If the post-1999 Macau 
government and the Beij ing regime a,"'8 flexible enough to nurture and 
continue these reforms, a viable au~onomy arrangement could emerge in which 
Macau's liberal institutions and values will have a better chance of 
survival .. Such a process requires tlklt the enclave's Basic Law, the mini 
constitution now being drafted for post-1999 Macau, sufficiently takes into 
account Macau's special problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the fire crac\<ers explode d 'L midnight on 20 December 1999, 
: " , 
Portuguese administered Macau will lormally take its place in what is often 
billed as one of the unique experimunts of the dawning century. Known as 
"one country, two systems," this ambitious policy of the People's Republic 
of China ostensibly aims to incorporate capitalist Macau--a nearly 450-
year-old Portuguese territory and tile oldest permanent European settlement 
in East Asia--into communist China without damaging the fundamental values 
of either system.! On 1 July 1997, a little less than two and one half 
years -earlier, China will apply the same policy to Hong Kong, the ' better 
known British territory located 60 kilometres northeast of Macau across the 
Pearl River estuary. 
Macau, the subject of this study, is the last of what was once an 
extensive network of Portuguese-administered overseas territories. Under 
the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration of 1987, it will be the last of the 
Chinese coastal trading ports under foreign influence to return to Chinese 
administration. The .. one country, t~"o systems" formula embodied in the 
declaration is supposed to resolve China's long standing desire to rid 
itself of the last vestiges of European imperialism while providing for the 
continuation of , Macau's current social and economic system and way of life. 
Modelled on the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which engineers the return 
of Hong ' Kong to China, the Sino-Portuguese agreement promises Macau's 
predominantly Cantonese population "Q high degree of autonomy" for fifty 
years including the right to retain its capitalist economy, existing 
1. The terms 'China' and ~Chinese' in th.i8 thesis refer to the People's RepUblic of China 
(PRC) unless otherwise stated. There are tWL' ~l,Ia.Y9 to spell Macau: cMacao' and cMacau'. The 
latter form is used throughout this thesis. 
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liberal political freedoms and cO'Tt.:.llental European-style civil law system. 
The culture and language of the terl ~itory's small Portuguese-Asian 
minority ,--the Macanese, are protectl....d for the same time period. ,During the 
half century after 1999, . Macau people are to have a government made up of 
local people, among whom Beijing ~ill appoint a chief executive and 
maintain a considerable degree of formal political control in other ways. 
Mqcau is to remain a separate custC/i;lS territory and have significant 
latitude for international partici~,ltion in economic and cultural matters, 
although foreign affairs and defenc~ authority will remain in Beijing's 
hands~2Chinese officials hope the success of these autonomy arrangements 
in Macau and Hong Kong will entice Taiwan into reuniting with the mainland 
under a similar formula. 
Hong Kong's fate under the "one country, two systems" plan has already 
attracted a great deal of media and scholarly attention. Comparatively few 
analysts have studied Macau, despite the peculiar political, cultural and 
economic characteristics which giye the enclave a distinctive place in 
China's autonomy experiment. With fewer than seventeen square kilometres of 
land (including a peninsula and t",'o islands), only about 500,000 people and 
virtually no natural resources, MacJu is a tiny territory and economy_ Its 
particular pattern of European and Asian cultural interaction has produced 
a distinctive Eurasian minority. Thu traditionally insular nature of ' its 
Portuguese administration, the remal~kable growth in recent years of its 
gambling and light-industry based economy a'fter decades of stagnation and 
its unique history of Portuguese ar-Id Chinese political accommodation gi ve 
2 • D.~Qlar.a~a6. .... c.Qn,iYn:t.a .... g.Q .... YQ:Y.~r.nQ .... da .... B~p!.1 .~!.l.iQ ... .I?Qr,t.y'9y~~a .... §l" ... dQ., .. YQy.~.r..nQ .... g.a .... B~p'y.blic.a .... P..QP.Mlar. 
d.a.."C.bina" .. ~Q.b.r.e.""a .... Qye.$.:t.aQ .... d.e. .... Mac.ay , 2 (J.Qint ... i)~(;.lar.at.iQn .... Q.f .... :t.~ .... GQy.~r..nU1~nt. .. J;~f_:t.b~ .. _B~p.Y..b..lic. .... Q.f 
eQt.t.Y9al ... .an(L.:t.'OO' .... Goy.~r.t.lmml:t. .... Q.r... .. :th~ .... ee,Qp.l~.~.~ .. ..r:~~~.Ry.b.lic. .... Q.f .... Cbina .... Qn .... t.b~ .... Qy~~:t.iQn .... Q.f. ... Mac.aY. , 
hereafter Ma.c.aY .... J.D.); An English version was released but has no official status. 
Macau's future under "one country, two systems" a significance exceeding 
the enclave's tiny physical and ecollomic size. 
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Although events in the enclave a ~ largely determined by what happens in 
Hong Kong, political upheavals in M~~au have sometimes destabilised Hong 
Kong as well .. Thus, the future application of "one country, two systems" to 
Macau could have an important effect on its successful application to Hong 
Kong. Furthermore, Macau's economic dependence on Hong Kong and China and 
political dependence on Portugal anJ China makes it a useful case study of 
the problems accompanying attempts to make highly dependent territories 
politically autonomous. Finally, despite its geographic proximity.~ :-to Hong 
Kong, Macau's political dynamics ·reillain obscure. With the exception of a 
handful of recent studies, analysis has tended to focus on stereotyped 
views of power relationships in the enclave that have seldom been subject 
to more serious academic treatment. With this thesis, I hope to make a 
small contribution to our deeper kn\)~'~ledge of the community. 
Much of the academic attention surrounding "one country, two systems" 
has focused on the dangerous clash of ideologies built into the experiment, 
particularly on the nature of th~ Chinese Communist regime and its true 
intentions towards Macau, Hong Kong and, ultimately, Taiwan. There are very 
sound reasons to worry .. Many of the principles of Chinese communism 
contradict values at the centre of 'the Macau and Hong Kong ways of life in 
fundamental ways, whether we juxtapose the contradictory principles behind 
'liberal and communist visions of society and government, capitalist and 
command economies or legal cultures based on the rule of law and those 
4 
based on the rule of policy~3 The uJtimate outcome of such a pairing could 
well be the weaker ~ Macau ~ succumbillt~ to the more powerful, China. The risk 
is especially great if Chinese leacL.rs intend the Joint Declaration's 
promises merely as expedients to fv, ~cstall the collaps·e of Macau and Hong 
Kong in order to glean economic b.encfits pending the eventual absorption of 
the two territories into China. 4 HO~Jever, focusing on these issues alone 
can polarise arguments into a battle between pro-China and anti-China 
factions, people who argue China i s ·trustworthy and those who do not, those 
who say China- will succeed in keeping its hands off the two communities and 
those . who say its highly-centralised ., Communist party-dominated political 
system will force Beijing to intervl.:l1e, even against its own better 
judgement. 
In this thesis, I instead look at "one country, two systems" from a 
perspective which stresses what it 110::.15 in common with other territorial 
autonomy ·arrangements around the world. A glance at virtually any day's 
newspaper reveals that territorial ~utonomy systems of various sorts are 
common methods for addressing conflicts involving culturally, economically 
or otherwise distinct communities, whether the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the 
Palestinians in the Israeli-occupieu territories. It is in this context 
that the uniqueness of Macau's preuicament diminishes and we can apply the 
lessons of other experiments with ~utonomy to the future Hacau SAR. 
:3. See, for example, Edward J. Epstein, "China and Hong Kong: Law, Ideology, and the 
Future Interaction of the Legal Systems," in r~aymond Wacks, ed., Ibe. ..... f.!Jt.!J.r.e. .... o.f .. _t.b~ ..... l..Q,!t'.L.in 
f:iQOg.J~o.ng (Hong Kong: Ox ford Un i versi ty Pr-es.;»), 1989, pp. 37-75. 
4. SUch arguments have been made by, in!~f.:.r. ~li~, Byron S. J. Weng, "The Hong Kong Model of 
cOne Country, Two Systems,': Promises and Proulems," in Peter Wesley-Smith and Albert H.Y. 
Chen, eds., I~ .... aa$.i.c. .... l...aw .... a.nd ..... HQflg .... Ko.ng!..$. ... .fJ.J .!.;~.I.r.~ (Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia: 
Butter-worths, 1988), p. 69; Oavid Clark, "Taldrlg the Basic Law Seriously?" A~.i~n .... J.OYr.n~l. ... o_f 
P.u.b.lic._ .. AdIoinie.t.r.~:tiQt.l 12 ( Dec. 1990 ): 257. 
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Defining Autonomy 
The t~tm ~autonomy,' when used t · ~ describe such territorial communities, 
generally implies that: 
for important political Ot" economic reasons a particular area will 
remain within the territorlal jurisdiction of another political 
entity but will possess political freedom to regulate certain of its 
own affairs without any interference by that entity. Granting 
autonomy to an area allows th~J people inhabiting it to exercise 
direct control over important affairs of special concern to.· them, 
while allowing the larger entity, which retains certain powers over 
that area, to exercise those powers which are in the common interest 
of both entities. 5 
In terms of ideal c6nstitutional types, the forms of autonomy used have 
varied. On one end of the spectrum is associated state status, where "a 
smaller state establishes a durable link with a much larger state 
surrendering some degree of its ind~pendence in order to accrue certain 
political or economic benefits" 6 while retaining the legal authority to opt 
out of the arrangement. Federalism usually involves two or more states 
giving up some governmental authority to a common general govern~ent while 
retaining final authority in other policy areas under a constitutional 
agreement which cannot be unilaterally amended by any party and which 
requires participation by the subunits in general government affairs. 7 
Other autonomy arrangements involve the central governments of unitary 
political systems devolving adminis·trative, legislative, executive or 
5. Louis B. S~hn. "Models of Autonomy Within the United Nations Framework," in Voram 
Dinstein, ed., Mo.Q.e.l.~ ... Q.f._.A!.lt.QnQIl1Y. (New BrUtlswicl<, U.S.A. and London: Transaction Books), 
1980), p. 5. 
6. Mi c hae le. Da vis , C.QO$.t.it.!.l:t.iQf)~l .... C.Qt.l. fr.Qnt.at.iQn .... in .... I:iQt19 .... KQng.~ ..... 1$.$.!J~$. ... .B.nQ .... .Imp.lic.a:t:.iQO~ .... Q.f 
:t.he_ ... Sa.$.ic. .. J"a.w (Basingstoke and London: Macm.illd.n Press, 1989), p. 132. 
7. See, for example, David Mi ller, ed., Tb~ .... 6.1ac.kwe.ll .... .Ency.c.1Qp.~e.Q.ia .... Q.f .... P.Ql.it.ic.al ... .I.bQygilt 
'(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 151; Rudol f Bernhardt, "Federalism and Autonomy," in 
Dinstein, MoQ.e.l.SLQ.f. ... AUt.QOQmy., pp. 24-26; D.:w is, C.Qo$.t.it.!.l:tiQna.l .... C.Qn.fr.Qnt.~:tiQn, p. 133. 
judicial authority to a regional or local government. In theory, the 
centr'al government generally retain~:, the constitutional authority to 
unilatera11y withdr'aw this power of self-government from the autonomous 
region . Although association, fede n:~lism and regional devolution ha ve 
differ'ent historical origins and diver'gent constitutional philosophies, 
arrangements bearing their names have been used when neither full 
incorporation into a single entity Ilor complete independence are desirable 
or possible solutions to disputes involving territorial communities which 
regat~d themselves as culturally or otherwise distinct .. 8 
Do such arrangements work? Under V\lhat circumstances is territor ial 
autonomy a way to achieve such of tell expressed goals as maintaining peace 
and order, protecting and cultivatiilg the distinct identity of culturally 
or socio-economically discrete communities, enhancing human rights and 
~xpanding the capacity of territorial communities to define themselves and 
participat~ in defining the global order? The emphasis on maintaining 
stability and prosperity in the Sin0-"Portuguese agreement suggest that at 
least some of these goals are applicable to Macau under "one country, two 
systems," a status that has been chat"acterised as somewhere between an 
associated state and an autonomous I'egion .. 9 Unde r what ci rcumstances can 
territorial autonomy help us reach t.hem and what are the constructive 
elements of such autonomy? Furthel'rnor"e, what is the role of the larger 
international community in determining failure or success? 
In .this thesis, I attempt to help answer these difficult questions by 
8. Bernhardt says there are fundamental Ji 'fferences between au"tonomy and federalism but 
concedes that .. autonomy descr i bes the 1 imi t~, C) f State inter ference, on the one hand, and the 
autonomous determination and regulation of c~.?rtain affairs by 9peci fic insti·tutions on the 
other. In this context, there are some similarities be'tween autonomy and federalism" 
. (Bernhardt, "Federalism and Autonomy," pp. ~:4-26). 
9. Davis~ C.QO.~t.it.Yt.iQIJ.a.1 ... "C.Qn"fr"Qnt.at.iQn .. ..i.i.l....I:iQn9 .... KQn9, p. 131 .. 
6 
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proposing an analytical framework fur dissecting autonomy arrangements 
drawn from a small comparative study of current and past experiments with 
autonomy ~ " Autonomy systems are not : tatic arrangements but highly dynamic 
processes driven by the continuous jockeying for power between central and 
local political actors. Therefor~, our goal cannot realistically be to 
'. 
freeze the powers of the central Chinese and local Macau SAR authorities at 
some perceived optimum level .. Nor Cdn we build a wall between the two 
communities. Rather, we must find ways to channel their ongoing conflict 
into peaceful institutions and proc~sses with the potential to build up 
patte.r,ns of mutual accommodation, c(.)upe ration and trust .. 
Scope anJ Limitations 
The experience of other autonomous territories suggests that building a 
successful autonomy arrangement fOI~ Macau requires addressing several 
specific issues which are characteristic proble~s for such arrangements. 
The four key issues I concentrate on are: community political and cultural 
identity, the subjective dimension 0f autonomy; representative political 
institutions, in particular the controversial roles of the chief executive 
and of direct elections; the legal system, potentially a place to settle 
central-local disputes and secure human rights in the autonomous entity; 
and external support, the role of outside resources in building viable 
internal autonomy. After looking at the role of these variables in other 
autonomy 'arrangements, I spend the bulk of this thesis considering how 
each could help or hinder Macau's autonomy under "one country, two 
systems .. " 
Many of the problems likely to confront the Macau SAR are inherent in 
all autonomy arrangements, whether or not they involve clashes of ideology. 
The contradictions between Chinese Communism and Hacau-style liberal 
capitalism are by no means superflu\A./s considerations. However, to 
understand~ their importance we must also understand the role of other 
political problems characteristic of autonomy systems. Furthermore, by 
focusing on the problems Macau will ~hare with other autonomous 
t~rritories, we can go beyond measui~ing the adequacy of the steps already 
taken by the Portuguese, Macau and Chinese governments as they prepare for 
1999 to also enrich our understanding of evolving notions of territorial 
autonomy in international law. Thus j my research focuses on both the value 
of Macau's experience as a distinct community within China and on 'the 
broader role of autonomy in world ol~der. 
The four variables I have chosen to study ar~ by no means the only ones 
shaping the development of Hacau's dutonomy arrangements .. Nor do they 
constitute a magic formula for the success of the "one country, two 
systems" scheme. My claim is merely that these factors have been 
influential in other autonomy arrangements and are likely to have 
considerable affect on Macau afte~ its returo to PRC administration 1n 
1999. Moreover, because of the similarity between the autonomy systems 
planned for Hacau and Hong Kong, th..:y are also of importance to Hacau's 
British-administered neighbour. 
My selection of outside autonomy experiments of relevance to this study 
have been limited by both substantive and practical factors. There is an 
increasingly .strong case to be made that all autonomy arrangements 
involving distinct communities are o·r legitimate interest to international 
law. However, to simplify comparisons with Macau, I have limited my study 
to autonomy processes that have ' beGn of some clearly definable 
international legal concern, whether the communities created are labelled 
8 
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federations, associated states or CU,i,ffionweal ths, autonomous regions or 
special administr'ati ve regions.. I h,. ~ ve also limited my main examples to 
those autonomy arrangements about w~ Lt.ch at least ' two reliable, ~nalytical 
studies were available. Unfortunate jy~ information on autonomy arrangements 
is rather spotty and much of what e><ists is limited -to descriptions o'f the 
historical origins of the arrangements and textual analysis of their 
constitutional features .. Few studies -Focus in any depth on how the 
arrangements actually work or work~J in practice, why they survived or fell 
apart and to what extent they achieved the goals of the parties involved. 
Almost no analytical, comparative s 'tudies of autonomy arrangement~~ exist at 
all. Therefore, the sample group of cases that resulted is necessarily 
small and far from representative of all extant and past autonomy 
arrangements: My observations rnustlJe considered suggestive rather than 
conclusive. Nevertheless, I hope ~tk!Y will encourage others to attempt more 
comparative studies of autonomy arrangements. 
My choice of research priorities and approach reflects my own language 
and time limitations as well as the pau~ity of both quantitative and 
qualitative secondary research materials on Macau. To take full advantage 
of Portuguese-language materials and Portuguese-speaking informants largely 
unexplored in English-language scho,larship on Macau, my analysis focuses 
primarily on Portuguese and Macau 90vernment policies during the transition 
period that began with the signing ()f the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration 
10 
and ended in early March 1991. 10 It deals in only a small way with PRC 
policies towards the enclave. Its tf~atment of the views of local Macau and 
expatriate--political elites is also limited to a few in depth interviews .. 
These restrictions should in no way be construed as a rejection of the 
important influence broader local elite and general public views could have 
on -Macau's future autonomy. Nor do 1 wish to suggest China's historically 
deep influence in the territory can in any way be ignored. 
Organisation 
I have organised ·my presentation in the following way .. The two ~ .~hapters 
in part I lay a foundation by dealing with the general theoretical and 
analytical dimensions of territorial autonomy arrangements. In chapter 1, I 
look at the major approaches interl"rtional legal and other scholars have 
used to understand autonomy arrangefJlents.. In chapter 2, I draw from the 
work of several of these scholars to suggest a framework for analysing the 
dynamics of autonomy arrangements and the main variables influencing their 
evolution. The framework focuses on the common experiences of several 
autonomy systems, in particular the Aland Islands (Finland), Greenland 
(Denmark), South Tyrol (Italy), sou thern Sudan (Sudan) and Eritrea 
(Ethiopia) .. Part I I applies this :fr.JlTlework to Macau to try to anticipate 
some of the problems the future SAR is likely to encounter. Chapter 3 
introduces key aspects of Macau's hi:3tory, society and political 
10. A list of interviewees is provided in the appendix. The principal officials I 
interviewed were members of the cabinet of fr':JI"mer Governor Carlos Melancia. Melancia ,'esigned 
in September 1990 after being implicated in 3 bribery scandal, but his cabinet remained in 
place and its Adjunct Secretary for Economic r., ·ffairs, Francisco Nabo, headed the MaCalJ 
'government as its acting governor until tbt;) .:.\ppointment of Vasco Rocha Vieira as ·the 
encla.ve's 127th governor in April 1991 . . Vieir.J. arrived in Macau on 10 May 1991 and 
subsequently named a new cabinet ("New cabl"I;,;'l- for Macau," I:iQng.kQ09 .... S.t.~nQ.~.r.Q., 17 Ma)1 1991 
[herea fter t:1KS.J),. 
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characteristics and the emer'ging autot1omy process in the enclave .. 
Subsequent chapters look in detail ot four variables that will influence 
that proce"ss: Macau's community idellLity (chapter 4); political , 
institutions and political participc"Lion (chapter 5); legal system (chapter 
6); and external support (chapter ,7) .. 
PART I: THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL CONTEXT 
12 
CHAPTER 1 
EVOLVING CONCEPTS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY 
A claim. for autonomy is an expr8 .. ,.,ion of a desire "by some segment o'f a. 
larger society which is currently o, 'uanized into a state N N N N to be 
different and to be left alone; to preserve, protect, and promote values 
which are beyond the legitimate rea~h of the rest of society .. "l 
Inter'national law specialists and o:ther scholars have not tackled the study 
• I, ' 
of such autonomy claims in a uniforl/" way .. Two major views are discernable, 
which I loosely group into traditio,!dl and nontraditional approaches 
according to how the· scholars undet~tand the evolving world order ~~ in 
particular- such concepts as stateho(~ and sovereignty. The discussion below 
focuses on rep resentati ve scllola rs ·r: t~om both t radi tional and nont radi tional 
approaches, then looks at how PRC $,~~ I'lolars and officials have viewed 
autonomy, especially in relation to the "one country, two systems" policy 
articulated f,or Macau. It argues thdt "one country, two systems" has roots 
in the assumptions of both the tradi'tional and nontraditional approaches. 
There is an increasing tendency for scholars using nontraditional 
approaches to see a wide variety of autonomy arrangements as contentious 
but important tools, recognised in international law, for securing peace 
and stability and the human rights ;of discrete communities without 
" 
destroying the sovereignty of exisilng states .. Several authors have turned 
their attention to identifying the ~pecific internal and external 
ingredients that make some autonomy ventures successful and the problems 
1. Hu rst Hannurn, eyt.QO'Qmy..t ..... s.Qy.~r.~i.gr.:\:t.Y. .... !:\u~'J.. ... S.el.f::::O'~t.e.r.m.inR,t.iQn.;, .... .I.h~ .... Ac.c.Qmm09.~t.iQtl .... Q.f 
C.Qo.f.lic.t.ing .... Bigb:t.~ (Philadelphia: Universit)' of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), p. 4. 
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which cause others to break down. However, positivistic doctrines linger in 
the more traditional analyses of a Lfi:.c'nomy .. 
Traditior.~\l Approaches 
Traditional international legal iJfJproaches are rooted in a world view 
where only narrowly-defined territorial polities labelled ~states' have 
well recognised international persoi·ldlities .. Nonstate territorial 
communities such as territorially-b~sed communities within states are 
seldom viewed as subjects of tradi"tlonal international law .. Unless part of 
colonial situations, they are seen as matters of exclusive concern to state 
authorities, whose jurisdiction is pr'otected by well-established d~ctrines 
of sovereignty and the inviolabilit.y of territorial state boundaries .. Thus, 
scholars using these approaches accept the traditional strict distinction 
between a state's exclusively domes"Lic affairs and those few internal 
issues of legitimate concern to the international community .. Distinctive 
territorial communities within stat(~s rarely fall into the latter category. 
Consequently, many traditional illternational law textbooks do not 
mention autonomy at all. Those that do often begin and end with a search 
for a definition of the phenomenon, reflecting the positivistic view that 
law is a preexisting body of rules ·L.hat can be found in the legal 
instruments. Concluding there is no term of art nor a generally accepted 
definition of autonomy in international law, the traditional studies 
relegate autonomy questions to the realm of domestic politics. In his study 
of the autonomy dispute that culmii iJ ted in the American War of 
Independence, Friedlander's comment·) reveal the influence o'f this approach: 
There is even reason to b~lie1e that autonomy as a legal norm really 
does not exist .... Those who seek to obtain a juridical definition of 
autonomy from international law treatise books will quest in vain .... 
14 
Viewed from the perspective of international law, autonomy is 
therefore an artificial concept of dubious legal consequences .... it 
still is invoked by politicians, historians, and political analysts, 
though its t~entieth-century tiistorical role has only been that of a 
political instrumentality.2 
If traditional studies make way fe·, autonomous territories at all, it is 
only in exceptional cases where their status is supported by 
internationally binding legal instn.:lllents such as treaties. Even so, some 
of the studies acknowledge some international recognition and support for a 
a few specific types of autonomy arrangements. To Bernhardt, for example, 
unless autonomy is secured by international treaty its granting or ' 
withdrawal remains a domestic sovereign decision falling outside 
in te rna t i ona 1 1 a w " .w.~.t..b ...... t..b.~ ..... P'9..$..$..~.p.l9. ...... G..X.9..§R.t..~.9..!J. .... .Qf. ..... ~.o.t..§ . .r..n§..tj.Qn9JJ.y 
.. : ,:- , " 
.g.y.9.r.9nl§sj,.9. ... .JJJd.ffi.§.!J. ..... .r..i.g.h.t..$. .. " 3 James C r(n,vford emphasises the exceptional nature 
of those autonomous entities with international legal status: 
Autonomous areas are regions uf a State, usually possessing some 
ethnic or cultural distinctivtjness, which have been granted separate 
powers of internal administration, to whatever degree, without being 
detached from the State of Wllich they are part ... tQ.r... .... $..!d.g.O ...... ?t.9..t..!d.$. ...... t..Q .. J?..§ 
.Q.f_.p..r~.~g.nt .. _ .. ;iJJ.t..§ .. r..§!_$..t. .. :I ..... J.t. ...... m.!d.§:.t.! .. ... J.:?.~~ ...... i..D .. _~.Q.m.§ ...... w.9.y ...... ~n.t..§.r.D.9.t.j:.9.n.9.~.~.y ..... Q1oQ.~n.g 
.YRQt]_ ... t..!J.§._ ... g.~.D.tJ::-.9J_.9J~.t.hQ.r.~.t..~.§{? N Oi ven such gua rantees, the local entity 
may have a certain status, although since that does not normally 
involve any foreign relations capacity, it is necessarily limited .. 
Until a very advanced stage is reached in the progress towards self-
government, such areas are not States. 4 
Grants of autonomy to non-self-g~verning territories, mandates and 
trusteeships under United Nations instruments concerning decolonisation and 
trustees.hip are · among those exceptional autonomy arrangements considered 
binding on central state authoritie:3 by traditional international legal 
2. Robert Friedlander t "Autonomy and the fhirteen Colonies: Was the American Revolution 
Really Necessary?" in Dinstein t MQg.~l$. .... Q.f. .. .rI!J .. t~·!nQmy., pp. 136-7. 
3. Emphasis added; Bernhardt, "Federalis"') and Autonomy," p. 26. 
4. Emphasis added; J ames Crawford, Ibe. .... CL~;~s.~t.iQn .... Q.f .... S.t.~t.e.$. .... io .... lnt.~r.na.t.iQna.l. ... .L~w (Ox ford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 211-212. 
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scholarship. Under UN General Assembly Resolution 1541, a non-self-
governing territory can achieve "a ·1 :(111 measure of self-government" by 
emerging as a sovereign independent ~tate~ free association with an 
independent state or integration ii I ' .",~ ) an independent state, providing it 
has the free and informed consent 07 the people involved .. 5 Within these 
three categor.ies t.here is broad, if flot well defined scope for autonomy 
arrangements with some recognition in international law .. Such arrangements 
often involve continuing UN oversictlt to protect the autonomy of the non-
self-governing entity being linked ·to the independent state .. 6 
The members of UN committees and the General Assembly have battled over 
the definition of internal self-government to be applied to non-sciif-. · 
governing territories undergoing decolonisation .. Louis Sohn argues these 
fights stabilised the concept of internal self-government in UN practice in 
the early 19505. 7 However, the international community has applied these 
self-government concepts to only a very limited number of territorial 
com~unities falling within the UN d2finition of non-self-governing 
territories. Macau and Hong Kong fall outside the definition according to 
UN practice. The organisation remov~d both territories from its list of 
non-self-governing territories in t.he early 1970s after pressure from the 
PRC, which claimed they were Chine3'·3 sovereign territory .. 8 ~xcept for rare 
.s. Michla Pomer imce. S.e.l.f::Q~:t~r.mj.n9..:t.iQn ... ~.n ..... L~w .... ~nQ .... .I?r.ac.:t.i.c.e ..... _.Ih~ .... Ne.w .... QQC:t.r . .in~ .... in .... :t.h~ 
U.nil~ .. Jiat.i'm~ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff ~ 1982). pp. 10-11; Hannum. Ay:t.QnQflly..i ..... $.Qy.~r.~.ign:t.Y-
M.(L..~l..f.:::Qe::t.~r.r.oina:t..iQt.l • pp. 39-40. 
6. S. Chowdhury, "The Status and Norms of Self-Determination in ContempOrary International 
Law." in Frederick E. Snyder and SUI'iJ<iart Sa·thirathai, eds., Tbi.r.d ..... WQr.1Q ..... A:t.t..it.~d.~~ .... IQWa.r.sJ. 
In~r.nat.ional .... .L:aw (Oordrecht: Martinus Nijhof'f, 1987), p. 95; Sohn, "Models of Autonomy 
within the United Nations Framework." pp. 5-'7. 
7. SOhn. "Models of Autonomy Within ·the United Nations Framework," p. 34. 
a. J erome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chi,u. F.:~#.Q.f?l~.~.$ .... C.hin~ ... J~mQ .. ... .Int.~r.nat.ion~l .... .l..Qw."._ .. A .... QQc.ym~o:tar.Y­
s.:t.Y~b:~, 2 vols. (Pr inceton, N. J .: Pr inceton Un i versi ty Press, 1974). 1: 912 at note 42. 
1.6 
cases like this, the types of ter'ritorial communities entitled to sel'f-
determination generally have been 1.i.llited in practice to those involved in 
colonial relationships with Westenl ~jovernments .. 9. Thus, these UN sanctioned 
: . .. ... 
" 
routes to international recognitipn dnd support for autonomy arrangements 
have been of limited use' in resolving other disputes involving distinct 
territorial communities .. 
Nontraditi'.:>nal Approaches 
Non-traditional approaches to autonomy in international law are shaped 
by the view that several interconnected global trends make traditional 
concepts like sovereignty and staterlood and the dichotomy between;~xternal 
and domest'ic policies increasingly inadequate .. Scholars falling into this 
.. , ~ 
group note the convergence between n()tions of autonomy and statehood .. 
Growing ties of global interdependollce are challenging the traditional 
principle that states are externally and internally autonomous .. Meanwhile, 
distinctive substate territorial communities demand more autonomy and the 
right to 'international recognition 3tld participation, but often settle for 
less than full independence. ID These scholars regard the constitutiNe 
processes shaping international legal norms as increasingly inclusive; 
growing numbers of nonstate territorial and nonterritorial entities 
participate in defining world order and contemporary notions ·of human 
rights increasingly view the individual as a subject of internatio,nal law .. 
Externally, many states have surren~".Jred some traditionally sovereign 
prerogatives to regional and othet .. international groupings such as the 
9. Fo~ a general discussion of sel f-detl:"j'I,'lina;tion in practice see Pomet'ance, Se:l.f:::: 
t2e.t.e.r.r.oina.t.i.o.n .... in .... La.w. .... a.n~t .. p.r..a.c.:tic.~; H an nurn , f:iyl. :t~Qno.rf.ly..A ..... $.Qy.e:r..e:.i9n:ty. .... a.nd ..... $.e:l.f::::~:te:r..rn.inat..ion... pp. 
27-49. 
10 • Oa vis t C,Qn$.:t.i.:t!J.t.iQna.l.J;Qf:l.fr.o.n:t~:t.i.Qn , pp. 131-135. 
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European Community and the Canada-United states free trade agreement .. !! 
Internally, central governments mu~ I. •• 1 rely on territorial units for local 
initiative, responsibility and self· ·j"ule .. "12 These restrictions on the 
domestic and external policies of st3tes make it more difficult for state 
authorities to convincingly claim their sovereignty is absolute .. 
Furthermore, the post-Second World ~Jar emergence of small, new states not 
fitting the traditional definition of sovereign statehood has helped dispel 
the traditional notion that all states are equal .. !3 
Few, if any, of these nontraditiul'lal legal stUdies argue that states and 
the principles o'f sovereignty ~ independence and territorial integrity are 
uninfluential forces in the current world legal order.. Rather, th~~ claim 
that the patterns of participation dild status in the international system 
are becoming more diverse and complex as traditional state actors are 
forced to recognise real changes in power distribution and confront actual 
problems .. Within this more flexible order, they see broader opportunities 
for resolving the demands for auton·)my made by nonstate communities .. 
Although scholars who use nontraditional approaches diverge on some points, 
I have grouped them together because of their shared tendency to see a wide 
variety of autonomy arrangements as, matters of both international and 
domestic legal concern .. The traditional dichotomy between international and 
11. Ibid., p. 132. 
12. Ivo D. Duchacek, Ih~ ... .I~r .. r.i.t.Qr.i~.l ..... o.ljJ.i J.n~iQn .... Q.f ... J?Q.l..i.t.i.c.$. .... Wit.h.i.n.:l ... j:lmQng.l ..... anQ .... Bc.r.Q$.~ 
Mation~ (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1966), p. 66. 
13. See Davis. c.Qn$.ti:ty.:t.io.oal.. ... C.Qn.fr.~,m.t.R,:t~i~.!r.l., pp. 131-135; idem, "The Concept of Statehood 
and the Status of Taiwan," J..Qyrna.l ..... Q.f. ... C.h.itl~~~ .. ... L.aw 4 (1990): 135; Lung-chu Chen and W.M. 
Reisman, "Who Owns Taiwan?: A Search fot' I;lt~rnational Title," y~.l.e: ..... t..i\W .... J..QYr.nal 8, no. 4 
(March 1972): 601-603; W. Michael Reisman, i.::y.~:r.t.Q ... .Ric.Q .... ~od ..... th~ .... .l.o:t~r.nat..iQn~.l. .... l?r.Qc.~~$.;_ ... lie.w 
BQle.~Li.n ... A~~Qc.ia.:tiQn (Washington, D.C.: Aml'JI" ican Society of International Law, 1975); Hurst 
Hannum and Richard B. Lillich, "The Concept of Autonomy in International Law," in Dinstein, 
t1o.d.e.l~L.o.f_ .. A!J:tQnQm)!.~ pp. 215-254; Ivo D •. Duci-i.:.\cek, c.Qr.op.ar..~t..iy.~ .... .E~d.~.r..ali~m.;._ .. Ih~ ... .Ierr .. it.Qr.ial 
D.im~n$.iQr.L.Qf .... f?Qlitic.~ (New York: Holt, Rirl:;;'il~(t and Winston, 1970), p. 356. 
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domestic affairs has diminislled me<:udl1g 1n a world where porous 'territorial 
boundaries have made 11 intermestic" ,!<~ sues the norm .. 14 As a result, these 
scholars are less hampered by the &~arch for a precise legal definition 
, ~ .. ... 
t.hat characterises traditional apP;·,,·o;.lches and more oriented toward solving 
extant problems caused t?y competing demands for autonomy, self-
determination and sovereignty .. Sever'nl have begun identifying specific 
institutions, processes and subjective elements which contribute to the 
success or failure of autonomy arrai Igements .. 
Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich's comparative study of twenty-two 
autonomy arrangements is typical o'F these nontraditional approaches. They 
note that traditional notions of independence and statehood seem 6flworkable 
as solutions to the problems of mirkH'ity and non-self-governing -
communities.. Meanwhile, as the t~JE'iTL.ieth centu ry comes to a close, a wide 
di ve rsi ty of autonomous entities an·j mush rooming numbe r of claims to 
autonomy testify to the mounting im,)ortance of the principles of self-
government and the right to participate in decisions directly affecting the 
local community.15 To Hannum and Lil1ich, autonomy is "a relative term 
which describes the extent or degre l3 of independence of a particular 
entity" and "a useful, if imprecise, concept within which flexible and 
unique political structures may be developed to respond to the increasingly 
complex interdependence of contemporary world politics."16 Unencumbered by 
14. Speech by Chief EmeJ<a AnyaoJ<u, Commul 'I y\h.?a 1 th Secretary-General, to the Commonwealth 
Press Union Conference, Hong Kong, 16 Oct. 1990; For ' similar arguments see Reisman, Puert.Q 
Bic.~L.all!:L.t.h~, ... IIlt.~r.1l2t.iQllal. ... .P.r"o.c.~~~, pp. 39-~12; Duchacek, I~r.r.iw.r.ial .... Q.iJu~n~ioo ... ,Q,f. ... PQl.it..ic.~ .• 
pp. 205-225. 
15. Hannum and Lillich, "The Concept of i4utonOmy in International Law," pp. 253-254. 
16. Ibid., p. 218; The authors statl? tl ,,:~l; autonomy refers to .. independence of action on 
the internal or domestic level ••• but occa~~ii(mally power" to conclude international 
agreements concerning cultural or economic j;ii). tters also may reside with the au'tonomous 
entity" (ibid., pp. 216-218). 
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traditional definitions, they inclt.Klc a wide range o"f autonomy arrangements 
of some interest to international l " ili~ in their study, including the 
constituent parts of federal gov'etT:..'l.'!ntal systems, associated states, 
internationalised territor'ies and (.\,.I'Lonomous regions of unitary 
governmental systems. Harinum and Lil.lich's treatment concentrates on legal-
co_nstitutional fr'ameworks for autonolllY and compares their allocation of 
executive, legislative and judicial authority between the autonomous entity 
and the central government and the degree of international personality, 
police, security, land and natural j'Csources, social service, financial and 
economic authority vested in the fo:'mer. 17 
In his ~ub$equent comparative study of twenty-seven autonomy 
arrangements, Hannum goes on to suguest a right to autonomy or "less-than-
sovereign self-determination" is emet~ging: 
A new principle of internatioll~.ll law can be discerned in the 
interstices of contemporary u,,,!finitions of sovereignty, sel f-
determination, and the human I~ights of individuals and groups, which 
will support creative attempts to deal with conflicts over minority 
and majority rights before tll{,~y escalate into civil wars and demands 
for secession. This right to autonomy recognises the right of 
minority and indigenous commulli ties to exercise meaningful internal 
self-determination and control over their own affairs in a manner 
that is not inconsistent witl] tile ultimate sovereignty--as that term 
is properly understood--of th"~ state .18 
Hannum also goes beyond traditional 'textual analyses of legal-
constitutional autonomy frameworks to examine how these arrangements work 
in practice. His ,perceptive observa'tions about the similarities among the 
operational problems con"fronted by different autonomy systems form an 
17. Ibid.; The authors propose a formu l.:\ t..i on of the extensl VI? minimum governmental powers 
a ter r i tory needs to be regarded as fu 11 y Q,1..l ;"LIi'lOmOUS and self-govern ir:';, (see i bid. PP. 250-
251). 
18. Hannum, AYt.QtlQmY.:, pp. 473-474 ,; For a s ,~mil,:t.;· argument see Davis, "The Concept of 
Statehood and the status of Taiwan," tJp. 15·~ -1 .s7. 
important part of my analysis in Clh-!rJter 2. I supplement Hannum's 
c0inparative analysis with that of Yc;:.]m Dinst.ein, ~Jho concludes that 
autonomy arrangements are not stati~ but transitional and dynamic, 
..... .. .  :
propelled by the push and pull of c(irtral-local political conflict and 
influenced by both outside geopolitical and internal psychological 
fOTces. 19 
Several scholars taking nontradit.:ional approaches have focused on the 
20 
role of international participation in securing the internal effectiveness 
of autonomous entities, confronting tlcad on the state-centred traditional , 
views of world order. 20 One of the Llioadest of these is Michael Reisman and 
- . 
Lung-chu Chen"s study of the ' Chinesl.:! Communist-Nationalist dispute over 
Taiwan. Reisman and Chen conclude tilat Taiwan's status is not merely an 
internal Chinese affair, as both th8 Beijing and Taipei governments claim, 
but a matter of legitimate international concern for reasons that have 
implications for other disputes in\h)lving territor'ial communities and 
claims of autonomy, sovereignty anJ self-determination. They say the Taiwan 
case is inclusive, or of legitimate international concern, because it 
involves: the interpretation of a treaty; territorial conflict; threats to 
peace under the UN Charter; the principle o'f self-determination of peoples 
(even though its normative content remains controversial); the nationality 
of individuals and groups; the prin<:;iple of decolonisation (although its 
. close links with anti-colonialism ideology' also makes the normative content 
controversial) and the principle of the rights of non-self-governing 
peoples, including the right to pr'o';Jress toward self-determination and 
19. Voram Dinstein, "Au'tonomy," in Dinst;~,;-in, f:1Qd,~l;$.""Q,f.." Ayt.QnQmy., p. 295 
20. Chen and Reisman, "Who Owns Taiwan'? r·) Search for International ri ,tIe," Pp. 601-603. 
21 
respect for fundamental human rights . They argue that ultimate sovereignty 
lies with the indigenous people of '/;,he territory in question and, thus, 
11 genuine assessment of thei r conseri I.: is a pe remptory component of title .. 11 21 
: .. .. ... 
Reisman and Chen's arguments do dot resolve finally the lingering 
conflicts over fundamental internat i onal legal principles which often 
hamper the settlement of territorial disputes .. As Reisman has said 
elsewhere, success often depends on ~'orking around the conflict to 'find 
practical solutions which recognise the symbolic and substantive needs of 
all sides lA,lhile at the same time prvpelling the international system 
towards the goals of peace, stability and respect for human rights. 22 
Reisman more directly tackles the p/'3ctical side of securing effeC'tive 
autonomy arrangements in his study of Puerto Rico's associated state 
relationship with the United States .. He identifies several variables which 
influence the success of autonomy arrangements including the political and 
cultural identity of the autonomous community, its economic, political, 
legal and constitutional arrangemellts and its international status and 
participation. Paying particular at·tention to the latter two questions, he 
says: 
Many small territorial communities about the globe face the dilemma 
of Puerto 'Rico: to establish and maintain links with larger social 
and wealthier economic systems, to retain and develop an indigenous 
culture and to be e'ffective il'l that comprehensive lA,lorld political 
process which increasingly p8,'letrates and shapes much of local 
community life .... Puerto Rico is as influenced by world affairs as 
any other territorial communit.y, but has virtually no influence on 
the international decisions that may ' shape its destiny.23 
21. Ibid., pp. 648-660. 
22. see Reisman's comments in "settlems:';·n .l in the Middle Eas·t: What Would It Look LiJ<e and 
can We Get There from Here?" Ame.r.i~an .... S.Qr.;;.i~ti. .... Q.f .... lnt.er.nat..iQtl~.l. ... .b~W.i ..... l?r.Qr.;;e.e.d.ing~ .... Q.f. ... t..~ ... 2Zt..b 
ennyal._ .. ~:tin9 (1983) p. 275; See generally udvis, "Concept of Statehood and the Status of 
Taiwan . " 
23. Re i sman, l?Y~r.:tQ .... Bi~Q .... ~nd ..... t.he. .... .lnt.~r.o 9. 't..;"Qnal .... l?r.Q~e.~$..- pp. 2, 4. 
22 
Reisman observes that mobilising inter'national support for autonomy is 
hampered by the reality that not a] .~. dutonomy arrangements are likely to 
generate the same degree of internal.lonal concern. 24 However, debunking 
some of the myths surrounding the h~~toric criteria for state status used 
to assess eligibility to 'participate in the UN and International Court of 
Justice, he says participation in 'international organisations offers 
considerable scope for territorial communities to actively expand their 
internal effectiveness. The definition of ~states' used to regulate which 
territorial entities are allowed to participate in the two bodies has been 
broad and flexible. It has reflected u policy of "increased participation 
.... "':- . -
if not universality." Membership ha:.> not been based on whether the 
applicant was a state, but whether it and other members would behefit from 
its par'ticipation and whether "the ycneral principle of the universality of 
participation would be realised. 11 25 
Traditional conceptions of statehood and absolute sovereignty create an 
increasingly misleading picture of the actual operation of the world order 
and ignore more flexible conceptions which can aid in our search for 
effective autonomy arrangements. Scllolars such as lvo 0 .. Ouchacek have 
catalogued the myriad of ways in which the formal and informal 
international competence of substate territorial communities is 
24. Ibid., p. 10; Autonomy arrangements ~"i 11 generate more in·ternational scrutiny if the 
autonomous territory was acquired in a colonial setting and/or if its people are racially, 
religiously, linguistically or culturally dj fferent from the larger community. Reisman 
contends that an arrangement exhibiting a pa~l;,ern of continuing subordination demands 
international scrutiny. I f the people of th~'.' J .• s'rri tory support the arrangement, however, the 
world corrmunity will recognise the arrangejllLoIt, regardless of the extent of the powers 
remaining in local hands (ibid., Pp. 10, 18). 
25. Many of those communi ties admitted 1; ', the 19609 were small and poor, with economic, 
customs, nationality, defence and monetary lis's linking them closely to a larger state. While 
there were -legal' objections made, they W~/'8 all even~ually admitted without substantive 
change in their political, social or econorn:i.I.:: circumstances. The international community has 
also opened new channels of participation tLrough associate membership and observer status, 
both formal and informal (ibid., pp. 51,69-'70, 105). 
23 
increasing.~6 To ignore the ,potential external means of supporting 
autonomous substate entities is to lunore political and legal reality. 
According to Davis, who has studied tile problem of international 
: .. . .. : 
participation for both Taiwan and t: ,.~: future Hong Kong SAR, the internal 
and external means of securing autoll~)my cannot be separated in practice: 
lilt is iri the enforceability of the arrangement that the confidence of both 
parties and of concerned members of the international community ~,ill more 
likely be assured ..•. Characterising such arrangements as purely internal 
matters rende 'rs success unlikely and ~3incerity suspect. lt27 Davis identifies 
international linkages as one of sev8ral key ingredients needed to secure 
the success of the "one country, tV\I() systems" project in Hong Kong'";- the 
others being appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms for central-local 
conflict resolution and protection tor human rights such as free ,speech. 
The View from the People's Republic of China 
Preoccupation witl1 sovereignty, ullity and noninterference in the 
domestic affairs of independent states override Chinese official thinking 
about international law, putting tt,0ir conceptions of territorial autonomy 
squarely in the realm of traditional approaches .. AlthQugh, as mentioned 
briefly above, there is also a good case to be ' made for giving the Chinese 
government's vie"",s a place among pr-.:)blem·-solving, nontraditional 
approaches. 
China's conduct of foreign relations and its conception of international 
law centre on the "five principles o'f peaceful coexistence" among states: 
mutual respect for. territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, 
26. Duchacek, Ie.r.r..i..t.Qr.i.~l.",Qi.me.n$.iQO" .. Q.f.."I..: , ! ,ti.t..ic.~, P. 229. 
" . 
27. Davis, "Concept of Statehood and tIll} Status of Taiwan," PP. 156-157. 
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noninterference in each other's inti:i 'nal a'ffairs, equality and mutual 
benefit and peaceful coexistence. 28 ~lthough these echo the fundamental 
principles of sovereignty and noni(JI~(;rference found in the UN Charter and 
, ..... . .... ' 
other widely supported internationa:;. legal instruments, C~lina 's version o'f 
these concepts is grounded in a docLI'ine of absolute sovereignty which has 
b~en eclipsed by most ~~ester'n sch61~::.t~ship and custom in international law 
as well as some of China's own prac.tices. 29 Despite this, Shi Liang, a PRC 
legal expert, argues that "sov€t"eign'Ly means the supreme power inherent in 
a country in dealing with its interrJdl af'fairs and international affairs 
without being interfered with or restrained by another country."30 Although 
China "accepts that sove t~eignty does Ilot authorise a state to ignore 
generally accepted pr'inciples of in ternational law, what norms fall into 
that category remain controversial. China's rhetoric and often its 
behaviour continue to reflect a rigid doctrine of sovereignty, a 
char'acter'istic some scholars have attributed to the 11 humiliating 
infringements on sovereignty" Chin.) experienced in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, when Western pi)~~ers claimed extraterritorial and other 
rights in China. 31 Legal positivism t\nd China '$ experience as a developing 
26. Cohen and Chiu, 1: 116-119. 
29. Oavi s, C.QQ$.~it.!Jt..i.Qt.lal .. J;o.n.f.r.o.nt.at..i.o.n" .. "_in._.J:iQng .... KQng, pp. 130-131; Cohen and Chi u, 1: 98, 
607-610. 
30. New China News Agency, 21 Sept. 196.3, in .f.o.r.~i90_ ... 6._r..o.ad.c.~~t. .... ln.fo.r.ma~.:i.o.n .... S.~r.y.ic.~, 22 
Sept. 1963, El, cited in Kevin P. Lane, s.o.v~.r.I~.ignt.y' .... i\nd .... ~tb~ .... S.t.at.!J.~ .... QuQ.; .... .Ih~.J:i.i~t.Qr . .ical .... RO'Qt.~ 
Qf_.C.bit.la.~.~.L.Ho.ng .... KQt.lg .... eQlic.y. (SOU 1 der, Colo.; Ir}estvi ew , 1990), p. 97. 
31. Hungdah Chiu, "Comparison of the Nat.i.onalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal 
Treaties," in Jerome Alan · Cohen, ad., C.binr3.~.~~. " .. I?r.~c.t.ic.~ .... o..f .... lt.l:~~r.nat.iQO~l .... "l..~w.: ... J~o.m~ .... c.~$.~ 
S.!iMd.i~ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972) p. 243; Stuart R. Schram, 
"[)ecentralization in a Unitary State: Theon·- dnd Practice, 1940-1964, in Stuart R. Schram, 
eel., Ih~","s.c.Qp.e. .... o..t ... s't.a.t.e. .... p.o.w.e.r ..... in .... C.b.inf.1, (LondclI'l: School of Oriental and African Studies, 
1985), p. 81 • 
. ' " ., ~ " 
. . 
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~ocialist country in an internatiol1~:\l legal system largely dominated by 
Western capitalist powers have also been influential. 32 
Consistent with this traditional view of sovereignty in their 
: ... ... ... 
international dealings, the Communi:.d. Cllinese authorities have adopted a 
unitary political system 'internally and emphasise the need for a strong 
central government. However, the ~ractical need to maintain the support of 
numerous etllnic minority groups and diverse regions in the 1930s and 1940s 
led Mao Zedong to speak of federalism and grant the minorities the ·right to 
secede in the 1931 constitution. 33 i~evet"theless, after tlleir victory over 
the nationalists in 1949, the Communist leaders rejected federalism, 
... -,,:- .-
nation~l self-determination and sec8ssion. "Although in many domains of 
political and economic work a high degree o'f decentralisation, o'r of 
devolution of power and responsibility, Ilas prevailed in China during most 
of the period since 1949, the unitary nature of the Chinese state has been 
forcefully asserted, and any hint of the federalism which prevails (in 
theory) in the Soviet Union utterly t'epudiated. "34 
still, the Communist government recognised the utility of combining 
national "unification and local exp'~diency," to use Mao's words. 35 It set 
up regional autllorities that were both local power organs and agents of the 
central government and granted some autonomy to the ethnic minority 
32. Andrew J. Nathan, "Sources of Chinese nights Thinking," in Edwards, R. Randle, Louis 
Henkin and Andrew J. Nathan, t:1y.fMn .... B.i9h:t~ ... jD ..... r::Qf)t.~mp.Q.r.~r.y. .... C.bina (New Yor~<: Columbia 
lkliversity. Press, 1986), pp. 126-133. 
33. Andrew J. Nathan, "Political Rights in Chinese Constitutions," in ibid.~ pp. 99-00; 
Schram~ "Decentralisation in a Unitary State," pp. 82-83; Hannum, Aut.Qnomy.1' p. 420. 
34. Schram, "Decentralisa·tion in a Unit<:\("y' State," p. 81; See also Hannum, A!J:tOOQIllY. •• p. 
420. 
35. B~rn.i.n .... r.i..b.a.Q, 4 Dec. 1949, cited. in ~ .. (:hram, "Decen·tralisation in ca Unitary state," p. 
93 
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territories. 36 However, China's reco£tnition of the minority groups' "right 
to autonomy" and "to freely develop their dialects and languages and ...... 
preserve or' reform their' customs, I'.,.~bits and religious beliefs" is al~Jays 
tempered by its parallel assertion \.:f tbe state!ls right "to take effective 
measures to assist economic and cultural development in regions inhabited 
by_ minor'ity nationalities ...... and resolutely oppose all words and deeds 
undermining national unity and equality .. "37 The 1982 PRC Constitution 
stresses the unitary, centralised I"Idture of the Chinese state, saying "all 
the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's 
Republic of China" and all local governments are "administrative organs of 
- . 
state under the unified leadership v-F and subordinate to, the state 
Council .. "38 Thus, China's limited recognition of a Cright' to autonomy is 
subject to sweeping limitations by the state which render it largely 
meaningless in terms of real self-government. 39 
The 1982 Constitution also provides for establishment of "special 
administrati ve regions ...... prescrib,:!d by law enacted by the National 
People's Congress in light o'f the specific conditions .. "40 Chinese leaders 
first spoke of setting up an SAR to address the Taiwan reunification 
question and later applied the ide.] t.o Hong Kong and Macau in the I'one 
36. Ibid., P. 94. 
37. "On Questions of Party History. Resolu tion on Ce'rtain Ques·tions in the History of OUr 
Party Since the Founding of the People's R~~i.Jblic of China," (Adopted by the Sixth Plenary 
session of the 11th Ce-ntral Committee of th..:: Comrnunis·t Party of China on 27 June 1981), 
printed in 6.~iji.n9 ... .Be.y..iew,. 6 July 1981, p. :;;3; See also Hannum, A!,ttoo.QmY.~ p. 422. 
38. PRC, CQn$.t..i.:t!Jt..i.on .... o.f.. ... t.~ .... P.~Q.P.l~.~.$. .... b~.p.!,I .. b.lic. .... o.f.. .. Ch.in~ (1962), Preambl e, Art. 4, 104 J 
108, 110 (hereafter PRC, c.OO$.t.,it.Yt.iP-fl); For a.11 English version of the constitution see 
6.~i.j.i.n9 ... .B~y.i.~J ~ 27 Dec. 1982, pp. 1. 0-29; See a 1 so HannulO, B~.ttQnQmY.,. pP. 421-122. 
39. Hannum, A!Jt.oo.Qf'oY,. pp. 426-427; Se€~ a.lBo Nathan, "Pol i tical Rights in Chinese 
Constitutions," pp. 99-100, 104, 116-119. 
40. PRC, Co.o.e.:t..it.!Jt..i.o.n, A'''t. 31. 
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countr'y, two systems" schemes elaboj"'.:rted in the Sino-British and Sino-
Portuguese Joint Declarations .. 41 Th·._ "one country~ tlNO systems" policy is 
in some respects a continuation of c:.ina's contradictory approach to 
autonomy adopted for ethnic minorit/ regions .. In theory, however, China is 
offering Macau and Hong Kong consick~j'ably more self-government than its 
autonomous regions, provinces, municipalities or special economic zones 
enjoy .. For China, the return of Hon~ Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty 
has always been a question of resoJ, 'ling lithe inherent tension between a 
claim to sovereignty over territory that is legitimately considered to be 
Chinese, and the strong incentives tllat exist against pressing the 
claim .. ~42 Although often vociferously declaring the P9rtuguese and British 
presence in Macau and Hong Kong ill~gal, China for years did not make their 
recovery an immediate goal .. Anxious to be regarded a responsible actor in 
international affairs, in constant need o'f foreign economic and political 
assistance and unwilling to give up the economic, technological and other 
benefits channeled to it through HOI ,l~ Kong, China has historically refused 
to press its claim of absolute sovt:t't::!ignty in either territory to its 
logical conclusions .. 43 Therefore, tht.! "one country, two systems" scheme 
embodies both China's desire for unity, central government control and 
absolute sovereignty and its recogni,tion of the practical need for local 
41. "The Nine-Point Proposal: one Year (-) ft-er," 6.e.ijin9 ... J3e.Y.i.~w, 11 Oct. 1982, pp. 19-20; 
Davis, "Concept of Statehood and the Status 1--' F Taiwan," pP. 136-137; Weng, "The Hong Kong 
Mode 1 of ~ one Country, Two Systems'," pp. 73 - :/4; Lane, SQy.er.~.i.gnt.y. .... 9n!:.t ... t.h~ .. .. St.~:t:Y$. .... Qy.Q.. pp. 
86-87. 
42. Lane, $.Qy.~r.~.i.gnt.¥' .... Q.no ..... t.h~ .... S.:t.~t.!J$. .... Q!JQ, p. 7. 
43. Ibid. pp. 7-8, 36, 101-102, ' 104, 123 ,: Cohen and Chiu, f?e.Q.Q.l~.~.:$. .... C.h.in~, 1: 373-376, 380, 
364-385. 
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autonomy and limited sovereignty"4/~ The Joint Declarations, themselves 
international agreements limiting C;,.i.na's sovereignty, give Macau and Hong 
Kong considerable powers of seJ:f-gc>" ,;rnment in all matters but defence and 
foreign affairs and recognise their' need to participate autonomously in the 
international arena. In Taiwan's case, Beijing has also promised the island 
the right to maintain its own armed forces. 45 
Because of these characteristics, some scholars have found striking 
af'fini ty between this autonomy schellle and nont radi tional app roaches: to 
autonomy .. Davis characterises Hon£J :(ong's resulting status as intermediate 
between associated statehood and var-i.ous internal autonomy models which, 
"at least on paper, may offer a very creative fr'amework for participation 
by territories not to be af'forded tl '1(~ full status of statehood but 
requiring a higller degree of autonulilY .. "4·6 Rlloda Mushkat challenges the 
validity of the traditional notion ~')'f "indivisible sovereignty" to argue 
that Hong Kong and Macau's future autonomy is not merely a domestic Chinese 
issue :4·7 ' 
The key attribute of sovereignLy is not necessarily active 
participation in internation..11 life but rather the state's 
~constitutional independence' (in the sense that its constitution is 
not part of a larger constitutional arrangement). Indeed, states may 
choose 'to opt out of international life ..... or they may find it 
difficult to play an international role because of refusal of other 
states to have dealings with them ..... yet their sovereignty or 
constitutional independence i:3 not thereby a·f·fected .. By the same 
token, it , is evident that international participation, including 
membership in international organisations, is not limited to 
44. Davis, C.QO$.t.i:t.y :t.iQt.l~l ..... C.o.n.fr.ont.at.io.n, pp. 130'-131; See generally, J.Y.S. Cheng, "Hong 
Kong: The Challenge of the Future," A~.i.~ .... P.i.,\c..lJi~ .... C.o.r.or.o!Jn.it.Y.: (Winter 1986), no. 31, pp. 19-44. 
45. Davis, "The Concept of Sta'tehood and ~he St.atus of Taiwan," p. 136. 
46. I bid., p ~ 131. 
47. Rhoda t1ushJ<at, .. Foreign, Ext.e·rnal i.\~ld Defence Affai,"s," in Wesley-Srni th and ChE'n. Ih~ 
f3.a$.ic. .... La.w .... a.nd ..... H.Qng .... Ko.ng.~.$. .... .f.!J:t.y.r.~ , p • 267. 
sovereign states."". constitutional independence does not mean a 
completely free internal or e;\ t:t-3rnal l1ancL 48 
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Nevertheless, Beij ing authoritic~~~ r'epeatedly stress the delegated nature 
of the local autonomy granted the s{;; ~ S and the :3upremacy o"f China '3 unity, 
: .. .. ... 
sovereignty and territorial integrit.y: 
First of all, China" must maintain the basic principle of sa"feguarding 
its sovereignty, unity and tel't'itorial integrity while establishing 
special administrative regio'n:j" The country must be united and there 
is only" one China--·the People's Republic" China is a single-system 
socialist country, not a fedei~l state. It will exercise sovereignty 
over the special administrative regions,,49 
Autonomy takes second place to sovcl-eignty in many provisions of the Joint 
Declarations and Hong Kong Basic Lav\l .. When the Chinese leadership perceives 
itself. threatened by "Hong Kong or Macau's autonomy, as it did aftei the 
Beijing Massacre o"f 4 June 1989, it has tended to adopt a defensive posture 
based on "its traditionally rigid doctrine of sovereignty.50 Therefore, 
although an unconventional solution with a great deal of potential if China 
proves flexible, the .. one country, t~·~o systems" concept does not appear to 
go far enough to accommodate the political, economic and social diversity 
of various parts of the contemporary Chinese world. 51 The scheme itself 
demonstrates the difficulties of trying to resolve the inherent conflicts 
between traditional and nontraditional conceptions of sovereignty and 
autonomy. 
48. Mushkat, "Foreign, External and Deh:YIc:e Affairs," p. 254. 
49. Wang Shuwen, "Special Regions Leave So~ialism Unchanged," E!~.i.iin9 ... .B~_v.i~w.,~ 15 Oct .• 
1985, pP. 17-16; See also Peng Zhen, "Report. on the Draft of the Revised Constitution of the 
People's Republic of China," S.~ij.i.ng .. " .R~v..i~w. _·" 13 Dec. 1982, p. 20. 
so. See generally Michael C. Davis, "1 i.':~i ·I.:,nmen in Hong Kong" (Papel' presen"ted a"t the 19th 
Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, Taipei, June 1990). 
51. Davis, "Concept of Statehood and tht.~~ Status of Taiwan," PP. 158-159. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TOWARDS A DYNAMIC ANALYT.lCAL FRAMEWORK FOR AUTONOMY 
The Chinese authorities ar'e by n(: .neans tile first government to make a 
compromise offer of autonomy' to a d ~~!tinctive community whi6h would 
pr'obably just as soon be left alone. In tile last century, political regimes 
hav~ " used ,autonomy arrangements to placate demands or potential demands for 
secession and as alternatives to complete independence for colonial, 
mandate or trust dependencies, terr'itorially based, unassimilated 
minorities and conquered enemies partially divided up in peace 
settlements .. 1 Nor are " all tile dange,"ous contradictions between sovereignty 
and autonomy inherent in 11 one countl~Y, two systems" unique .. Many autonomy 
arrangements are transitional .. Many have broken down, either when the 
larger community attempts. to absorb the autonomous entity or when the 
autonomous entity tries to separate t o form an independent state of its 
own. 2 The chronic ~nstability and 1 0 55 of life in Eritrea, soutllern Sudan, 
Northern Ireland, Palestine and Sri Lanka are cinly a few examples of tile 
war 'and violations of human rigllts ~ llat often accompany the ~ollapse of 
1 .. Friedlander, "Autonomy and the Thirtc ' :'j'J Colonies," p. 136. 
2. The Romanian~ Greek and Bulgarian aut~)'IOmOU9 entities formed ~'Jithin ,the ottoman Empire 
after the Crimean War subsequently broke wilh links with the empire completely (Zvi Yavetz, 
"Autonomous Arrangements in the Ball<an Stat(~s ," in Dinstein, t1QQ.e:l.$. .... Q.f .... A!J.:totlQmy. ... p. 92); The 
Thirteen American cOlonies rejected their iJ.U tonomous status within the Sri tish Empire and, 
after a bloody war ,formed their own natiotl '·state. The colonies had enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy from the British motherland since UI12ir founding and the colonists increasingly saw 
themselves as different from other Englishmc,l. Eventually, British policy ,infringed upen the 
autonorflOUs' governance the colonists had CO/ilL"' to regard as their own. They demanded more 
.autonomy t~n Britain was willing to give .:::u.d conflict became inevitable (Friedlander, 
"Autonomy and the Thirteen Colonies," p. 1(1/). 
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autonomy agr~ements.3 Even those au ~onomy agreements that appear to work 
well--the Aland Islands in Finlancl) ri t3mel in Lithuania) Ca rpathian Ruthenia 
in Czechoslovakia, Greenland ' under I k"tlne Rule and South Tyrol in Italy, for 
, ..... ... ... 
example--have not been without conf .:,icts. 4 Mindful of this poor record, 
some scholars have been deeply pessimistic about the long-term ability of 
autonomy arrangements to protect t 'he interests o-f distinct territorial 
communities: "Throughout modern history in both theory and pr'8ctice, 
autonomy has been, at best, inherently suspect. In those few historical 
instances when it was actually atte',III)ted, autonomy either worked very badly 
or not at a11 .. "5 The ideological conrlict inherent in "one country, two 
systems" increases the risk of conflicts and the price of failure. 
Despite the potential for probleflis, minority communities continue to 
demand and central governments to elllploy autonomy arrangements to resolve 
conflicts, impelling us to find better diagnostic tools for engineering 
~uccessful systems. Several studies falling into the category of 
nontraditional approaches to autonolflY discussed above offer useful 
observations about what has made po.rLicular autonomy arrangements work and 
others fall apart. I have gathered t~leir observations together to construct 
3 .. "Nothing better illustrates the almost ,insurmoun·table di fficulties faced by modern 
pluralistic societies in dealing with recah::i t,,'at)'t minorities on the transnational level than 
the futile attempts , to grant autonomy to dis3ident popula'tions .... It has been particularly 
frustrating for democratic regimes when mi""j(i ,ty rejectionists have turned to terror violence 
as their ultimate political weapon, with Ir6'land, Spain and Israel the preeminent 
contemporary examples. The Northern Irish p[,rliament is indefinitely slIspended, home rule has 
failed to end Basque ext,'emisrn, and the Camp David accords face an uncertain future. In each 
case autonomy has been the chosen method of c(Jnfl ict--resolu,tion, and despite offers of--or 
attempts at--sel f-government, conflict contiill~es" (Friedlander, "Autonomy and the Thirteen 
Colonies," p. 135). 
4. Yavetz, "Autonomous Arrangements in the Balkan S'ta·tes," p. 92; For bacl<9round on 
Greenland, ,the Aland 131ands and South Tyrol ;)oe respectively notes ' 19, 21 and 65 on pp .. 19; 
21 and 65 of the present study. 
5. Friedlander, "AIJtonomy and the Thirt8,;-n Colonies," p. 136. 
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a comparative framet.oJorl< 'for analysir;g efforts to build autonomy 'for post-
1999 Macau .. 
These studies suggest that, desp~·. :, ,(~ thei r many distinct qualities, 
, .... . .. 
autonomy arrangements confront some common problems flowing from the 
central-local conflicts inherent in the agreements .. A few specific 
ingr'edients appear'" to be common to ' tile more enduring arrangements and ar-e 
the foundation of the analytical framework .. Internally, they concern the 
cultural and political identity of ti,e autonomous entity, mechanisms for 
securing human rights and settling central'-local disputes and political 
institutions and political participation .. External factors, including 
geopolitical forces and evolving il'l Lc:r'national legal nornls regarding 
international participation, are also important .. Territorial communities 
increasingly look to the global society for backing for some sort of 
special internal status and sometilfl(~s succeed in getting it .. Note the 
recent attempts by the Soviet Baltic states and the Iraqi Kurds to gain 
international support for their cl~im3 .. 
These four ingredients offer potential internal and external means to 
accommodate competing sovereignty ai-Id autonomy claims within Macau's 
autonomy arrangements .. By pinpointing the common problems of autonomy 
processes and fleshing out some of U,e essential components of successful 
efforts, this study also tries to offer some fruitful starting points for 
examination o'f the Hong Kong SAR and otl1er autonomy systems .. 
Autonomy (lS a Process 
My framework begins with the premise that an autonomy agreement is not a 
static institutional and political al~rangement nor a final solution to 
conflicts involving discrete communities .. Rather, it is the beginning point 
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of a dynamic process, the ·first in ~J ::>eries of political bargains between 
central and local actors who, jockoying to protect their o~}n interests as 
environmental factors change, shape and alter the original autonomy 
agreement. In doing so, they either ienew it in some new form or cause it 
to break down .. 6 This cent'ral-1ocal LJa rgaining, which includes related 
po~itical con·flict within the dUtOi'lUI1l0US entity, provides the dynamic pulse 
of the arrangement. Dynamics which lean too much towards one party can be 
destabilising because they are likeiy to undermine the willingness ,of other 
parties to renew the autonomy bargain. 7 Thus, enduring autonomy agreements 
include 'institutions, processes and dttitudes that can maintain a balance 
. :~ ,-
between the power of central and lo~al political actors. To find that 
balance, the autonomy system should seek the support of all major groups by 
designing "a social institutional blend o·f symbols and practices" that meet 
the minimum inter'ests of all key ?ctors while advancing broader goals of 
peace and stability and respect for human rights .. 8 Viewing autonomy 
arrangements as ongoing bargaining pr-ocesses is particularly useful for 
stu9ying an arrangement invol ving tll(;~ PRC, whose leade rs 11 do not treat the 
signing of a contract as signaling cl completed agreement; rather they 
conceive of the relationship in longer and more continuous terms, and they 
6. This notion of autonomy arrangements as processes of bargaining is borrowed from 
studies of federalism which analyse federal political systems as processes impelled by the 
social forces behind the political process lather than focusing exclusivelY on the 
consti tutional documents (see Uma o. El ear. u, f~Q.~r.~l..i~m .... ,~m,d ... .Mat.iQO .... 6.YildiOg'.M ... Ih!;L,Mig~r .. i~n 
.ExQe.r.ie.nc.~, .... 1.2S.~:::.l.9.6.~ [Elms Court, Devon: AI .. t.:·I~JI" H. Stockwell, 1977J pp. 19-21). 
7. For a similar pe,..spective related to democratisa·tion see Guillermo O'Donnell and 
Phil ippe C. Sctyni tter, "Tentative Conclusioils about Uncertain Dernocl'acies~" in Gui llermo 
O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurenl€' Whitehead, ed~., Tr.~n$.it.iQt.H? ..... f.r.Qfll .... Ayt.,bo.r.it.ar.i.~n 
BYl~,; ..... P.n~~P.e.c.:t~ ..... fQr .. _.Q~rllQ!;,r.Mc.y. (Baltimore an (.I London: Joms Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
part 4, p. 36; Dankwart A. Rusto~J, "Tl'ansit~c.;lls to Democracy: Tow~u"'d a Dynamic Model, ,. 
c.o.mp.ar.a:ti.y.~ .... eQ.l.i:tic.~ 2 (Apr i 1 1970): 3S 1 . 
8. Reisman'$ comments in "Settlemen't lI'l Che' Middle East," p. 275. 
will not hesitate to suggesting {si(:] modifications on the heels of an 
ag reement . " 9 
The Role of A .. ! tonomy Ag reements 
Much of the conflict inherent in autonomy processes is fuelled by the 
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original autonomy agreement itself .. Parties to disputes involving distinct 
communities often use mushy legal dl~fting to bring about an agreement 
despite their failure to resolve major points of contention. Therefore, the 
wording of the resulting autonomy accords is frequently vague and subject 
to different, even contradictory, il;·terpretations. Central authorities use 
it to justify its encroachment into the affairs of the autonomous entity 
while actors in the autonomous entity use the same document to defend their 
claims for greater autonomy. Al thou~;h this haziness facilitates completion 
of the initial accord, the resul till(J legal document is a troublesome 
vehicle with which to resolve the pr)litical conflicts likely to arise in 
implementing the accord .10 For inst JI'lce, the 1978 Camp David accord 
prdvided transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza based on 
"full autonomy" for the areas' Pale::.>tinian inhabitants pending 
determination of the territories' "final status. However, it used language 
so vague and symptomatic of such dC8D divisions that implementation proved 
9. Lucien Pye, C.hio~$.~ .... c.Qr.om~r.c.i~1.. ... Ne.gQ:t:.i~1:.in9 .... S.t.Y.le. (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn 
. and Hain, 1982), pp. xi -xi i, cited in Ian sco·tt, f?Ql.i:t.ic.a..l .... C.ba.o9~ .... ~nd ..... C.r.i$..i~ .... Q.f. .... I...e.g.i:t.imac.Y._.in 
tiQ09 .... I5.Q09 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Pn:-~~~~~ 1969), p. 195. 
10. Dinstein,- "Autonomy," pp. 296-300; I, ', the case of the Cook Islands, for example, the 
legal instruments setting up their associatc'd state links with New Zealand have been 
criticised for not clearly specifying the l'~vul of aid New Zealand was required to give its 
former colony, nor the functions of the New 1.0aland au·thorities in the new arrangement (Steve 
Hoadley, "Cook Islands and Niue: Models of FI (~'e Association" (chapter 3 of his forthcoming 
book Ih~.,."S.Q!.l:th.J?gc.i.f.i..c. .... fQr.~i9n .... A.f.fa.i.r,~ .... H~r)lJ..l~~!y.·k [Sydney: AlIen and Unwin, 1992J, pp. 44-45). 
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impossible .. !! The inevitable surfa(,.LIHJ of problems unforeseen at the time 
of the original autonomy negotiaticl.8 also adds to the inadequacy of the 
initial accords. Thus, the If legal i; .... ) t rument which ordains autonomy can be 
of momentous significance in adjLJst. ~:~ rjg tile scales of the balance of power 
between the central and local authoi"i.ties ....... But the text of the 
constitutive document cannot~ by itself, settle all outstanding legal 
'issues .. If 12 Rather, it is a legal sn~pshot of the political power balance at 
a particular moment in history .. It pl-~opels the autonomy process forward as 
the various parties struggle to Shdj)C! the process in their favour .. 
Different ensembles of institutionnl arrangements and political and 
economic power relationships will tend t.o favour some parties over others .. 
The analytical task becomes one of dissecting the original agreement in 
order to anticipate the direction in which the transition is likely to move 
and the probable consequences .. 13 
One of the more troublesome imp(~cisions in autonomy agreements lies in 
I 
, I 
the vague definitions many gi ve fo,' foreign affai rs and defence powe rs, 
which are characteristically reserv8d to the government of the larger 
polity. The problem does not bode ~~1211 for Macau .. The terms of the Sino-
Portuguese Joint Declaration grants authority over these areas to the PRC 
central government but does not clearly articulate the limits of its 
authority. 
In the associated state arrangelw2ilts that linked several islands in the 
Eastern Caribbean with the United Kingdom under the West Indies Act of 
11. Mayer Gabay, ilLegal Aspects of the C. .. UlilJ David Frame~"ork for Peace in Relation to the 
Autonomy Proposal, 11 in Dinstein, t.1o.Q,~l~ .... Q.t .. ..I,: iiJ.,~Qo.o.r.oy., pp. 255, 259. 
12. Ibid., p. 296. 
13. Comments by Larry Fabian in "Settl'~'j'j; '; 11 t in the Middle East," p. 274. 
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1967, disputes over Britain 's ambi~JI. <.Jusly phrased foreign affairs and 
defence prerogatives contributed to ;.;.,everal islands opting out of the 
arrangemen~~.14 In addition, the act Jid not provide for judicial decision 
when conflicts of opinion or doubtft:1. cases cropped up .. Britain was in a 
position to unilaterally · determine lAjhether a matter fell into these t~JO 
pol~cy areas. 1S This proved to be m0tB than a theoretical problem when, In 
1969 , British military and police fv! 'ces intervened in Anguilla following 
popular unrest related to the islafh-j's demands for more autonomy ~Jithin the 
three-island St.Kitts-Nevis-Anguill~ associated state. The British 
justified theit .. action, which had been at tile request of associated state 
authorities-; lAJith a very wide intellJIAetation of its reserved powers over 
external affairs. 16 British authorities also took advantage of these 
imprecisions in the legislation to pass the Anguilla Act of 1971, which 
made Anguilla '5 de facto position 11Idr-e like that of a Crown colony, and 
then refused to accept the island's :3ecession from the associated state 
14. I saac Dookhan, A ... .P.Q$.1!._ . .Er.o~nc..i.p.a1!iQn ... .t.U.$:t;.Qry .... Q.f. ... :th~ .... ~~:t ..... l.nQi~~ (Har low, Essex: Longman , 
1975), p. 129; William C. Gilmore, "Legal Pe(spectives on Associated Statehood in the Eastern 
Caribbean," V.ir.ginia .... J.Q!Jr.nal .... Q.f __ l.n:t~r.n~:tiQn~1. .... l..aw 19 (Spring 1979), pp. 496-497. 
Under the accord that led to the West lndies Act, the British Caribbean territories of 
Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, st. Lucia, Grenada, Dominica and St. Vincent were to have 
"virtually complete autonomy in their intern.:.!l affairs based on a Westminster-style . 
constitutional model which could be amended locally" and "the power ·to terminate ·the status 
of association unilaterally and move on to full sovereign statehood should they so desire," 
while the U.K. would be responsible for "cit.izenship, external affairs and defence" .(Gilrnore, 
"Legal Perspectives on Associated Sta·tehood in the Caribbean," pp. 492-493). 
15. Additional uncertainty stemmed from the British parliament's freedom to makes laws for 
the associated states providing it insel'ted ;.l clause speci fying "expressly" that a law was to 
apply to one or more of the associated stat8"~ because of the government's responsibilities 
"relating to defence and external affairs." 8ritish authorities retained the power to use 
Orders in Council to change the laws of the JAssociated states even to the extent of 
"derogating from the provisions of the constitution ••• relating to fundamental rights and 
freedoms" if it was required in the exerciG~' of one of its reSpOnsibilities. The courts were 
speci fically prevented from playing any me<..ilingful role in de·termining when such an occasion 
had legitimately arisen (Gilmore, "Legal Pel· ·~~pectives on Associated Statehood in the 
Caribbean," pp. 514, 521-525). 
16. Ibid., pp. 521-525. 
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arrangement on tile grounds it lacked the consent of the multiisland 
associated state government .. 1? The Ii'd,lateral exercise of authority by the 
British government helped weaken th(~ 'fundamental assumptions on which the 
autonomy bargain had been made and (.;(Altributed to the decision of several 
islands to opt out of the ' associati~), J arrangement .. 18 
. The extent of the defence and f~jDign affairs powers reserved for the 
government of the larger polity ha~) .]lso proven problematic in the 
Greenland Home Rule arrangemt~nt .. 19 The agreement assigns. the Danish 
government sole authority over secut'ity and defence matters in Greenland, 
issues of major concern because of NnTO's defence interests In the Arctic .. 
However, in practice, defence and security matters overlap considerably 
with policy areas assigned to the GI·(.~enland government such as 
environmental protection, fishing iri the territory, hunting, agriculture 
and reindeer' breeding .. As a result, Oanish authori ties have developed 
17. Ibid., pp. 526-529. 
18. By 1979, Gr€:'nada, Dominica and St. LUt.::ia had ended their associated state linl<s wi ·th 
Britain while st. Vincent was on the way ·to Jwing so and st. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla seamed also 
headed in that direction. The islands also i i icreasingl y foundtha·t their economic and 
political interests collided with Britain's i.n other international spheres. Regional 
integration movements in the Caribbean and t: ~€:~ EC and changes in 8ritain's ci·tizenship and 
nationality laws restricting the ability of islanders to exercise citizenship rights in 
8ri tain contributed to the breakdo~"n ·too (ill~d., pp. 552-554). 
19. Approximately 41,000 of the island'~5J,000 people are ethnic Inuit born in Green!and, 
which is located in the North American Arctic and is a former Dan; . .:)h colony. Denmark's 
Greenland Home Rule Act of 1978 was approvc·J ul a referenf!urn in Greenland in 1979. It 
gradually transferred control over, in:t~r. rJ~: . \ . .;1, organisation of Home Rule and local 
government, taxation, inteYilal transpertati'..Jd, fishing, hunting, agriculture, reindeer 
breeding, environmer-""al protection and coun1,;(y planning, commerce, labour, economic 
development, social wel fare, education, cul-l.,ql'al affairs and housing to a directly elected 
quasi-parliamentary local Home Rule governfll~-;·,rt~ . Danish and Greenland Home Rule au·thorities 
share control over natural resource matters. foreign relations are reserved to the Danish 
government, but Greenland authori ties are C::~", s'.ll ted and enjoy some delegated authori·ty. In 
1985, the island withdrew from the EEC foll(.):;':ing a local refet~endum while Denmat"k remained a 
member. Danish aid accounts for about 75 per·~,~~nt of Greenland's public revenues (see 
generally Frederik Harhoff, "Secut~ity and P':Jlicy Aspects of the Arctic: A Greenlandic 
Perspective," 2 parts, Y.i:t~:::6.!Jll~:t.i.n, 1989; iJem, "Greenland's Withdrawal from the European 
Communities," c.QmmO'tl ... .Mar.~~:t. ..... L.aw .... B~v.i~w 20 (1083): 13-33; Foighel, "A Framework for Local 
Autonomy: The Greenland Case," in Dinstein, J~iQQe.l~ .... Q.f. ... Ay:tQnQflly', pp. 31-52; Hannum, ~.ltQnQflly', 
pp. 341-346). 
formal and informal mechanisms for ~:~,.rforming the Home Rule gove rnment and 
consulting with it on defence and s~Gurity questions. Nonetheless, the 
vagueness ~~mains in the accord and I~here is no constitutional obligation 
for Danish authorities to use some \. 1'1 ; these consul tati ve mechanisms. 20 
Troublesome as these ambiguities can be, they are the word games that 
allow the disputing pa rties to reacl J an autonomy ag reement in the fi rst 
place. Under the right circumstance , they can provide useful legal 
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flexibility. The Guarantee Act of lY22, which first set out the autonomous 
status of Finland's Aland Islands, is one such example. 21 The act was 
typical of autonomy agreements in tlldt the language it used to diviqe 
legislative powers between the centr' ... ,l and local authorities gave rise to 
differences of opinion and disputes over interpretation. Initially, the 
rulings of the Finnish President, b~cked by the Finnish Supreme Court, 
usually reflected the idea that Ala fld's autonomy was exceptional and, in 
i 
20. Har-hoff t "Security and Policy ASpeC ~~:i of ·the Arctic," part 2, pp. 1, 16, 18. 
i 
21. The Aland Islands--genet'ally called {)}dnd--are a 6,500-island archipelago located in 
the nOI'thel'n Baltic Sea between Sweden and Finland, an area of historically strategic 
importance to both Sweden and Russia. S~\}eden ceded Aland, an ancient Swedish province 
inhabited by people of Swedish language and ('ul"ture, to Russia as part of Finland in 1609. 
When Finland declared independence from Russia in 1917 it claimed sovereignty over the 
islands. However, ·their local inhabitants wailted to reunite with Sweden. The League of 
Nations Council was called to decide the dis~ute and awarded Aland to Finland provided 
preservation of the local people's Swedish l ~~ilgUage, culture and traditions were guaranteed 
and the islands were neutral and remained d(:.;':ililitarised. The decision was supplemented with a 
treaty between Sweden and Finland concerning implementation of the 9Ual~antees. Under the 
current Autonomy. Act, which will soon be amG': .ded to transfer more authori ty to Aland, the 
national cons·titution, foreign affairs (wi tli some restrictions) and defence, postal, customs 
and monetary services, the law courts, penal ~ode and roost aspects of civil law are outside 
the competence of the islands' authorities. ihe Aland parliament has excllJsive authority over 
education, social affairs, police, health and local industry. It can levY provincial taxes, 
although Aland alS9 receives monies through U)I? central government. Lal"ld ownership is 
restricted to Aland regional citizen$, who an;' also exempt from compUlsory Finnish military 
service (see generally Gunnar Jansson, Henril< Gustafssoo, Bjarne Henriksson, Anders 
FaQerlund, Lars Ingmar Johansson, "Aland: f1 j·j0del of Ten~i torial Autonomy" [Repor·t 
commissioned by the Human Rights Project Gr 0up, a Soviet-American nongovernmental 
organisation promoting rule of law and derno('''c.rtic ins·titutions in the USSR, 199OJ; HE:"nril< 
Gustafsson, "The Aland Islands," in Erik Al·i.~I·dt, Nils Andren, EI~ik J. Friis, Gylfi P. 
Gislason, Sten Sparre Nilson, Henry Valen t (i ..:intz Wendt and Folmel~ Wisti, eds., t.:{ordic 
O_e.mQCr.a~y.~" ... Id.e.a.$.., ..... I~ml.e.~ .... and ..... ln$.t.it.!J:t.ioo$. ..... il} .... I.-!.o.lit.ic.$.., ..... .Ecooomy..I ..... Ed.Yca:t.ioo.I ..... SQc.ia.l""and. 
!:!Jlt.Yr.al ... .A.f.fair.$. .... o,f. ... O'e.nmar.:k.L ... finl.~nd .. JI . .... lc.~lQ,nd. . 1 ..... Nor.:way. .... ~n~L .. S.~de.n ( Co pen hagen: Oet Dansl<e 
Se lskab, 19~H) pp. 201-207; Hannum, AY.t.oOQWY.. PP. 370-375). 
39 
cases of uncertainty, priority should be given to national legislation. The 
Alanders, by contrast, felt dispute~ over interpretation should be guided 
by the pri.nciple that the original ~ J urpose of the law was to give Aland the 
broadest autonomy possible .. , Despite these initial differences, the Finnish 
government has since agreed to sevci~ul modi'fications to the original 
Guarantee Act .. Each has made the division of authority less ambiguous, 
responded to new problems the legislation did not foresee and, overall, 
altered the arrangement in favour o'f ttle Alanders .. 22 
The original framework has proven flexible enough to permit change 
and evolution as the times have demanded and this in turn has 
fostered a spirit of dialogu(,! und compromise between the Finnish and 
Aland authorities .. 23 .,".-
Under what conditions do the parties perceive vagueness as flexibility 
rather than a recipe for unending conflict? The next section attempts to 
answer this question .. 
Community Identity 
Part of the answer lies in subje~tive variables related to the 
autonomous community's sense of identity with both its own political 
community and the larger polity tO ' which it is attached .. If an autonomy 
proces~ is to work, it requires the support of the community that must live 
under its dictates as well as of tlll~ political authorities in the larger 
territorial community. Dinstein writes: 
The question of whether an arrangement of autonomy is to be crowned 
with success or doomed to fClilure depends, in the final analysis, on 
the state of mind of the parties .. The legal or procedural intricacies 
of the arrangement cannot guarantee the outcome .. Success is 
contingent on the goodwill of the parties and their' desire to live 
22. Jansson, Gustafsson, Henril<sson, Fa<.;sG'rlund, Johansson, "Aland," Pp. 16-17. 
23. Ibid., p. 5. 
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jointly under one legal-poli t leal roo·f . .I.!J.~ ..... ~nq.1.§Q.~.n~.§,.Ql~ ... ~.9..QJJ.g.1..t..!.Q.o 
.f.Q.c. .... ~;tM .. y.JJ~.Ql§ ...... 9.y.t..Qn.Qm.Y. ...... ~.~ ...... t..h.~ ...... ~.t~.~.~.t..~.n9..~ ...... 9.f. ...... g ...... ~p.~..r.~.t. ...... 9..t ..... t.9..g~.t..b.~.r.n~.~.~ 
M~hi.9..h".M~Mo.;j.Mt..~§ .....  tjt9. ...... g..r9.JJP..~ ...... g.@.~p..:i ..  t~ .~~ ...... t..b..~.tr. ...... g.if.f.~ .. r..~.n9.~~.~ . . ... Con ve rs e 1 y , 
when there is an overwhelming yearning for a parting of the ways, 
when there is no sense of moving in tandem, autonomy cannot weld the 
parties together. It can be i.i,j')osed by force, but it cannot work in 
the long run .. 24 
"The inclination to share a common destiny," Dinstein says, is the reason 
that Greenland's Home Rule status i s so apparently successful, why the 
autonomy arrangements for southern Sudan worked, at least for a time, and a 
major reason why autonomy did not ~:K)rk in the case of Eritrea. 25 The 
practical importance of community identity is implicit in international 
legal norms regarding self-determiilJLion and the need for informed consent 
of the -affected population in associated state agreements .. It is si'milarly 
reflected in Reisman's comment that such traditional indicators as common 
citizenship, trade or currency agreements, delegation of foreign affairs 
powers or inclusion under the jurisdiction of the high court of the larger 
polity are insufficient evidence of the associate state reaching "a point 
of no return after which it is no longer considered a C:state',. 11 Rather, 
lithe single most critical factor in 'contemporary international law .... 
would appear to be the demands of tile people within the associate."26 
In many cases, autonomy agreements grow out of demands by territorial 
communities which have a highly 'developed sense of local identity based on 
attachment ,to the characteristics that distinguish them from the larger 
24. Dinstein, "Autonomy," p. 295 (emphas is added); Similar comments have beet) made about 
the role of community identity in the success of Swiss fedel'alism: "The system works as well 
today as it always has, and the only possi t.,le 'constitutional' explanation for it is ·the 
will. the traditional will of Swiss society ~3 a whole, to ~~ld together 'freely, in spite of 
its linguistic t re! igious, cuI tur al, social, (i'conomic and professional cleavages and 
segmentation" (see Ghita Ionescu, "The Reh.1v.3.nce of Switzerland for Modern Politics," 
GQ~er.nrmm:t. .... and ..... Qp'P'Q$..i.:t.ioo 23 [Winter 1988J: 12). 
25. Oinstein, "Autonomy," p. 295; For ba.d<ground on Eritrea and Southern Sudan see notes 
44 and 51 respectively pp. 45 and 46 of the present study. 
26. Reisman, · p.Y.~.r.t.Q ... .Bic.Q .... al1d ..... :th~ .. .. .I.nt.~rJh\r~.i.l)nal ... .P.r.QG.~~~, PP. 15-16 .. 
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entity. Without this sense of local identity, the territory's citizens and 
leaders will be less willing to clef . ,,, ; ;d their community's autonomy from 
enct"oachments by the larger territoj ·j.dl entity. However, i'f their sense of 
" .. ... 
local community identity is not bal~r)ced by a sense of shared destiny with 
the larger community, th~y might not be willing to support the autonomy 
process at all. Uma o. Eleazu desc·J~j.bes how a lack of shared national 
loyalty among both citizens and leaJers contributed to the breakdown of 
federalism in Nigeria: 
Nigerian leaders did not deve10p institutional structures that could 
bridge the social differences t.hat made 'federalism necessary ... .. 
Taking cues from thei r leade r~:>, .m.9.?t. ...... N.~.g.~.ct9..n§ ...... q.1.~;L.'O.9..t. .. ..  ~t~.Y.?..l.QP. .... JJ 
.9..Qm.mj._t..m.~.n.t. ...... t.9. ..... t..b..~ ...... 1.9.~.9.J ..... .Q.f ..... .!J.4 .·.~ .i.9..o.§.1 ...... ~J.n1.t..Y.. .. ~ ...... Ib.~ ...... y_§J!:t~'?' ...... 9.o.g ...... ?.Y._m.Q.Ql§ 
.t.JJ.9..t. ..... J.9.9..m.~.~L .. l .9. . .r.g.~ .... j.!J ...... t.JJ.~i . .r. .... Q.9.. J:.j: .t.1.g.§..~ ...... 1.!I!.9.g.~ . .r..Y... __ ~_~ . .r.§ ...... t.J].9_~.~ ...... 9.f 
.§..~.g.t.J.9..o.9.Jj.;?m. ..... 9..!J.g ..... '§'Jdl?.:..n9..t..1.9..!J.?J ...... ~:'.~.nt. . .r..~§' ...... Qf..J?'.Q.W.~..r.. Any won de r the n t ha t 
any group that felt aggrieved immediately sought its own c~ntre of 
power--a state--within which it could protect what it saw as unique 
to .itself. 27 
Thus, successful autonomy requires Lhat the people of an autonomous 
community have a finely balanced S811';.>e o'f "double loyalty" or dual 
i ~ . 
community identity.28 
Particularly ~Jhere former colonic~\ opt for continued ties to the 
metropolitan community, their willillgness to tolerate continued links is 
often based on the economic and political benefits derived from the 
association rather than cultural links Ot .. sense of shared identity. 
Reisman's study of Puerto Rico sugyests these material benefits alone fail 
to create a comfortable balance of identities: 
27. El eaz u, f~.~r.a..li$.m .... Md ..... ~.at..i.Qn .... 6.~!.il.d.J . :· .. lS1, p. 244. 
28. The notion of dual loyal ty is bor row:;:;·d from the s ·tudy of federal ism by Ut'$U la K. 
Hicks, who argues that "a viable and durab18 "fedel'ation cannot be built unless all ci ·ti1.ens 
recognise themselves as having double loyal t.y: ·to their own State and to ttr? nation" (Ursula 
K. Hicks, f.~.e.r.ali~n; ..... fa..i.l!Jr.e. .... and ..... S.Yc.c.e.~~ Cl..':;Jfldon and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978J, p. 175). 
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In terms of general social and economic development measured in 
either GNP or per capita inco::le, association has been a beneficial 
arrangement for most Puerto' R,:.cans .. In terms o"f self-respect, dignity 
and national identity, associdtion has been less successful. And woe 
to him who "fails to weigh the;:;) (~ intangibles in the balance; they are 
among~ the most explosi ve "fact(:('S of tllis century .. 29 
Dual community identity is more lil("\~l.Y to exist if the autonomy arrangement 
was not forced upon the territorial community .. Autonomy agreements 
negotiated and implemented before mi.nority conflicts escalate into 
separatist demands, terrorism or war are more likely to ha~e the backing of 
local 'people who have a sense of dUd1 identity .. However:. there is no 
guarantee this identity will last f')I~ever .. "Even when autonomy appears to 
function satisfactorily for' some tiiflC, a cleavage may occur when suddenly--
due to a change in the psychological climate--the impulse for independence 
becomes prevalent .. "30 Such a change helped precipitate the American 
Revolutionary War in the Thirteen Colonies:. resulting in the declaration of 
independence by the United States .. 31 A shift in political circumstances 
recently led to a resurgence of Quebec nationalism, sparking new efforts 
among Quebecois to significantly alter their province's relationship with 
the Canadian federation and increased support for its secession .. 32 
Even if strong dual identity doe3 not exist at the beginning, the 
autonomy process is not necessarily lost. The experience of the Aland 
Islands suggests that, unde r the t~ight conditions, dual community identity 
can develop where none existed be"fore .. In a 1917 unofficial pleb.iscite 
before Finland declared independen(;~~, 96 pe'rcent of Alanders supported 
30. Dinstein, "Autonomy," p. 295. 
31. Ibid.; See generally Friedlander, "{ .. . It-onomy and the Thirteen Colonies." 
32. Barry Came, "The FLQ Crisis: Quebec .. uld Canada 20 Years Later," Mac.lean.~.~, 15 Oct. 
1990~ pp. 18-19. 
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-reuni ficati'on with Sweden.. When in J. \}21 the League of Nations Council 
decision supported Finland's claj:rrt ' ,.1 '.) the archipelago instead, the Alanders 
accepted ,the decision with some he~ ~tation .. 33 Even as late as the Second 
World War, the Aland Landsting, or ,j~rliament, askecj for union with 
Sweden .. 34 However, nowadays Alanden:> accept thei r status .. The secretary of 
the- Aland Parliament says, "Thf~ efforts made in the 1910s and 1920s for 
-reunIon with Sweden have long ago been replaced by a strong desire on the 
pa rt of t he A la nde rs to gove rn the 111:.:>8 1 ves .. 11 35 tI Mos t A la nde rs cons ide r 
themselves to be ju~~ Alanders, not Finns nor Swedes." 36 At the same time, 
a 1990 public opinion poll showed tllat only about one In ten Aland~rs 
favoured full indep~ndence and only about 39 percent wanted more 
autonomy. 37 
The emergence of this 'balance of loyalties in Aland is due to several 
factors including the archipelago's sound economy, small,culturally 
.homogenous population and we'll'-defined territory .. ~8 Furthermore, the 
presence of an officially recogniseJ Swedish-speaking minority in mainland 
Finland with special rights provid08 Aland with internal support for its 
33. Gustafsson, "The Alar:'ld Islands," p. ::C2 .. 
I 
34. Finn Seyersted, "The Aland Autonomy '-,\llcI Intel"national Law," t.iQl:,o .. i~k. ... I.iQ$.k.r..i.ft._ ... fQr. 
.Int.~r.n~:tiQOal ... .Be.t. 51 (1982) pp·: ..... 23-24. 
35. Lars Ingmar Johanscson, "The Autonomy uf Aland--Elasis of a Floul"ishing SOciety," in 
Peace Sac i ety 0 f Al and, Ih~ .... a.lQ,nr.J ..... l$.la.nd.~ .... f.~~~ , !;'QnQfOQ!J.$. .... Qe.m.i.l.it.ru::.i.z:J~d .... .R~g.iQtl ( A 1 and: Mar i ehamns 
Tryckeri Ab, 1988), p.39. 
- '. 
:36. Letter to me from Lars Ingmal" Johan~; .:.oL1n, SecI"e-tary, Alands Landsting (par 1 iamen·t), 28 
Dec. 1990. 
37. "Special poll on the autonomy issuCi>: happy as we are," Ala.nd ..... E!!J.~i.n~$.$. ... Hep.Q.t'.:t, 1990. 
38. Jansson, Gustafsson, Henriksson, Fa·,:j-;.1I'!und and Johansson, "Aland," p. 5. 
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status and a significant cultural l ~;Jlk to ttle rest o'f the country. 39 
Inter'national support, in particulGI' Sweden's support for the original 
autonomy arrangement, has also rein';"ur'ced the autonomy' process despite its 
less than auspicious start .. 40 Without it, Alanders would not likely have 
been so willing to come to accept tll (J arrangement themselves .. 41 Many of 
the$e factors have at least partial parallels in Macau. 
Political Institutions and Participation 
The tension between the desire of local people for local control and the 
reluctance of central authorities to r'elinquish their power is at the heart 
of the autonomy p r'ocess . 
An autonomous region should t::l'ljoy effecti ve control over matters 
which are primarily o'f local concern, within the overall framework of 
the fundamental norms of the ~:;tate.. Autonomy is not equi valent to 
independence, and autonomous government should not expect to be 
immune from the influence of central governments .. At the same time, 
however, the state must adopt a 'flexible attitude which will enable 
the autonomous region to exercise real po~,er, precisely when that 
exercise of power runs counter to the state's inherent preference for 
'centralization and uniformity.42 
The composition and author'ity of thu local legislature, executive and 
administration are often at the cenLre of this political tug of war. 
39. Johansson writes, "We are part ,CIf till;' Swedish speaking population in Finland, with 
di fferent contacts to tha·t cl.~ltural framework. The legal status of the SWedish language is 
very important also for us. Due to the fact that Finland officially is bilingual, all 
official documents are printed in both langu.lgeS, texts and descriptions on goods are usually 
to be found also in Swedish, there are schCl()ls and universities with e-duca,tion in SWedish and 
so on. We can take advantage of all tha·t. If w(? were the only Swedish speakers in Finland our 
situation. naturally, should be much more complicated" (l.etter to me from Johansson, 28 Dec. 
1990) • 
40. Jansson, Gustafsson, Henriksson, f<;~()':':"I ' lund and Johans$(.'lfl, "Aland," p. 5. 
41. Ibid. pp. 38-39; 
42. Hannum, A!J:t.QoQrm:':, p. 466. 
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The office of the chief executiv~ of the government in the autonomous 
territory can be where these conflic ting claims clash most strongly. In 
some nonfederal autonomy arrangemen '! ~ , the central government must approve 
the candidate for chief executive e i tlJar directly or after local selection 
or election. 43 The latter case idea! ly results in a chief executive who 
embodies the principle o'f dual identity, demonstrating both a strong 
I 
commitment to distinct local intere::.~ts and a willingness to cooperate with 
central authorities .. However, in' sol;ld cases it puts the chie'f executive in 
the untenable position of answering to two masters. For instance, 
interference by the Sudane:3e presiduilt in the appointment of the regional 
council president in the south resulted in an executive whose loyalty to 
both the Sudanese president and th(~ r~~egional Assembly hurt his 
effectiveness. 44 
So long as there were no major issues over which the regional council 
and the national P resident ell '(fe red, the a rrangements seemed to work .. 
However, whenever the souther-r, executi ve took independent stands, the 
President came down with a he~yy hand and usually dissolved the 
Regional Assembly, disrupting the stability of the South. 45 
43. Hannum and Lillich, "The Concept of ()l.Itonomy in International La~J," pp. 221-222. 
44. Hannum, AYt.OtlOlnY., p. 324; Sudan abuts the Red Sea and eight sub-Saharan and north 
African countries. People of Arab extraction, mostly Moslems, cove I' about two-thirds of the 
country ~..,hile the southern third is primarily the home of peoples who al'e culturally linked 
to black Africa and are either Chri3tian or fc)llow traditional African religions. The British 
colonial government administered the two areas separately, but they were united when SUdan 
became independent in 1956. The sou·thern pr~Jblem -turned into .3, bloody war after the military 
regime installed in a 1956 coup declared t:,c3:t Islam and the Arabic language would be 
introduced in the south. It was no·t until 197:2 that a · new military government reached the 
Addis Ababa Agreement on autonomy with the ~.ou ,thern rebels. It granted the I~egion a High 
Executive Council and a Regional Assembly r 'i.:· ~; ponsible for internal security, local 
administration and economic development. TI,E' accord recognised English as the principle 
regional language and the people's right to practice non-Islamic t'eligions. However, 
divisions IIJithin the south and attacks on tilE' region's autonomy by the cen-tl'al government, 
including the reintroduction of Islamic secL.lrianism, had triggered renewed civil war by 
1963. The government and main southern reb~- l group reached a -tentativE' agreement in 1989, 
which the Na'tional IslcUflic Front did not supr.oort (ibid. Pp. 308-327; Haim Shaked, "Anatomy of 
an Autonomy: The Case of Southern Sudan,~' in Dinst,ein, MQQ~l$. __ .. o.f .. _  Ayt.Qno.my., PP. 151-170). 
4S. Hannum, A!Jt.Qtlor.o~ , p. 324. 
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The northern Eur'opean autonomy ,Ji~t\1ngements avoid much o'f this problem 
by separating the functions of the l ocal government executive from those of 
the centraL governm(~nt representati lo ,,! in the autonomous territory .. This 
does not eliminate central-local cOj 'd~licts, but it offers some assurance 
that the conflicts will ~e less disl-uptive to the day-to-day functions of 
the . local gover'nment .. In Aland, ex'~<;utive powers rest with the regional 
Executive Council chosen by the directly elected Aland parliament from 
among its membe rs.. The Finnish cent nJl ~10ve t~nment 's rep re::,entati ve 'in 
Aland, the county governor, is appoillted by the Finnish president to look 
after central government administt~~:=t t.ion in the region .. 46 Under the ·1921 
agreement between Finland and Swe~8n, the county governor had to be someone 
acceptable to the Alanders and the I~ole o'f Alanders in choosing the county 
governot~ increased over the year's" lite 1951 Autonomy Act requi res the 
Finnish president get the approval of the speaker of the Aland parliament 
for his or her candidate .. The curn31TL custom is for the speaker of the 
Aland parliament to negotiate \l.Jith members of the local parliament to come 
up with a name, ~\}hich he or she then SUbmits to the Finnish president.. If 
the president does not approve, the s peaker submits a list of five 
candidates, from which the pr'esideld:o selects one .. 
This procedure is intel1ded to guarantee that tl1e County Governor of 
Aland has the confidence of both state and Autonomy authorities, and 
it has been successful. The Aland County Governor today is not 
regarded by the Aland population as an emissary of the central power, 
but rather as a balancing eleillent in ·the interaction between two 
authorities equal in principle, the State of Finland and the 
Autonomous Territory of Aland . 47 
46. Ibid., pp. 371-372. 
47. Jansson, Gustafsson, Henriksson, Fa'::)':;'"! lund and Johansson, "Aland," p. 28. 
47 
In recent years, all county governo,:;> have been native Alanders .. 48 
Under the Home Rule arrangement, Greenlanders similarly directly elect a 
regional assembly which chooses an ~ ,<ecutive cabinet, the majority of whom 
must be assembly members. The Danis,i'I representati ve in Greenland, the high 
commissioner, primarily acts as a li~ison between Greenland and central 
authorities. He has no veto over internal Greenland affairs but may be 
invited to participate in legislative or executive debates. 49 
In many of the examples of autonolllY discussed here the question ' has not 
been whether to establish democratically elected local institutions, but 
how the authority of ,these institutions should be balanced with that of the 
government of the larger polity. If the larger polity is not democratic or 
if central and local actors have different conceptions of democracy, as is 
the case for Macau and Hong Kong, then whether to establish a directly 
elected legislature and executive in the autonomous territory is itself 
disputed. Conflicts over the "source or nature of political legitimacy make 
central-local battles more complex~ This is particularly the case when 
autonomous territorial communities l·vithin the jurisdiction of a larger 
authoritarian government demand or succeed in setting up directly elected 
local government institutions, such 8:5 happened in souther'n Sudan. The 
actions of Southern Sudan's directl.y elected Regional Assembly subsequently 
became a major point of central-loc31 tension contributing to the breakdown 
of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. The wide dictatorial powers of the 
Sudanese president would have been menacing even had Sudan itself been a 
48. They have included the depu"ty spe'al ~E:- of the Aland parliament, the head of the 
Executive Council and a high official in -the- local parliamentary administl'ation (ibid •• p. 
28). . 
49. Hannum, AY.t.QOQIn>':, p. 343. 
functioning democracy .. 11 It was perh,:,ps inevitable that a democratic, 
autonomous regional government wou1d be seen as a threat which the non-
democratic centre would seek to COil Lt 'ol .. 11 50 The 'failed 'federation of 
:'- ~ .. 
Eritrea with authoritarian Ethiopi~,:, under the UN recommendations also 
I 
granted Eritrea a directly elected local legislature .. 51 These two cases 
suggest that, in autonomy disputes characterised by deep central-local 
ideological dif'ferences, whether ot (lot to set up democratic institutions 
can be a dilemma .. While directly elected political institutions cari build 
48 
local confidence in the autonomy arl~angements, they can also create tension 
between central and local authorities precisely because their legitimacy 
challenges that of the central gove(nment .. Despite ttlis risk, democratic 
institutions are likely to have strong appeal for minority communities 
looking for ways to secure their autonomy in the face of authoritarian 
central governments .. In these cases, other internal and external variables 
may determine whether or not ' the al ~ rangement survives the resulting 
tensions .. 
so. Ibid., p. 323 • 
.51. The region of northern Ethiopia knowi I today as Eri trea ~~s an Ital ian colony between 
1890 and 1941. During that time its pop.Jlation was roughly hal f Eri trean Christian and hal f 
Moslem. In 1941, Britain took over temporary cldrninistration of the ten'itory. After the 
second World War was over, Ethiopian Emperur Haile Selassie's claim to Eritrea was opposed by 
many Er i trean Moslems and some members of the international comllXJn i ty. As a cClrrlPrc.\fJ1ise, the 
territoJ'y was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 according to the recommendations of a lM 
commission endorsed by the Ge-neral Assembly. The federal arrangements called fo/' a federal 
government to take responsibil i ·ty for defen,-'.~} foreign affairs, finance and in·ternational 
trade. A Eritn~'an government accountable to d. dil'ectly elected assembly had authl1rity over 
all other internal affairs. After repeated viola-tions of the federal agreement by the central 
government, a serious independence movement. 6'fnet'ged in the late 1950s. Ethiopia annexed 
Eritrea in 1962 and put the area under dirtr'c-t;. military rule in 1967. Guerrilla fighting has 
continued between the E.thiopian and EI'itrE'all forces (see generally Tom J. Fal'er, W~.r. .... C.1Q!Jd.~ 
QO. .... th~ ... ,H.or.n .... Q.t ... A:fr..ic.a.: ..... A .... C.r .. i~i$. .. ... fQl~, .... o.~t.~n:t.~~ [New York and Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for Internat.ional Peace, 1976J; Hr~ffai Erlich, "The F.ritrean Au·tonomy 1952-1962: 
Its Failure and i ·ts Contribution to Further E~Jcalation," in Dins'tein, M~'XJ.~-1$. .... !~'tf. ... B!Jt.Qnonrt., pp. 
171-162; Hannum, e!Jt.QnQm~, pp. 337-341). 
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Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
The strength of and public SUPPOi't for the legal system and other 
dispute settlement mechanisms are 0 ; prime concern to the success of 
autonomy p'rocesses. The successful \.._·13 of these institutions 'for .resol ving 
or diminishing jurisdictional and oLner central-local disputes can 
strengthen the insti·tutions' capacity to handle future problems as belief 
in theit"' legitimacy grows .. Failure could fuel further political 
disagreement, suspicion and distrust. 52 The absence of conflict resolution 
mechanisms contributed to the Addis Ababa Agreement's failure to guarantee 
the autonomy o'f southern Sudan .. 53 In the Eastern Caribbean, there were no 
mechanisms by which disagreements about Britain's reserved powers over 
defence and external affairs could be submitted to an independent, 
impartial adjudication body acceptable to key parties. 54 By contrast, the 
availability of the United States court system to settle a simil~r dispute 
between the Northern . Mariana Islands and the American government has 
probably helped encourage the islanders not to abandon their Commonwealth 
status yet .. 55 
I I " 
1 
An independent and impa rtial j LldJcia ry a rmed with st t"'ong legislation can 
also contribute to the stability o'f the autonomy proce~3S by helping to 
secure human rights in the autonofli("lJS territory. Violations of human rights 
frequently contribute to the erosioll of local support for autonomy 
' 52. Ibid., p. 324. 
53. Ibid .. 
54. Gilmore, ' "Legal Perspectives on Asse.eiated Statehood in the Eastel'n Caribbean," P. 
514. 
55. The Mariana authorities have also ~:A : blHi·ttE·d thei r complaint to the UN Se·curi ty Council 
and the UN Trusteeship Council (Lizabeth A. 11cKibben, "The Political Relationship Between the 
United States and Paci fic Island Entities: ·lh •. ;;' Path to Se'} f-Govel"nment in ,the NOI"thel'n 
Mariana Islands, Palau, and GIJam," I:iI;\r.y.Q.:n;.I .... .T.JJ..!;.G..r..o.~ :!;.iQnal ... l~w ... .B~Y..i.~ 31 [h'inter 1990]: 272, 
280-281, 285-287. 
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arrangements .. 11 A common characterisi . ic of those ethnic conflicts which ,b,§. .y',~ 
led to serious violence is the viol.1Lion of fundamental human rights .... 
. while they . . ~re more often responsib:.~.~! for exacerbating existing con'flicts 
than for creating di visions where t/'It:!re were none before ...... it is these 
violations which often escalate political or economic differences to the 
stat.us o'f open and violent conflict," 56 
Hannum argues that a IIfully autollomous ll territory I,\,ould have Ilan 
independent local judiciar'y tAJith fU.ll responsibility for interpreting local 
laws. Disputes over the extent of local authority or the relationship 
between the autonomous and central governments may be within the original 
jurisdiction of the local courts, but final decisions are commonly within 
the competence of either the state j udiciar'y or a joint dispute-settling 
body .. 1157 Many central-local disputr2~3 hinge on di vergent interpretations of 
the constitution or other basic law enshrining the autonomy arrangement. 
Therefore, the allocation of 'final duthority to interpret the 
constitutional documents of autonoHl;l are of critical importance .. In most 
cases, final authority remains in central government hands or in a joint 
central-autonomous body. 58 There hd".,JE) been exceptions: Eritrea, priot" to 
its annexation by Ethiopia, had authot"ity to interpret its otAJn Basic Law; 
the League of Nations adjudicated disputes between Poland and Danzig; 
questions regarding interpretation o'f the Free Territory o'f Trieste Statute 
were to be determined by an ad-hoc commission .. 59 The 'form is less important 
56. Hannurn, w .t.QI1Qmy. , pp. 455-456., 
57. Ibid. , p • . 467. 
58. Ibid. , p. 139 .. 
59. Ibid. , p. 139 at no'te.· 476. 
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than finding a solution tha.t builds confidence in the autonomy process on 
all sides.. I n the case of Macau and : :ong Kong, thei r unique status makes 
local competence to interpret tile jJ ..  :' .... >.LC Law more appropriate .. 60 
:- . .. 
A t~~o-pronged system involving cS !liore politicised forum first and a 
judicial decision as a last resort is used in Greenland and Aland, where 
the use of constitutional courts is less well accepted than in the United 
States .. 61 In Gr'eenland, a mediation/arbitration board made up of" two 
appointees o'f the Gr'eenland authorities, two Danish government appointees 
'and three Danish Supreme Court j ud<Jl:~s appointed by the chief justice, is 
competent to j udgl3 c<?nflicts betweul'I the Danish government and tile .Home 
. -"':-'0· 
Rule authorities .. If tile board's political appointees cannot reach an 
accord then the judges make a ruliny .. 62 In the Aland system, the Finnish 
president must get opinions on proposed Aland legislation from the Supreme 
Court and the Aland Delegation, the latter composed of two members 
appointed by the Finnish gov~rnment, two by the Aland parliament and a 
chairman nominated by the president of Finland, all of whom can be recalled 
by their nominating authorities .. Thu chairperson is, as a rule, the Aland 
county governor, who is by custom an Alander with the confidence of both 
the Aland parliament and the Finni::>:1 government.. In practice, the Finnish 
president only seeks the Supreme Cour't's opinion when the Aland delegation 
states the legislation competence· of th~ Aland parliament is questionable 
or when the law is complicated or l",ove1 .. The practice is to let centt~al and 
60. Ibid., 139. 
61. Letter to me from Johansson, 28 Dec. 1990. 
62. Questions of interpretation of authcw i8ing legislation must sti 11 be se·t·tled by 
ordinary courts under the Danish Consti tutic.,.,. The board cannot hear the complaints of 
private citizens. As of 1985 thl? special con;;ilission had not yet been used (foighel, "A 
·Framework for Local Autonomy," p. 51; Harhoff, "L.e statut jllridique du regime d'alltonomie du 
green 1 and ,.. In:t:~r.::::HQr..r.J. , no. 17 [1985 J, p. 20) ). 
52 
local representatives attempt to r('~:'\" ::~ ll a negotiated agreement first .. 63 The 
secretary of the Aland ' parliame~t S~ijS the system has the confidence of 
Aland's political leaders: "The Alai'..J Delegation and the President have 
always functioned neutrally and cOt'IGctly and their solutions have been 
accepted also by the politicians of (~land If "64 
The case of South Tyrol, an ethnic···German province o'f Italy, j.J.lustrates 
that, even where dispute settlement methods fail to bolster the authority 
of the autonomous territory, the process can survive if it has othe~ means 
of support .. 65 In Italy, both the cE:,ltr-al and the South Tyrol provincial 
government can take allegedly illeo~· :.l provincial or regional acts to the 
Italian Constitution Court, whose judgements are binding .. In recent years, 
the court's rulings have tended to ~')l~aken South Tyrol autonomy "by holding 
that inherent national powers of Cdirection and coordination' ... take 
63. Jansson, Gustafsson, Henril<sson, Fag~:llund and Johansson, "Alands," pp. 24, 28, 34; 
Gustafsson, "The Aland Islands," P. 206. 
64. Letter to me from Johansson, 28 Dec. 1990; "Virtually all of t .he President's vetoes of 
Province lal"'s have stenvned from technical en'(jrs which cannot be entirely avoided, given the 
complexi ties in the di vision of competencE' bc·tween State and Province authorities" (Jansson, 
Gustafsson, Henriksson, Fagerlund and Johans';3on, "Aland," p. 44). 
65. The peace tre·aty that ' follo~~d ttJe r irs·t lAJorld War awarde·d Sou·th Tyrol, an 
overwhelmingly German-speaking part of AU$ti ' l~, to Italy as a reward for abandoning the 
Triple Alliance ~Iith Germany and the AustrCJ-Hungarian Empire. The area was subjected to 
assimilation and denationalisation policie-.;; from the 1920:3 onward. Today, about 64 percent of 
its people are Get'man-speakers while the re'st are Italian ot' Ladin-speakers. After the Second 
World War, the Austrian and Italian reach~d an agreement guaranteeing autonomy for SOUth 
Tyrol, but Italy violated at least the spi t~ j t. of the accord by attaching south Tyrol to the 
overwhelmingly Italian province of Trentino, thereby rendering German-speakers a minority and 
their autonomy an illusion. Subsequen·t Austr.ian complaints to the UN and Council of Europe, 
as well as concern caused by terrorist attacks and a general constitutional trend in Italy 
toward regional isation, led to the 1969 "pac:l<~\ge" of measures to improve South Tyrole'an 
autonomy. The "Operational Calendar" signed b/ Austria and Italy commits the parties to 
submit future disputes to 'the International Court of Justice. The 1972 Autonomy Statute sets 
up a Regional Council for Trentino-Alto Adi0·.?/South Tyrol, whose presidency alters between a 
German-speaker and an Ital ian-speaker and h~~~ quite 1 imi ted powers. A Provincial Counci 1 and 
Provincial Government in South Tyrol has bruau,?r competence over economic, social and 
cul tural matters. German has eoqual standing 'iJl th Italian as the region'9 official language 
and separate German-language education and r,'I"I:Jportional linguistic represen·tation in the 
civil service are guaranteed (Christoph Sehl l;~ut?r, "Autonomy in South Tyrol," in Dinstein, 
Mod.e.l.;;?, .... Q.f .... AY.t.oo.Qflly., pp. 53·-66; Hannurn, A!J:~~.".~ !~ !l:OY., pp. 432-440). 
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precedence over' regional and provil'l<;.ial competf-3I1ce." 66 Despite this 
imbalance, the South Tyrolese gener ... \Jly accept the system in place under 
the 1972 Italian-Austrian agreement <l~3 an advance over previous 
arrangements and workable in practi'",~" Much erf the credit for this support 
rests \lJith Italy and Austria, whose ~'~ish to avert a resurgence of con-fliet 
over the ter'ritory encourages the S(juth Tyrolese to seek future changes 
through normal political processes rather than violence. 67 
Externdl Support 
Many other autonomy ar'rangements Irave -floundered because o-f the ·failure 
... -~.-
of outside actors to put pressure 011 the key parties to make an imperfect 
system work. In circumstances where the political and or economic position 
of the autonomous community is weal<, external interest in the arrangement 
can deter the stronger central duth0rities from overrunning the smaller 
polity's autonomous status. Reisman says of international scrutiny: "Though 
an irr'itant to some, [it] is a heal thy stimulus to reexamination and, where 
appropriate, to change or reinforcement....... Fr'om the perspecti ve of the 
international protection o-f human rights, a status which purports to 
insulate the political elite from ~~(.)I"ld scrutiny and from the need to 
comply with international standards is imperfect .. "68 External support is 
often controversial and sometimes exceeds tolerable bounds, disturbing the 
autonomy arrangement. 69 At times, support from an outside actor can swing 
66. Hannum, AYw.O,omy, pp. 436--437. 
67. Ibid., pp. 439-440. 
68 • Re i sman, r.!JJ~~r.t.Q ... .Bi.c.Q .... D.nQ ..... :th~ ..... l.nt.~:r.t. i. ~\ . Li,.Qtl~l .... f!.r.Q~!'?'s.$. , pp . 114 -11 5 . 
69. A notablr.~ example of controversial I;,:-xtl.:.wnal involvement is the Irish Republic's 
participation in atte'rnpts to resolve the HOI tl'rern Ireland problem under th~? 1985 Anglo-It--ish 
Agyeemen t (Hannurn, Ayt.onQm:t., PP. 241'-243). 
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the political mood in ttle smaller p'.I1.ity towards demands 'for full 
independence. In ottler' cases, a decJ, ~: . .ion by the outside actor to withhold 
support can.encourage the community La accept autonomous status instead. 
As noted above, Austria has beel'l instrumental since the end of the 
Second World War in pushing the Itcllian government to provide some measure 
of r.eal autonomy fOt", South Tyrol, most recently under the 1969 package of 
reforms and the 1972 New Autonomy Statute. 70 Implementation delays and 
substantive shortcomings continue "Lv limit the ability of these measures to 
address all Tyrolese grievances .. HO\,\18ver, the new autonomy arrangement 
might never have come , about had Austria not actively pressured Italy.71 
."!-'.-
The role of Austria in guaranteeing the autonomy of the South Tyrol 
should not be underestimated, although Italy has consistently 
maintained its position that Tyrolean autonomy is a purely internal 
matter (with the exception of the broad obligations included in the 
'1946 De Gasperi-Grubbet" Accord). Austria has not yet declared (as it 
is required to do under the Operational Calendar) that the Package 
has been fulfilled, and this remains a significant factor in Austro-
Italian relations .. In this rc~:..,pect, the situation of the South Tyrol 
resembles one o'f the classic post-Versailles examples of minority 
protect ion, a nd A us t ria n 5 uppo rot was pe rhaps dec is i ve 1 n obta i n i ng 
the relatively broad autonomy gt"anted in 1972 .. 72 
In contrast with the unilateral s upport offered by Austria, external 
backing can also be multilateral ttlrough such instruments as treaties or 
international intergovernmental and Ilongovernmental organisations .. The 
resolutions and recommendations of UN bodies have supported efforts by such 
territories as the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico and the former British 
islands in the Eastern Caribbean to bolster ' their autonomous status under 
70. Scht'euer, "Autonomy in Sou,th Tyrol , ... r~'p. 53- 57. 
71. Ibid., pp. 54-56, 62; Dinstein, "~I..rt. '.li,'.)my," pp. 295-296. . 
72. Hannum, AY~QnQm~, p. 440. 
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associated state relationships with much stronger partners like the United 
States and Britain. 73 
Hannum argues that multilateral ~ . :- international involvement may be a 
better option than unilateral preSSI-11 'e from a single neighbouring ' state in 
some cases because it can -be more subtle and less threatening. 74 However, 
it may also be less reliable than a single party with a personal stake in 
the outcome of the autonomy process. Although a UN commission's report 
formed the basis of Eritrea's autol'l.)IIIY arrangement with Ethiopia, the lack 
of ongoing multilateral support for- the territory's distinct status 
undermined the accord and encouraged its complete collapse in 1962 into a 
war that continues today.75 Several commentators have blamed the 
.-'::- .-
international community's refusal to protect what it had created on 
Ethiopia's Cold War-sensitive geogl\Jpl1ic location, the almost mystical 
leadership position Ethiopian Emper0r· Haile Selassie had among newly 
independent states and his reputatio(l as an antifascist hero. 76 
Selassie, the PRC regime and the leaders of many new states--in many 
cases yesterday's independence guerr-illas--have become some of the world's 
most fierce proponents of traditional international legal concepts of 
73 .. Gilmore, "Legal Perspectives on Asso,;iate Statehood in the Eastern Caribbean," pp. 
553-554; See generally McKibben, "The Political Relationship Between the United States and 
Pacific Islands Entities." 
74. Hannum, Al.!:t.ooomy., p. 457. 
'75. A UI'I commission reconvnended that Er :~ ~I" ea .. consti tute an autonomous un i t federated with 
Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopio.n Crown,~' with the Eri trean government 
possessing of full "legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the field of domestic 
a f f ai rs" (F arer, War ..... C1Q!Jd.~ .... Qn ... "th~ .... HQr.n .... Q.f.. .. O.tr.iQa. , pp. 26, 28). However, UN par ti c i pat i on 
effectively stopped after -the two parties adopted the Federal Act and constitution. When it 
.became clear that real control over the terl itory was in Ethiopian hands and Haile Selassie 
moved to destroy Eritrea's paper autonomy, there were no provisions for dispU·te settlement or 
reI iable interna.tional supervision ·to support Eri trea (Hannurn, A~tto.nomy., P. 340). 
76. Chr i stopher Clapham, Ir.Q,o~.fo.r.m~t.io.n ... _ ~il)~ .... C.Qnt..i.nYit.y. .... io" .. Bey'Qlut.iQo,f.\r.y. ..... Et.hio.P.iiA 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 1.988), pp. 207, 221; Farer, WQ,r." .. C.1QYd.~LQO .... t.he .... Hor.o .... Qi: 
ef.rj.c.a , p. 29 • 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of substate groups 
demanding independence and threatening to redesign the post-colonial map.77 
While in many ways critical to the ~~t,ability of the international system, 
the rigid enforcement of these pril,Giples can, paradoxically, cause 
conflict, as the history Of Eritrea attests. Emphasising stable frontiers, 
the international community generally prefers that the grievances of 
minorities be resolved in some way ::.-./Jort of secession, often through 
territorial autonomy arrangements. Outside support "has more frequently 
repressed than encouraged minority or' secessionist movements .. "78 However, 
rigid conceptions of sovereignty often cut off the external support needed 
to mak~ these autonomy arrangements work. Even claims for remedy of serious 
violations of minority rights seldolil lead to a collecti ve demand on the 
international level for a specific r'cmedy, such as restructuring of the 
internal autonomy framework. Ironically, the minority group making the 
claim might be driven to demand secussion in order to get any sort of 
international response at all, evell ~\}hen regional autonomy or internal 
restructuring--not independence--is their real goal .. 79 The debacle of 
Eritrean autonomy reveals the fal~ity of claims that international 
involvement in autonomy arrangements is necessarily destabilising; it may, 
on the contrary, stabilise an otherwise shaky arrangement. 
External support, or external ef'j"ectiveness, can play a particularly 
critical role at the onset of an a:Jtonomy process when the citizens of the 
77. Clapham, Ir.a.n~.for.mat.iQn .... ~nQ ..... c.QD.t..in!J . .i .. ~y. .... in ... .B~y'QlYt.ion~r.Y .... .Et.h.iQP'.ia., P. 222; For thi s 
reason, Sudan's neighbours backed the north's position against the south's demands even 
though they were more ethnically and culturally aJ<in to the southern Sudanese African 
minority (Shaked~ "Anatomy of an Autonomy," p. 169). 
78. Hannum, AutonomY, Pp. 456-457. 
79. Lee C. Buchhei t, S.~e.~~iQn.; ..... Ibe ..... 1...~9jJt. .inl~\~y .... o.f .... S.el.f:::D.~t.e.r.minf1l.t.ion (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1978), pp. 214-215. 
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territorial community are less con'Fident o'f the internal constitutional 
protections provided for their stat:.1S. The experience of Aland suggests the 
role of external effectiveness chan~.;e~) over time if the citizens trust in 
internal constitutional guarantees ~:rows. The original Aland autonomy 
agreement incorporated into Finnish law in 1922 sprung from an accord 
between Sweden and Finland and from League of Nations Council decision. 
Under the league's provisions, Finnish authorities were required to submit 
complaints by tile Aland parliament ~~bout implementation to the leagye 
council, which was obliged to submit them to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. However, this mechanism was never tested during the 
life of- tile league and, at the requiJst of the USSR, Finland dropped~--the 
provision from the 1951 version of nland's Autonomy Act. 80 Some scholars 
have since questioned wl1ether the UN has assumed the league's supervisory 
obligations towards Aland and, then:~ fore, whether the islands continue to 
have international legal status. 81 A proposed new version of the Aland 
autonomy act contains no clause mentioning an international guaranty. 
According to one analysis, this is because the obligation to observe the 
I -
original international provisions is now an "unshakeable principle. 1I82 
For the Alanders ~ .. the provision of an international guarantee for 
their autonomy was of fundamelltal significance, especially during the 
early decades. But this issue is of considerably less concern to the 
Alanders today. They have had seventy years of experience with the 
autonomy and of dealing with the Finnish state authority about the 
autonomy. It has basically been a positive experience. Their 
confidence in the firm legal foundation undergirding their autonomy 
80. Seyersted, "The Aland Autonomy and Ij.ternational Law," pP. 25-26; Jansson, Gustafsson, 
Henriksson, Fagerlund and Johansson, "AutonG,'-'Y," Pp. 37-39. 
81. Seyersted, "The Aland Autonomy and 1.rtt:3'rnational Law," pp. 27-28; Jansson, Gustafsson, 
Henriksson, Fagerlund and Johansson, "Alanli ~ ," pp. 37-39. 
82. Jansson, Gustafssot), Henriksson, F ::\1j2 i .lund and Johansson, "Alands," p. 39. 
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I, 
in the process has shifted frRm a locus in international law into its 
place in Finland's consti tuti·)nal orde r .. 83 
The fact that the constitutional S ' : , "'~,' LUS of the islands cannot be amended or 
abolished without the Aland par'lianl":t ,t's agreement is one of the 
territory's main internal guarante8~~84 
This sense of confiden6e in the rinnish constitutional order does not 
mean external support is irrelevant' to Alanders .. With Finland's consent, 
the territory became a member of th(: Nordic Council in 1970 and some 
Alanders view this involvement as a kind of modern replacement of the old 
League of Nations guarantees~ The N~)rdic Council provides a regional 
international forum in which Aland could take up issues concerning its 
relationship with Finland .. Nordic Council membership also bolsters 'the 
territory's participation in Nordic t~egional decision making on fishing, 
conservation, cultural, educational and other questions of direct local 
concern .. Other potential forms of e>cL
'
3rnal effectiveness flow from 
Finland's adherence to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which has some limited provision for minority rights, and its 
participation in the Council of Euro~e since 1989 .. 85 
Pa'rticipation in international orqanisations and other dimensions of the 
global constitutive process are an increasingly fruitful avenue for 
autonomous territories seeking ways to enhance their internal autonomy. 
Associated states perhaps have the It2ast inhibited opportunities for 
invol vement because they a re recognj.sed as states.. Reisman argues: 
Association invol ves a recogn,.i.tion o'f the political dependence of an 
entity, but at the same time ~n insistence on its continuing discrete 
83. Ibid. 
84. Modeen, "cons,titutional Problems," p. 9; Gustafsson, "The Aland Islands," p. 204. 
85. Jansson, Gustafsson, Henriksson, FaS~'I'lund and Johansson, "Alands,'" PP. 38-39, 41. 
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identity under the internationa1 scrutiny 'accorded to all states. 
This becomes an increasingly ll!iportant status for small states which 
find themselves in the compal~~ively uncontested sphere of one of the 
Great Powers ..... " the small as"uciate state may seek membership in 
general international organi z.:..\ 't ions , simultaneously conceding its 
dependence in one area, but 3GGerting its independence in another; 
membe'fship i tsel f becomes SOfllC gua rantee of continued indep~ndence .. 86 
However, it is increasingly difficult to argue that other types of nonstate 
autonomous entities are matters of . ~~nly inclusive concern or that 
aut6nomous territories have no right to an in~ernational legal personality" 
The denial of self-determination' arid human rights to an activist 
territorial community by a regime is likely to cause instability for the 
international community as a whole and damage peaceful and friendly 
relatiqns among nations .. Thus, the pl~evention and curtailing of suGh 
denials are of imperative concern to the international community,,87 
Nevertheless, the Eritrean settluiflent and the post-1919 treaties 
involving international oversight to guarantee minority rights were not 
completely successful, raising the question whether autonomy accords 
imposed by the international community can be viable over the long term. 
While a cause for pessimism about {nternational solutions to conflicts 
involv~ng distinct territorial comffilJnities, the collapse of the League of 
Nations minority system and the UN arrangement in Eritrea were linked with 
the international political context (yf the time and their' shortcomings 
86. Reisman, "Puerto Rico and the Intel't):,rtional Process," p. 19. 
87. M.S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, "Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness 
of International Concern." Amer.ic.an .... ,).Qyr.na.l. .... Q.t. .. lnt.er.na:tiQoal ..... .L.aw 62 (1968): 1, 12, 15 in 
Chowdhury, "The status and Norms of Sel f-D~d-'f)rmination in Contemporary International Law," 
pp. 98-99. 
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might not be applicable to future situations,,88 The recent involvement of 
the United States, Britain and oth(;; military forces, as well as the UN, ln 
securing some sort of autonomy for 'l,.:'lC Kurds in northern I raq will help 
test the viability of multilateral i.nvolvement in autonomy arrangements 
during the post-Cold War era .. 89 
In the end, the type of external support most useful to each autonomy 
arrangement must be assessed separately. The powers of international 
persuasion in multilateral forums could sometimes be more effective than 
the formalised supervisory and adjuJication mechanisms envisioned in the 
League of Nations minority treatie~). At other times, international 
involve-ment is limited by the endul ~ing reluctance of some international 
bodies to discuss (i.nternal' autonomy or' minor'ity political rights 
questions and to call member states to task .. 90 International media and 
nongovernmental organisations offer other avenues of external 
effectiveness. 91 
e8. SUpervisory mechanisms for minol'i-ty tn;.?aties established under the League of Nation's 
Council and "Committee of Three" were cumbersome. They were not backed by powel's of 
enforcement and appeared biased against the ill:;'nority community. The Free City of Danzig and 
Mernel Territory, established to secure the "'ights of a German minority enclave of strategic 
importance, were absorbed or annexed by the Larger political entity. Eritrea suffered the 
same fate (Hannum, A~It.Q'1Qmy., pp. 53-54, 341, 457). 
89. "Hope against hope for Iraq's Kurds," .E.~QnQr.oi~t., 4 May 1991, P. 43. 
90. Hannum, Ayt.Qn~ny., p. 457. 
91. Ibid., pP. 457-458. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MACAU AND ITS ;~UTONOMY PROCESS 
Macau's autonomy process formally began with the negotiations that led 
to the 13 April 1987 initialing and subsequent raiification of the ' Sino-
Portuguese Joint Declaration committing Portugal to transfer administration 
of ,Hacau ' to' the: PRC ori '20 December ;1999 .. , The exterit of ,the autonomy 'the PRC 
promises in the accord is, on paper:, greater than most o'f the ' autonomy 
arrangements discussed , thus far, although it provides fewer constitutional 
guarantees than those given to eithe r associate states or component 
territories of federations and even some autonomous regions .. Under the 
Joint De'claration the future Macau ~3nR is to enjoy a 11 high degree of ' 
autonomy" except in fore'ign affairs .. ~.dd defence matters fo'r fifty -years .. It ' 
will have "executive, legislative. o.ild indepenct~9t judicial power, including 
that of final adjudication," a goverl 'lment and legislature "composed of 
'local inhabitants," the executive being appointed by the Chinese government 
lion the basis of ...... elections or consultations to be held locally .. "l The 
,qommunity's "current social and ecoilomic systems ...... will remain unchanged" 
~nd its current laws "basically unchanged," while all rights and freedoms 
of the residents and others in Maca.j 11 will be ensured by law .... 2 Under the 
name 11 Macau, China," the SAR can "on its own maintain and develop economic 
and cuI tu ral relations 11 with othe r ~~ ()unt ries and inte rnational 
organisations .. It may issue its o~nl travel documents and its own currency .. 
The PRC cannot levy taxes in the S(·'II-{, which will remain a separate customs 
1. Mac.aY .... J.O', 2( 2) (3) • 
2. Ibid., 2(4). 
", ' , , I I 
..... 
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territory and free port. 3 The SAR g~vernment is responsible for maintenance 
of public order in the region. 4 POI ~ ugal is to be responsible for 
administering Macau during the tral,: ..>ition period, during which time the PRC 
: . . .... 
is to enact a Basic Law, or mini -cu, 'isti tution, for the Macau SAR based on 
the terms of the Joint De6laration. 5 
These terms ~~ere the starting pc>i.nt of a ·dynamic process of political 
change, the outcome of which is still unknown. The Joint Declaration is the 
first in a series of political barg~ins between central, local and external 
actors that make up this process. Both formal and informal, these bargains 
will mark the dynamic of the autonolflY process in Hacau, altering and, if 
the needs of the key parties remain satisfied, renewing it at the same 
time. 
This chapter describes some of t.he main contours of the autonomy process 
in Macau as it has unfolded thus far. In reality, the process is more 
complex than this simplifieddescr~~tion suggests, with a huge cast of 
actors stretching from Lisbon to Beljing to Hacau, Hong Kong and beyond. 
Much of it occurs behind closed doors. Only a brief introduction to the 
history of Portuguese tenure in MaCdU and the major political and economic 
actors in the enclave is given her~. This prepares the ground for a more 
detailed look In subsequent chapters at some of the key attitudes, 
institutions and processes that will help determine the evolution of 
Macau's autonomy process. 
3. Ibid., 2(7)(8)(9). 
4. Ibid., 2(10). 
5. Ibid. 3, Annex I( I) .. 
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The History of Portugal's Tenure in Macau 
The Portuguese government o·Ffici .... :.Lly describes Macau as "Chinese 
territor'y under Portuguese adminis'L. '" tion .. "6 The words hint at the historic 
uncertainty of Portuguese tenure ane the system of dual jurisdiction that 
has reigned for much of the enclave ' ~) nearly 450 years, fluctuating with 
the relative strengths of the Port~Guese and Chinese authorities. 7 
Portuguese traders first establi~d'led a settlement in Macau in the middle 
of the sixteenth century, probably ill 1557, although there is evidence of 
minor Chinese settlements on the pellinsula at least two centuries before. 8 
From 1560 to 1640, Macau was an imp\)I"'tant trade centre and mission 
headquarters for the Roman Catholic church. The territory's golden age was 
short lived, however. By the mid seventeenth century, the union 6f the 
Portuguese crown with Castile, the rise of Holland's influence in Asia and 
its capture of Malacca and the coll~pse of Portugal's Japanese trade 
brought Macau's heyday of prosperity to an end .. Although Macau held on to a 
significant trading role as a base 'for foreign merchants until the British 
founded Hong Kong in 1841, the territory's fortunes never fully recovered. 9 
How the Portuguese originally mCl,'klged to establish themselves in Macau 
and the nature of the rights they enjoyed is disputed, in part because 
there is no contemporary evidence that a deed or other sort of written 
6. R.D. Cremer, "A Model for Macau," A$.:L;\i.l ... A.tf~.i.r.~ 13, no. 4 (Winter 1986-1987): 45 .. 
7. Norman MacQueen, "Macau: End of a Sp~'cial Case?" I.be. .... WQt.ld .... IQO,.;\y, 41, no. 6-9 (Aug.-
Sept. 1985): 167. 
8. Cohen and Chiu, P.e.Qp.le..~.~ .... C.hin~, 1: 3/<1; Richard Louis Edmonds, L1~c.~y (Oxford, Santa 
Barbara and Denver: Clio Press, 1969), p. x;.,. 
9 .' Edmonds, ~c.@"!J. , pp. xx-xxi i • 
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agreement existed .. 10 By 1573, howev·.:. I'"', thei r occupation had become an 
established fact, probably founded . , j a "leasehold" agreement based on 
payment of a "ground rent" to the Cl .,l.nese Emperor .. 11 According to some 
interpretations, the "ground rent," vyi"lich the Portuguese submitted to until 
they refused payment in the mid-nin(:.~teenth century, constituted full 
Portuguese recognition of Chinese s~vereignty in the enclave .. 12 
Chinese intervention in the enclave's affairs limited Portuguese 
authority for most of these three c(;ITturies .. China "continued to receive 
rent for Portugal's use of Macau, tu collect land taxes and customs 
revenues, to station an official in i~acau, and, at least occasionally, to 
exercise some of the other function~) associated with the Western concept of 
~sovereignty.' Nevertheless, Portugal, which enjoyed considerable- autonomy 
within this system, [sic] continued to claim sovereignty over Macau."13 
Mediation, bribery of Chinese offici~ls and frequent tension and conflict 
characterised the system of give alld take that reigned in Macau .. 14 Afonso 
and Pereira conclude: 
10. Harald Bruning, "The Position of Macc:~u in the Portuguese constitutions Since 1822," 
J.QYr.na.l .. J~.t.J;.b~N .. Nac.a!J .... S.Qc.i~t.y' .... Q.t ... S.Qc.ial .... S.c..i~:n~;:~~;;?" no. 1 (Sept. 1966), pP. 12-13; Lourenco 
Mar ia da Conceicao, Mac.a!J .... En:tr.e. . .J~Qi~ .... Ir.~:tag.Q~~ .... !;QIll.. .. a .... C.hin~.J ..... le.~Z:::le.e.7. (Macau: Insti tu to 
Cultural de Macau, 1988), pp. 7-10; Rui Afonso and Francisco Goncalves Pereira, "The 
Political Status and Government Institutions uf Macau," I:iQOg . ...I~Qng .... .Law .... J.Q!Jr.nal 16, pt. 1 (Jan. 
1986), p. 29; Cohen and Chiu, I?e.Qp.le..~.~ .... C.h.in~A. 1: 374; For a main land Chinese version see "On 
the Questions of Hongkong and Macau," S.ei.ji.t.Hl. .. B~y..i~w, 23 Aug. 1982, p. 18. 
11. Afonso and Pereira, "Political statu~;; and Government Institutions," p. 29; Conceicao, 
Nac.a!J. .... fo.t.r.~ .... QQi~ .... Ir.a:t~g.Q~ , Pp. 6-9. 
12. Afonso and Pereira, "Political Statu:;) .lnd Government Institu·tions," p. 29 at note 7. 
13. Cohen and Chiu, I?~Q.P.l~.~.$. .... C.hina, 1: 3/'1; A Chinese imperial decree in 1613 prohibited 
construction of new buildings and ordered rns·asurernent of vessels for taxation purposes. In 
1688 Chinese authorities set UP a cust~ns hcuse. In 1726 they ordered the Portuguese-Macanese 
trading fleet reduced to twenty-five vessels and subjected them to strict contt'ols. In 1736, 
the Chinese established a local mandarinate ... ~~·th power to examine and punish criminals 
(Afonso and Pereira, "Political Status and G(Jvernrnent Institutions, It pp. 30-31). 
14. Ibid., PP. 30-31; Edmonds, Mac.e.!J, PP. xxvi-xxvii. 
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The consent of the Chinese authorities had always rested on a 
specific understanding of th'~~ Ilature and limits of the power vested 
in the Portuguese in Macau. Since Macau's origin as a Portuguese 
settlement, a dualism had bel-·
i
, i shown, sometimes strikingly, in all 
aspects of life: in the exerci~e of political power, the 
administration of justice, re l igious structures, trade affairs, even 
the Qrban administration. 1S 
By the early nineteenth century, Portugal had begun more forcefully 
I 
asser'ting its authority in Macau in an attempt to reduce China's influence 
and the symbols of Beijing's claim to sovereignty. After China's defeat in 
the Opium Wars and the rush by Wester'n powers to conclude treaties granting 
them extraterritorial and other rights in the weakened kingdom, Portugal 
also sought a treaty to clearly est~blish its sovereignty in Macau. 16 
Negotia.tions were prolonged, finally resulting in the parties sign~Dg the 
Lisbon Protocol in 1887, in which Portugal agreed to cooperate with China 
in taxing the opium trade in Macau and China agreed to Portugal's perpetual 
occupation and government of the ellclave .. 17 The two parties reconfirmed its 
terms the following year by ratifying the Treaty of Beijing .. Nevertheless, 
Portugal's authority was not absol~te. Portugal was obligated never to 
I 
I 
alienate Macau to another state wit'hout China's prior agreement. Moreover, 
the parties were to delineate the bO!Jndaries of the territory in a 
subsequent treaty, which was never negotiated. 18 
15. Afonso and Pereira, "Political statu::, and Government Institutions," pp. 29-30. 
16. Edmonds, Mac.aY, pP. xxii-xxiii; In aJdition to these factors, Conceicao attributes the 
move to the irregular pressures of Chinese intervention in Macau and the influence of 
positivist legal theory in the nineteenth century, which made Portuguese officials 
uncomfortable with ·their lack of a legal document proving Portugal's right to Macau 
(Conceicao, Mac.a.y. .... .En:t.r.e. .... D.oi.~ .... Ir.a:t.ad.Q$., PP. li·-13). 
17. Cohen and Chiu. f?e.Qp.l.e.!..~ .... !:hina 1: 3·/· }; For a Portuguese text of the protocol see 
Conce icao, 1:1ac.a.Y .... .En:t.r..e. .... QQi.$. .... Ir.a:t.adQ$., PP. 141-142. 
18. For a Portuguese text of the Treaty of 8eijing see Conceicao, Mac~Y .... .En:t.r.e .... D.Qi$. 
Ir.at.ad.Q$., PP. 153-171; Afonso and Pereira, "Political Status and Government Institutions," 
pp. 33-34. 
In the early centuries, the PortLi~uese in the enclave enjoyed 
considerable powers of sel f-governrr"~ I'lt from Lisbon ~ exercised through an 
elected local senate.. Beginning in t.ne nineteenth century, Portugal 
gradually drew Macau and its la~~s il ;to its overseas empire .. Like Lisbon's 
other overseas possessions, Macau b~came an overseas province of Portugal 
in 1951 and gained the status of ari autonomous region in 1971 .. 19 Despite 
the Treaty of Beijing and Lisbon's centralising policies, however, 
Portugal's authority in the territory was far from secure .. During the 
cultural Revolution in late 1966 and early 1967, anti-Macau government 
demonstrations led to the death of t;~ight local residents.. Portuguese 
- . ,.-" 
officials buckled to the demands of local pro-Communist groups and -PRC 
authorities by signing a protocol aureeing to prohibit Nationalist 
activities in the enclave, stop adill:i.tting refugees from China and accept 
the entry of PRC. gunboats into Macau:ts harbour,,20 "In the months 
immediately following the Jariuary 1~G7 settlement, the Macau authorities 
were afraid to enforce laws for feal"' of political implications, but 
gradually the government reasserted some of its former authority,,"21 
The military coup which toppled rJor'tugal!ls Caetano dictatorship on 25 
April 1974 set in motion a chain of events that brought democratic 
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government to Portugal and independ~nce to all Portugal's African and Asian 
19. Edmonds, Mac.au, p. xxvii; Bruning, "The Position of Macau in the Portuguese 
Consti tutions," pp. 16-16; Fr anz Ansprenger ~ Jbe .... Di$.$.olyt.ioo .... o.t ... t.be._C.olQoial .... .Empir.e$. (London: 
Routledge, ' 1989), p. 264. 
20. The protests ostensibly began with ·the alleged unnecessarily brutal suppr€.>ssion by 
Portuguese authorities of Macau residents r';;":'j ',ovating a building for use as a school on Taipa 
Island (Cohen and Chiu, f?eo.p.le.~.$. .... C.bina 1: 375, 793-795, 616-816). 
21. Edmonds, Mac.ay, pp. xxiv-xxvi. 
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possessions save Macau .. 22 The Portu~'Ju'3se government reportedly informed the 
PRC it wanted to return administrat ~0n of Macau to China~ but the Beijing 
government refus'ed fear'ing such a m,Jve would spark instability in Hong 
Kong .. 23 However, the Lisbon governiil'..;nt was under pressure from lobbies in 
Portugal and Macau to treat the enclave in a manner consistent with its 
democratic and anticolonial policies. As a compromise~ the Portuguese 
Constitution and the Organic Statute of Macau promulgated in Lisbon in 1976 
granted Macau some political autonolllY from Portugal and, in a sense" began 
Portugal's disengagement from the t:~rritory with China's tacit approval. 24 
Jhe Organic Statute, the enclave's mini constitution, said the territory's 
people shall "enjoy civil rights and, except as provided otherwise In the 
Constitution of the Republic of Portugal, the right of self-government in 
administration, economy, finance and legislation."25 Setting out the basic 
principles and institutions for the enclave's administration, it provided 
for a Legislative Assembly made up of local residents, a minority of whom 
were directly elected. However, residency qualifications restricted the 
number of local Chinese qualified to vote .. 26 The Portuguese Constitution 
22. Gerald J. Bender, Ango.lf1', .... V.nQ.~r. .... t.h~ ... .f:\.w.:t!J9l,l~$.~. lI .... _Ihe. .... t1Yt.h_ .. anQ ..... t.h~ ... .8~~l.it.y. (London: 
Heinemann, 1978), pP. 234-237; Ansprenger, Q.i.$.$.o.l!Jt..iQn .... o..f .... t.h~ .... C.o..l.Qni~.l ...... Emp..i.r.~$., pp. 268-269. 
23. Chris Kershaw, "If Portugal decided 'tu pull out of Macau," HKS, 9 June 1974; "Leand,"o 
denies Macau offered back to China," HKS, 2 A~' r. 1975; MacQueen, "Macau," p. 168. 
24. MacQueen, "t1acau," p. 168. 
25. Portugal, Or.9~n.i.c._.St.at.!Jt.~ .... Q.f .... t.1~cp..y. , :i. 990, Art. , 2 (hereafter OSM); All references in 
this thesis refer to the 1990 version unless otherwise stated; For a Portuguese version of 
the 1990 Organic Statute see Governo de Macau, So.le.t..i.oo .... O.fiCiiAl, no. 20, supplement, 12 May 
1990, pp. 1779-1794; For an English version of the 1976 version see Peter Wesley-Smith, 
"Macau," in Albert P. Blaustein and Phylli$ i1. Blaustein, eds., C.Qn~t.i:tyt.iQO~ .... Q.f. ... D.e.~nde.nc.i~ 
a.nd .. _Sp.~ial ..... So.y.e.r.e.ign:t.i.e:$., vol. 2 (New Vor k: Oceana, June, 1987). 
26. The 1976 version of the statute provlJed for a Legislative Assembly of seventeen 
deputies of which five were appointed by the governor, six directly elected by universal 
9t.rffrage and six indil'9ctly elected by lo.cal 8ivic organisations (OSt1, Art. 21; MacQueen, 
"Macau," p. 168). 
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said Macau was under Portuguese adridnistration but did not identify it as 
part of Portuguese territory.27 Thi~ new constitutional framework presaged 
a secret accord reached between Por':i.ugal and the PRC in 1979 after the two 
I 
governments established diplomatic ~ ~lations.28 . Under the agreeme~t, both 
governments recognised Macau as Chillcse territory under Portuguese 
administration, a status that carries considerable implications for Macau's 
autonomy after returning to PRC administration in 1999. 29 
Society, Economy and Political Participation 
Macau's current status is characterised by one scholar as "Chinese-
sove rei_gnty-and- Portuguese-adminis 1:. nl tion-manipulated-by- rep resentgti ves-
of-China .. "30 Another calls it "a hi~h degree of local autonomy" with . 
"Chinese influence in, and control over, Macau's economy and political 
system ...... solidly established with approval of the Portuguese Republic."31 
This unusual status and its meaning for post-1999 Macau must be understood 
in relation to the role of major political and economic actors in the 
enclave and their means of politi6al participation. 
About 97 percent of Macau's more than 500,000 residents are ethnic 
Chinese, most of them Cantonese originally from neighbouring Guangdong 
province in the PRC .. As Portuguese traders declined in importance in past 
centu ries, ethnic Chinese rose to dOfllinate the local economy.. Today, p ro-
Beijing local Chinese business, union and kai fong-association elites play 
27. portugal,. CQO~:ti:t~tt.i.Qn ... J:tf .... :th~ .. _.Re.:'p'!J .. b..l..\.G. ... Q.f. .. J?Qr.:t.yga.l., Art. S( 1 )( 4) (hereafter Portugal, 
COO$.t.i.:tY:t.i.Qf1 ) • 
28. Edmonds, Mac.a.!J., p. xxvi. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Wesley-Smith, "Macau," p. 1. 
31. Crerner, "A Model for Macau," PP. 53-·!;Jl.j . 
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a predominant role in the political system, although a new group of 
independent local Chinese political ll:.)aders is trying to challenge these 
traditional elites.. Locally born EUi ~', \ ,:3ians, known as Hacanese, and 
expatriate Portuguese continue to ~ =.uy major roles in local administration, 
politics and the professio'ns in nur/lt' (!I~S out of proportion with their small 
3 to 4 percent share of the populat'ion .. "To a large extent, Macau's future 
depends on the outcome of political struggles and compromises between these 
four political forces .. "32 
The Hacanese--called ~macaense,' ~filhos da Macau' or ~filhos da terra,' 
in the local Portuguese dialect--al~~ a difficult group to define, both 
racially and culturally .. 33 I use tl'le term to refer to someone of EU";~~sian 
ancestry who speaks Portuguese,34 although most Hacanese also speak 
Chinese .. Because definition is pro~lcmatic and government statistics tend 
to identify people as either Chinegc or Portuguese nationals, which does 
32. Herbert S. Yee and Sonny Shui-hing LI,.), "Macau in Transition: The Politics of 
Decolonisation" (Paper presented to the Chin.l and Hong Kong at the Crossroads Symposium, 
Baptist College, Hong Kong, 3-5 Sept. 1990, forthcoming in A~i~n., .. s.YrY~Y.:), P. 2. 
33. Scholars and Macau people alike use 'ti)6' term in various ways, some to refer to people 
of mixed Chinese and Portuguese ancestt'y, oth~'rs to anyone born in Macau, at least any non-
Chinese, and still others to those of mixed [w'opean and Asian ancestry who speak Portuguese, 
especiall y Portuguese with a Macau accent (Scl~ Edmonds, t1Q,c.~y, p. xxxix; F . A. Si 1 va, Al.l .. _OYr. 
Y~a.t~r.d.Q,Y.:$_; .... .Ihe. .... SQn~ .... o..tJ:19c.9!J::::::Ihe.ir ..... Hi~:t.o.r'y ... ,;).n!:L.H~r . .i:t.~g~ [Ca 1 i forn i a: UMA, 1979 J, p. 12 ; 
generally Ana Maria Amaro, f.i..lbo.~ .... d,~ .... I~r..r..Q, [11acau: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1988J). 
34. This follows Ana Maria Amaro's argU;ri~~nt that the Macanese are not descendents of the 
offspring of Portu9lJese-Chinese liaisons, in early Macau. Rather, they are descendents of some 
of the first Portuguese residents of ''1acau ~;.nd Asian or Eurasian women, who were mostly from 
Malacca, India, Timot' and other points of PC1r t.uguese trade and se'ttlement throughout Asia and 
Africa. The Eurasian Macanese community that developed from these liaisons was relatively 
insular and fairlY well off socially and fin.::lI'Icially. Marriages tended to occur wi,thin the 
community itself or with Portuguese. Chinese-Portuguese and Chinese-Macanese intermarriage 
was relatively rare in Macau until the nit)et.,:;o€mth century. Therefore, traditional Macanese 
culture is not predominantly a mixture of Pc.wtuguese and Chinese heritage, but a product of 
Portuguese and numerous Asian and even Afric..ln cultures including Goan, Malay, Japanese, 
Filipino, Tai, Burmese, French, English and other strains. With the increase in marriages 
between Macanese and Chinese in recent decaGE.:'s, Chinese blood increasingly dominates the 
Macanese mix. According to Edmonds, the children of marriages between Portuguese men and 
Chinese women are now regarded as Macanese 'l,oo. These maf'riages help reinforce -the Portuguese 
identity in the populatiOn while maintainin~i Chinese cultural associa'tions (see genet~ally 
Amaro, fil..bQ~ .... da .... I~r.r.a; Edmonds, t1ac.ay" P. ·' ) .:t<.x ) • 
70 
not necessa rily correspond with the:\. r ethnic or racial identity , it is 
di fficul t to know how many Macanesl.::.~ Llle re a re in Macau. Most estimates 
range from 10,000-15,000" In any C"';<' \':':I it is a group with influence beyond 
,- .. . 
.its small numbers. Macau's only of·"" l.:;ial language is Portuguese, a tongue 
understood by only about 4· percent (jf Macau residents. Expatriate 
Po~tuguese rarely learn to speak Chinese. Instead, many use English to 
communicate with non-Portuguese residents. Therefore, bilingual Macanese 
have traditionally acted as intermeJiaries between the Portuguese 
administration and legal system anJ the enclave's Chinese residents. They 
dominate the middle ranks of the civil service and some are professionals. 
- . 
Macanese leaders have taken an active role in Macau's Legislative Assembly 
and Consultative Council, the latt8t~ an advisory body to the governor. 35 
Carlos Assumpcao, a Macanese, has bc~n the assembly's president since 1976. 
Most expatriate Portuguese in M\JCdU are administrators, soldiers, 
teachers and other civil servants 0:1 contracts of a few years. In contrast 
with the early years of the city, V~('y few Portuguese are involved in 
commerce,36 although some work as p('ofessionals in the pri vate sector. A 
few expatriate Portuguese residents Ilave participated in the Legislative 
Assembly. In general, however, their main channel of political 
participation has been their traditional monopoly of the senior civil 
service, the, judiciary and government executive" Ironically, given the 
Macau government's policy o'f recruiting more local Chinese and Macanese 
into the high ranks of the civil service, the absolute number of Portuguese 
35. OSI:1, Art. 43-50. 
:36. Wong Siu-lun t "Chinese Entrepreneul ~;i l d,)) in Macau," R.D. Creme,", ed., Ind,!J~:tr . .ii.\l 
.E.c.QOQOOy. .... Q.f .... l:1ac.ay ...... i.n. ... :the. .... 19.2Q~ (Hong Kong: np r Press and China Economic Research Centre, 
University of East Asia, 1990), p. 27 • 
. -.. , . 
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expatriates in Macau has been climb :~llg in recent years ~ "presumably to make 
a last attempt to lusify the territ('1 y and to take advantage of recently 
0lanned infrastructural investment.' 37 Between 1989 and 1990 alone, the 
number of Portuguese expatriates il' the Macau civil service incre~sed from 
1,46.1 to 1,907 or about 30.5 pe rce: It.. 38 
Language and other restrictions ',!;\Jve until recently excluded local 
Chinese from all but the lower echt!lons of the Macau civil service. 
Traditional suspicions of organised politics and of colonial institutions 
have also discour'aged most local Chinese--the majority of whom were born in 
China and are recent immigrants to i'lcJcBu--from participating in politics 
througli elections. However, there ai"O small signs this is beginning"-to 
change. By contrast, Chinese busine:~>s, labour and kai fong association 
elites are politically active and play a pivotal role in balancing PRC and 
Macau interests in the territory .. Tlley are generally labelled "pro-China" 
or "traditional" groups by scholars and local political observers. 
Among these, business elites hold a particularly strong political 
position, especially leaders of th~ local Chinese Chamber of Commerce. The 
political clout of this umbrella gr\)up for business associations has been 
based on PRC backing of its leader~3hip and the continuity of its top 
personnel. From 1950 until his death in 1983, local banker Ho Yin chaired 
the chamber. Ho Yin acted as 8eijil'i'J's unofficial representative in Macau. 
His successor, Ma Man Kei, was the chamber's vice-chairman after 1950 and 
currently sits in Macau's Assembly, where business representatives have a 
preeminent role .. Ho Yin's son Edmund Ho is the assembly's vice-president .. 
37. Edmonds_ ~ac.ay, p. xxvi. 
38. Interview, Rui Rocha, deputy dit'ec-tc/" -, Service of Administration and Public Function, 
Macau Government, 6 Feb. 1991. 
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Chamber of Commerce representative~:> IKlve held important posts in PRC 
political institutions such as the ~3 'L(lnding Committee of the National 
People's Congress (NPC).39 
Beginning in the early 1980s and particularly after Sino-Portuguese 
negotiations on Macau beg~n in 1986, ordinary Macau Chinese have been more 
politically active, casting ballots in elections, signing petitions and 
participating in demonstrations and a growing variety of newly formed 
political organisations. 40 An indepundent reform-minded deputy, Al~xandre 
Ho, became a directly .elected Legi:::>lative Assembly member in 1984. He 
subsequently formed the Associacao dl3 Amizade Alexandre Ho, which contested 
the 1988 elections and won three o·r the six directly elected seats':"'-The 
pro-Beijing and Macanese community's Uniao Eleitoral kept the other three 
seats. While only 4,000 registered voters went to the polls in the 1980 
Legislative Assembiy election, 29,000 citizens voted in the 1984 elections 
after the franchise was expanded by eliminating separate residency 
restr'ictions for local Chinese .. The number of Macau Chinese interest groups 
registered to participate in indirect elections to the assembly similarly 
rose to 144 in 1984 from only ninety-two in 1980. 41 Beginning in 1985, 
Chinese residents formed twenty-thret3 new interest groups concerned with 
such matters as social welfare and jviacau's political future. 42 
39. Cremer, "A Model for Macau?" p. 49. 
40. Lo, "Aspects of Political Development- in Macau," C.h.ina .... Qy~r.t.e.r.ly., no. 6 (Dec. 1989), 
pP. 846-849. 
41. Wong Hon-Keung, .E.c.QnQf,oy. .... o..f .... t1~c.a~J. n1a.c.:~u: Jot'nal Va Kio, 1988), p. 19; These increases 
are linked to the lifting of residency restriction on Chinese voters before the 1964 
elections. 
42. The Macau Social Science Association. ·the Social Workers Association and the Pos't-
Secondary Graduates Association, for exampl~, at'e political discussion groups which organise 
seminars to debate government policies and l'/I<~cau's future (Lo, "Aspects of Political 
Development in Macau," pP. 846-849). 
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Demonstrations in support of the PRC pro-democracy student movement in Hay 
and June 1989 drew approximately on~ in five residents in the largest 
public protests the enclave has sel;:.1 .in two decades. 43 
The impact political participatil..· ;, ·patterns and elite and popular 
expectations ha ve on Macau·' S 8utoncJ lal.Y process cannot be sepa rated from the 
territory's economic dependence on rlong Kong and China. As a small open 
economy with no natural resources of its own, Macau survives on foreign 
trade. 44 Water, most food, sophistic(..(ted consumer goods, investment goods, 
raw materials for industry and some electricity are imported, the majority 
from these two neighbouring giants "..1. 5 For China's part, PRC state-owned 
firms are important participants ill r1acau's import-export, banking,. 
. -':- #'"' 
insurance and shipping sectors .. A ldr·ge group of private companies also 
acts as distributors and agents fot~ PRC goods and se rvices. Oi rect PRC 
investment has increased in recent years in the manufacturing and tourism 
areas and in major infrastructur'e d·jvelopments like the new international 
airport. Macau depends on China for skilled construction and unskilled 
manufacturing labour .. 46· For years the central government-owned Nam Kwong 
Trading Company was Beijing's economic and political representative in the 
43 .. "Vinte poY canto da populacao de MaC2,U mani festou-se a favor dos estudantes de 
Bei j ing," Ga;ur.t.~ ... .Mgc.ae.n~e. (herea fter GM), 2/1 May 1989. 
44. With an export orienta·tion (export v .. ~lue as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product) of 
62 percent and an impart or ientation (impol"" t val ue as a percentage of GOP) of SO pet"cent t 
Macau has one of the highest trade-dependetlt terri torial communities in the world (H .K. Tse, 
"Macau's International Trade Relations: the Changing External and Internal Environment," in 
Cremer, lnd.!J.~:t.r.i.al. .... .Ec.QnQr.oy' .... Q.f. ... :t.he. .... Mac.aY ..... .in .... t. .h!~ ..... 1.22.0$., P. 57). 
45. H.K. Tse, "Macau's In·tarnational Tt··i...\J(;;· Relations," P. 60; Cremer, "A Model for Macau," 
p. 51; John Karnm, "The Macau Connection," !;;'J:.l.i.i:.t.::.~~ .... 6.!J~in!?~$. ... .Be.~d.e.w 12, no. 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1985) 
pp. 46-49. 
46. Kamm, "The Macau Connection," Pp. 46 ···4"7; Creme,.., "A Model fOt" Macau," p. 52. 
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territory. In 1987, the political 1"1.:.>113 was taken over by a new office of 
the New China News Agency set up ii I the encla ve. 
Hong Kong business has penetratcli Macau's economy so deeply that one 
observer has called Macau "a colony o'F a colony."47 Much of the capital 
that fuelled Macau '$ industrial bOCHII after 1960 and especially a-fter 1970 
came from Hong Kong because of the Bt'itish territory's loss or saturation 
of its own quotas and preferential tariffs for its major exports, 
particularly textiles and garments, toys and other light manufactures. 48 An 
estimated 60 percent of industrial investment and 90 percent of technical 
and managerial staff in Macau's mali ~Jracturing sector are from Hong Kong. 49 
.. ~ .. 
Hong Kong gamblers are the biggest r.I ~:ttrons of Macau's casinos and, because 
taxes from gambling accounted for about 49 percent of government teceipts 
in 1989, ' they indirectly contribute a huge chunk of Macau's public 
revenues. 50 Hong Kong dollars aCCOUi-,t for a major share of Macau's money 
supply both in terms of currency ill circulation and bank deposits.s1 
Because Macau has neither an airpol -t nor, until recently, a deep-sea port, 
much of the enclave's external communication depends on Hong Kong. 
Such close economic ties to China and Hong Kong bring close 
institutional and personal links'ges and influence Macau and Portuguese 
government policies. Many Macau business leaders also have economic 
interests in Hong Kong and some liv8 part or much of their time in the 
47. A~ia .... Y.~~r .. bQQk 1966, p. 184. 
46. Victor F .5. Sit, "Industrial Policic-:,3 "for Macau in the 1990s" in Cremer, lod!J$.t..r..i.al 
.Ec.QOQOlY. .... Q.t ... l1ac.a!J .... in .... t.b~ .... l9.~Q~. Pp. 68-70. 
49. Wong Siu-lun, "Chinese Entref:(eneun~ h.ip in Macau," p. 27. 
50. Har ald Brun ing, "~~acau tr irns budget ~3 . .s pc _" HKS, 4 Dec. 1990. 
51. A$.i;;L.Y.~ar .. ~t.:; 1965, p. 189. 
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British territory. Among this group is Stanley Ho, whose Sociedade de 
Tourismo e Oiversoes (STDM) has h~ll i the gambling franchise in Hacau since 
1962 .. Ho also has stakes in Macau 1. ~ t . ,:Jlic utilities, transport companies, 
banl<s, hotels and major infrastthucture projects as well as numeroUs Hong 
Kong and overseas ventures ' .. Althouq: 'l he does not participate in the 
Legislative Assembly, good relation~) with the Macau government are 
essential for renewal of the 'franchise on favourble terms and his political 
influence is significant .. 52 Accordiilg to one government official, I1 It is 
not impossible but it is very difficult for a governor to say no to Stanley 
Ho, but he [Ho] doesn't run MacauM He just looks after his own 
interests. 11 S3 Some analysts argue C:d.na has run Macau since the 196(/ riots 
and there is no doubt China '5 :i.nflLK~nce in Macau remains strong. However, 
Macau's network of political and eC(Jilomic linkages is complex .. "Although 
China has exercised in'fluence over che colonial administration nonetheless 
it [the administration] has been able to formulate and implement policies 
free 'f rom Chinese p ressu res .. 11 S4 
Macau's· Autonomy Process 
It is within this intricate web of PRC, Hong Kong, Macau and Portuguese 
interests that the Sino-Portuguese fJegotiations on Macau began in June 
1986, formally marking the start of Macau's autonomy process. Portuguese 
and PRC government representatives were the only official parties to the 
talks that led to the Joint Declaration and the sole official participants 
.52. Johnathan Friedland, "A winning streal<;," f~r ...... ~~$.:~e.rn ..... Ec.Qn~mlic. .... Re.y.ie.w (hen~'af"ter 
f.,EEB) , 6 Sept. 1990, pp. 56-59; Id., "A ro·tal flush," f.,EfR, 6 Sept. 1990, PP. 59-61. 
53. Interview, Jorge Rangel, president, 11,\r.::au Founda'tion, an autonomous public agency 
whose respOr'Isibilities include operation of t.he University of East Asia, 12 Feb. 1991. 
54. Lo, "Aspects of Political Developm€,l'It~ in Macau," p. 650. 
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in tile Joint Liaison Group (~lLG) fOt"lH0d for consultations on transition 
period issues under the accord .. MaC~l.I.l people and the Macau government, the 
latter of which is politically reSI . .!' ~,' 1 ::::>ible to tile Portuguese president and 
not the Portuguese government) were' .Iot formally represented .. 55 However, 
unofficial participants co~e into ~]dY through Portugal's own activities In 
Macau, Macau government officials as technical experts to the JLG, the 
"united front" efforts undertaken by Beijing to win local support for "one 
country, two systems" 56 and tl1e net~\lorl< o·f business and political 
connections linking Macau to Hong Kong and the PRC .. Portuguese government 
and expatriate participation in the bargaining process is likely to become 
less significant as the transition j:J81"'iod progresses, while PRC-Hong Kong-
Hacau interactions will increasingl)' propel the autonomy process and shape 
the pattern of central-local negotiations and compromises. This process is 
influenced by such internal attitucjj,nal and institutional variables as 
Macau people's sense of identity in relation to China and Macau, political 
institutions and participation and the legal system. External linkages with 
Portugal, Hong Kong and other interllational state and nonstate actors also 
mould the process .. 
Hong Kong's mark on Macau '5 autoilOWY process was deep from the 
beginning. The Sino-Portuguese agl~81:.;!ment on Macau is modelled on the Sino-
British Joint Declaration respectil18 Hong Kong, which was initialled on 26 
ss. The Portuguese president, who is sUP~-'lJ8ed to be above party politics and is di,..ectly 
elected for a five-year term, is supreme cO"IIIiI,~nder of the Portuguese armed forces and acts as 
head of state. He also appoints the Macau gOVl;'rnor. The Portuguese government, which has no 
direct responsibility for the Macau governmc'i1t., is headed by a prime minister and cabinet 
accountable to -the Portuguese Assembly of t/'.,;- RepUblic or parliament. The Assembly of the 
Republic must approve amendments to Macau's urganic Statute. This division of responsibility 
is supposed to keep Macau out of Portugal's vulatile party politics (Bruning, "The Position 
of Macau in the Portuguese Constitutions," p. 19). 
56. For a description of some of BeijinS)'s activi ,ties in Macau see Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, 
"Settlement of the Macau Issue: Distinctiv~ '-;C..:ltures ()f Beijing's Negotiating Behavior," 
~c.a$.jJ;!flal_ ... f?a.p.er.$.L.R~.p.r,i.nt.$. .... s.e:r . .i.e:$. .... i.n ... ,CQnt.emf~!n!L~\r.y' ... ,A$.i~n .... St.!J.Q .. i.~~ , no. 4, 1968 (87), Pp. 20-22. 
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Sept. 1984 after two years of o'ftell 'tense negotiations. Beijing's influence 
in Macau has generally been much st" ,;l1ger than it has in Hong ' Kong and, 
particularly since 1979, its relat:'~'lllship with Portugal often more amicable 
than its ties with the United Kingck),tI M Nevertheless, the PRC has tended to 
group the two territories together (\8 similar problems left over from 
history to be settled "peacefully tfnough negotiations when conditions are 
ripe." S7 cons~quently, even though Portugal had already conceded PRC 
sovereignty in Macau and the 1888 T I'eaty of Beij ing had no terminal date, 
once China decided to force the British out of Hong Kong it seemed 
inevitable it would also take back 'Lhe enclave. 58 Throughout the 
negotiations, Portugal and Macau have had difficulty taking full ad~antage 
o'f their generally good relationship ~Jith China in the face o'f Beij ing 's 
tendency to treat Macau like Hong 1'~uj'Jg so as not to cause trouble in the 
British territory. On 3 October 1984, a month after the initialling of the 
Sino-British accord, Deng Xiao Pinu told a delegation from Macau and Hong 
Kong that lithe Macau question, like Hong Kong, will be settled at the same 
time and with the same formula."S9 Like its past, the future of Macau in 
Beijing's eyes is inextricably entan9led in that of the more valuable and 
more troublesome Hong Kong. 
Nevertheless, the Sino-Portuguese accord on Macau does have some 
distinct features and has triggered an autonomy process with some unique 
characteristics. Negotiations betwc8n Lisbo~ and Beijing representatives 
went on intermittently for nine mOllths. While the most fundamental conflict 
57. Cohen and Chil.~ t Ee:Qp..l.~.~. :;?, .... C.hi.lla, 1: ,.kJO" 
58. Wesley-Smith, "Macau," p. 9 • 
.59. Yu~ "Macau's Past, Present, and FUtUi: c," in s.~l.~t.~d. .... l.n.fQr.ma:tio.ll .... QO .... t1ac.,;A!J .. _l~3.~:::l9.e.S. 
(198S)p. 12, cited in Chang, "Settlement of the Macau Issue," P. 4 at note 14. 
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between the PRC and United Kingdom I!dd been whether Britain could continue 
its sovereignty and government over Hong Kong after 1 July 1997, the issues 
that most divided Portugal and Chincl were the timing of the return of Macau 
to the PRC and problems relating to 'the nationality of the enclave's 
inhabitants .. 60 Afte r they reached cHI dg reement, some schola rs and 
jout"'!1alists concluded Portugal had ~.:~queezed more concessions from the PRC 
than Britain had managed .. 61 For one thing, the PRC had wanted to take over 
Macau and Hong Kong at the same tir~l(:~ in 1997, whereas Portugal wanted more 
time to prepare the territory for tf"k~ transfer in order to avert some of 
the bloodshed, embarrassment and hLl.il.]n dislocation that characterised its 
rushed decolo.nisation in India, Africa and East Timor .. Lisbon's 
representatives saw no reason to hUi "ry out of Macau .. Portugal accepted 
China's claim to sovereignty over tlJl~ enclave and was on good terms with 
Beijing. It wanted more time to train local people to take over senior 
posts in the government administra·~i(..)n and legal system and translate local 
laws into Chinese and prepare to maJ\G Chinese an official language; it 
wanted to imp rove the encla ve 's t rallsportation and othe r economic 
infrastructure, if possible with thu participation of Portuguese companies, 
and to benefit from the transfet~ of some of the capital frightened 
"investors might pull out of Hong KOI'lg before and after 1997 .. 62 In the end, 
Pprtuguese negotiators managed to e;ct.ract almost two and one-half years 
more time than had been granted the British in Hong Kong .. 
60. "Portuguese may quit Macau early," I: H~5., 18 Sept. 1986; Albert Chan, "Complex problem 
of Portuguese passports," s.Q!Jt.b. ... C.hina .... J:1Qr.nitl~:J . ..f.?Q~tt (hereafter Sc.J:1I?), 30 June 1986; Chang, 
"settlement of the Macau Issue," PP. 3, 8-16. 
61. Chang, "Settlement of the Macau IssuJz," pp. 3-4 and note 13 .. 
62. COlin McSeveny and John Beasant, "Ei\rly handover for Macau confinned," $C.t1p.. 26 Jan. 
1987; Chang, "Settlement of the Macau Issue," Pp. a-1(). 
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The Joint Decla ration on Hong KO: ',L! also reflects the inability o'f 
Britain and China to resol ve their c,;ispute over who had sovereignty over 
the territory .. The first article o'ft,lle accord states that the recovery o'f 
Hong Kong "is the common aspiration 0f the entire Chinese people, and that 
it [China] has decided t.o , resume tl"I(,'! 13xercise of sovereignty over Hong 
Kong .. "63 By contrast, the Sino-Port~guese agreement says merely that Macau 
"is Chinese territory and that the Covernment of the People's Republic of 
China will resume the exercise of s()vereignty" over the enclave, reflecting 
the fact that sovereignty was not all issue in the negotiations on Macau. 64 
Whereas there is no mention of Hong Kong's mixed-race inhabitants and other 
ethnic minority groups such as the local Indian community, Portugal ~ '~ained 
specific protections for Macau's MaCdnese minority: "The Macau Special 
Administrative Region shall protect, according to law, the interests of 
residents of Portuguese descent in Macau and shall respect their customs 
and cultural traditions."65 Nor did the Sino-Portuguese agreement mention 
the stationing of the People's Libetdtion Army in Macau,66 apparently 
because the Portuguese no longer have a military garrison in Macau while 
Britain still stations one in Hong Kong .. 67 
63 • Ih~ .... ,).Q.i.n:t .... Q~c.l.sr.a:ti.Qt.l .... 9~f. ... t.h~ .... QQy.~r.nri'I~LL~ .... Q.f .... t.ooN .. e~p.le.~.~ .... B~~.b..l.ic ..... Q.f. ... C.h.ina .... ,;t.nQ .... :t..h~ 
uni:t~ ..... Kin9d.Qm .... Q.f .... Or.~a:t .... 6.r..i.j;.a..in'N.~nd ..... /:iQr.t.h~r.n , .. ..IJ:~l~nd ..... Qn .... :tm .... Qye.~:tiQn .... Q.f. ... HQng ... .I:~Qng, 26 Sept. 
1984, Art. 1 (hereafter HQt19 .... KQfl9 .... J.Q). 
64 • Msc.a!J .... ,).Q, Ar t . 1. 
65. ~ac.a!J .... J.Q, Annex I (V); See Chang, "SE:t .. tleme'nt of the Macau Issue," p. 4 and note 13. 
66. The Sino-British Joint Declaration says: "Military forces sent by the Central People's 
Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for the purpose of 
defence shall not , interfere in the in-ternal ,:df,3.irs of the •.. Region" (tlQn9 .... ~QO.9_ ... J.Q, Anne,\( I 
[XI I I J; Chang, "Settl ement of the Macau I SSl.l c.~," P. 4 and note 13). 
67. "Reunion da Lei Basica terminou de n,,;l.nha," J..Qr.na.l .... d~ .... l1sc.a~l, 9 June 1990 (hereafter 
J.M) • 
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The nationality dispute dut"'ing tile talks stemmed "from differences in 
Portuguese and Chinese nationality lUWS. Portugal's law recognises only one 
type of nationality, lAJhich grants T,d.l Portuguese citizenship including 
right of abode and entry in Portugal as well as consular services and 
protection. There are an estimated 100,000 Macau people, mostly ethnic 
Chinese , with Portuguese passports ~~'hich entitle them to ente r into and 
live in Portugal and to consular sej vices and protection. 68 However, the 
PRC nationality law does not recognise dual nationality for Chinese 
nationals. 69 Some analysts argue tileft. China acquiesced to Portuguese 
demands for dual nationality in Ma(~uu. 70 If there is a cornprornlse, it took 
the form of ambiguously worded phra~es penned by both sides in the ~eparate 
Portuguese and Chinese memoranda on nationality attached to the 
agreement. 71 This vagueness is typical of the word games used to paper over 
unresolved disputes in many autonomy agreements. The same ambiguities that 
were interpreted by analysts as signs of flexibility on the nationality 
issue in 1987 were to cause problelils later. After signing the Joint 
68. Chang, "Settlement of the Macau Issue," p. 12; Edmonds, t.1~c.~y, p. liii. 
69. See generally Hungdah Chiu, "Nationality and International Law in Chinese 
Perspecti ve," Qc_c.a~iQOal. ... ,f?g"Re:r~LBe.p.rj,n:t~ .. "s.~:r.J~$. .... in ... ,C.QO:te.m.P.Qr.Q.r.Y. ... ~ian" .. St.!Jo . .i.e.$., no. 3, 1990 
(98); Chang, "Settlement of the Macau Issue," p. 12. 
70. Chang, "settlement of the Macau Issut.:·~" p. 4. 
71. The PRC memorandum states: "The inh~uitants in Macau who come under the provisions of 
the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, whE·ther they ar·e holders of the 
Portuguese travel or identity documents or IKJt .. have Chinese citizenship. Taking account of 
the historical background of Macau and its realities, the competent authorities of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China will permit Chinese nationals in Macau 
previously holding Portu9UE'se travel docum€:'ln .. s to continue to use their documents for 
travelling to other sta·tes and regions after the establishment o'f the Macau Special 
Administrative Region. The above-mentiorled Chinese nationals will not be entitled to 
Portuguese consular protection in the Macau ~3pecial Administrative Region and other parts of 
the People's Republic of China." The Portugu~sl? memorandum reads: "In confo,..mi ·ty with the 
Portuguese legislation, the inhabitants in 11 .. lCclU who, having Portuguese ci·tizenship, are 
holders of a Portuguese passport on De'cembeJ' 19, 1999 may con·tinue to use ita fter this date. 
No person may acquire Portuguese ci,tizenship as from December 20, 1999 by virtue of his or 
her connection ~Jith Macau" (MAc'QY ..... J.o', Memora,',ua on Nationality). 
8.1. 
Declaration Portuguese officials had stressed that Macau Chinese with 
Portuguese p~ssports would be treatl:~ just like other Portuguese citizens. 
In the aftermath of tbe Tiananmen S:· ',l.Jare massacre, Lu Ping, then vice-
" .. .. 
president of the PRC state Council \ ,. Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, 
said Macau Chinese with Portuguese I'kl tionality would be considered Chinese 
nationals by the PRC government and ~ould not be entitled to Portuguese 
consular protection after the tran~ fer in 1999, although they could use 
their Portuguese passports as travel documents. 72 His ~Jords mirror the PRC 
policy on nationality in Hong Kong. l'hey make it possible that children 
born in Macau after 1999 of parent:3 \A)ith Portuguese. passports will not bl~ 
able to acquire Portuguese citizen:::> : Li.p. 73 
.-"::- .-
Macau's experience demonstrates Ilo~~ the initial formal autonomy-
agreement is critical, but not becai1::;e it resolves all outstanding legal 
disputes. Rath~r, the accord reflec·ted the balance of power among central, 
local and external actors at the ti.:lc and helped set the agenda for 
subsequent negotiations that will dlJtermine whether the autonomy process 
survives and in what form. In this sense, the signing of the Sino-
Portuguese accord initiated a new phase in Macau's aut.onomy process which 
is still underway. 
Three interconnected developments characterise the current phase. All 
are closely linked with issues growing out of the Joint Declaration, 
~lthough other variables such as political conflicts surrounding the 
drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law and the 1989 Tiananmen Square student 
protests have been important too. F j,rst, China appears to be making more 
72. Adam Lee, "Curbs on Portugal passpol' ':. :',oldet'$," $Q!.f~h. ... Ch.i.na ... MQr.n.ing .... P.o.$.:t. (hereafter 
S.CMP.) , 11 Sept. 1969. 
73. "China seeks Taiwan rule before 2000," SCMP., 27 Mar. 1987. 
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attempts to influence Macau politiG~) and government administration. This 
trend was particularly marl<ed in thu months following the crackdown on the 
PRC student movement on 4 June 1989. 14 Second, the Macau and Portuguese 
governments and Portuguese busines~ ;, people are more active in the ' enclave 
than before. Much of the governme~t activity surrounds intensified efforts 
to: reform Macau's political system and its laws, as well as translate them 
into Chinese; tr'ain local Chinese tu assume leadership of the ci viI 
service, legal system and other public institutions; develop new 
transportation and industrial infras tructure so that the territory IS less 
dependent on Hong Kong; and integrate some Macau civil servants into the 
Portuguese civil service and take other steps to protect Portuguese ' 
citizens and culture in Macau. 75 SOiil'2 Macau government policies have drawn 
criticism from Chinese officials and some local Chinese citizens, who 
regularly accuse the Portuguese of Ilot moving quickly enough on 
localisation and officialisation of the Chinese language. 76 An increase in 
citizen political participation in Macau, an intensification of a trend 
which began earlier in the 19803, is the third major characteristic of this 
phase of the autonomy process. Po],itical participation over the past three 
years has been directed at actions critical of the PRC government--the May-
June 1989 protests, for example--a~ well as of Macau authorities. Macau 
74, Yee and Lo, "f1acau in Transition," Pr,) . 8-12 .. 
75. For example, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Macau Legislative ' 
Assembly and the Portuguese Assembly of thE' ,.::(~public conflicted over the latter's desire to 
insert a more speci'fic reference to human ri0hts in Macau's Organic Statute. The statute made 
only general reference to "civil rights" and ",the principles established in the 
constitutional laws of the Portuguese Republic." In the end, the amended clause referred more 
explicitly to "those principles and ... thoz:z rights, liber'ties and guarantees established in 
the Constitution of the Republic of Portugal and in the present $tatu'te" (OSM, Art. 2). 
76. Yee and Lo, "Macau in Transition," p. 15. 
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residents are more overtly critical of the Hacau government,77 although 
recent public opinion polls found t1.;:, ·~·a u people were generally satis'fied 
with the government's perfor'mance .. 7::, 
Central-local bargaining related t,o the drafting of a Basic Law 'for the 
futu re Macau SAR is cent ral to this :5tage of the autonomy process.. Howeve r , 
even more than its Hong Kong countclpart, the Macau Basic Law is also a 
product of dictate .. The Basic LatA), Ur.3-Fting Committee, a working group under 
the PRC's NPC, has a total of forty ¥'eight members, nineteen of whom are 
from Hacau and the others from the fJRC. The Macau side includes numerous 
prominent pro-'Beij ing Macau Chinese business leaders c.~.n.t..~..r .9J .. ~.9 Ma Man 
Kei, Edm'und Ho and Stanley Ho), two f",aCanese (Macau Foundation P resfCJent 
~orge Rangel and Legislative Assembly President Carlos Assumpcao),. Macau 
Bishop 0 .. Domingos Lam and labour alld kai fong association representatives .. 
While China initially appointed two liberals to the Hong Kong Basic Law 
Drafting Committee, there are no nOIl .. ~traditional Macau Chinese leaders 
among the Macau drafters. 79 Legislative Assembly Deputy Alexandre Ho 
participates in the Basic Law Consultative Committee, formed to solicit 
public opinion on the draft Basic L.:;a~ .. The fit~st draft of the Macau Basic 
Law will be published in August 1991 .. After a period of public consultation 
in Hacau, there will be a second round of talks leading to a second draft, 
which is to be made public in mid-1992, followed by more local publi6 
77. Ibid., p. 12; Lo, "Aspects of Politic,~d Development in Macau," pp. 846-849; Ian Scott 
has argued that the Hong Kong government's l':2~litimacy has declined during the transition 
per i od (see genera 11 y Scot t , P.Ql.it..i.c.Q..l .... C.ban£l',;:~ .... ~nd ..... t.b~ .... C.r.i$.i~;'L.Q.f. .... t..~it.im~c.y..h .. i.nM .. HQ09 .... KQOg ) • 
78. Macau Instant Poll, conducted by SUI \/(-JY Research Hongkong for the Macau office of 
Lusa, a Portuguese news agency, 20-22 Sept. 1990. 
79. Lo~ "Aspects of Political Developm:;;.~·il~ in Macau," p .. 839 .. 
consultations .. A 'final ver'sion o'f tllr:~ law is scheduled to be tabled for 
promulgation in t.he PRC's NPC in AI", .. i.l · 1993 .. 
The Basic Law chapters on the polj. tical system and fundamental rights 
and obligations, particularly whetlll~(' or not to include a "right to life" 
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provision and the method for selecting the 'future chief executi ve and other 
pol~tical and advisory organs have been among the most controversial topics 
in drafting committee meetings .. 80 Fvl10wing the pattern of the Sino-
Portuguese talks, provisions on nationality have also divided the drafters .. 
PRC members have adopted a strict ill·Lerpretation of the nationality 
provisions to be applied to Macau~ They want to replicate the terms of Hong 
Kong Basic Law, which limits senlOt·· officer holders in the SAR to Chinese 
citizens who are permanent SAR resiJents and have no right of abode in any 
foreign country .. 81 Depending on ~\}h~! Lher the provisions are interpreted 
flexibly or strictly, this could ex~lude Portuguese and Macanese residents 
and the approximately 100,000 Macau Chinese with the right to Portuguese 
citizenship from holding high offic~ in the SAR.. Some Macau drafters argue 
such provisions contravene the Joint Declaration, which has none of these 
restrictions and includes specific ,.JJ'·otections 'for Macau residents of 
80. The death penalty is not permitted l~IIJer Macau or Portuguese law bu·t is permitted in 
the PRC. Proposed amendments to the Macau Penal Code currently under discussion include an 
explicit provision that no one shall be sent~'llced to death or an inde: .. finite or li fe term of 
imprisonment for any crime (Interview, Seba:~tiao Povoas, adjunct secre·tary for justice, Macau 
Governroent, 21 Feb. 1991). 
81. "Contrato do jogo a rever apos 99," ~J.tl, 18 Mar. 1991; "Lugares impertantes so para 
Chineses?" J.I~, 15 '>tar. 1991; The Hong Kong Ci,3.~;ic Law applies these res·trictions to ·the chief 
executive, Executive Council. principal officials, 80 percent of the L.egislative Council, the 
council . president, the chief justice of the C";AJrt of Final Appeal and the chief judge of the 
High Court, secretaries and deputy secretari es of departments, directors of bUl"eaux, the 
COflYoissioner against corruption, director IJf <:~udit, commissioner of pol ice, director of 
irrrnigration, cortV'oissioner of customs and ex,else and members of the Committe'e for the Basic 
Law ( I~ .. J~Q,~i!:: .... 1..Q,l"' ... .Q.f .... :th~ .. .. t:f.Q09 .... KQ09 .... $.~c..i..;A.l .... A!;J.m.i.o.i~:t.r.a:tiv.~ ... .B~9.i.QO .... QJ .... :th~ .... P.~o.p.l~.~.;$. ... .Be.p.!J.bli!:: .... o..f 
China ntong Kong: Consultative Committee fo, ' the Basic Law, Apt". 1990J, Art. 44, 55, 61, 67, 
90, 101 (herea fter tioo9 .... KQ09 .... 6..I",). 
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affairs and external relations have been less problematic. 83 Drafters have 
! 
repot"tedly agreed to clauses t~ecogl'l.;, ;;;;d.ng Portuguese as an official language 
after 1999, although it is unclear 1~ ·JI(3ther the provision will follow the 
weak wording of the Hong K6ng's Basic Law, which says, "In addition to the 
Chinese language, English may also L)(;~ used as an official language." 84 
Unlike Hong Kong's Basic Law, the MclC3U draft is said not to contain a 
specific re'ference to stationing thl.:! PLA in the enclave.. It will have 
specific clauses protecting the customs and traditions of Portuguese 
descendents and the enclave's cultL,~l heritage. Its economic provisions 
... -~ .-
will be less elaborate than those ill the Hong Kong Basic Law due to Hacau' s 
less advanced stage o'f economic devl~lopment .. An annex to the draft Basic 
Law listing PRC la~Js tllat will apply in the Hacau SAR is expected to 
; i 
replicate Hong Kong's except it ~i~l also include the mainland law on 
( 
: 
territorial waters, 85 perhaps beccHI0l:: China does not ackno~"ledge separate 
1 
! 
Macau territorial waters. 86 
Despite these differences and tll~ insistence by Portuguese officials and 
some l1acau drafters that the territur'y'$ distinctness be more broadly 
recognised and protected, Macau's lk!sic Law is likely to be in many at~eas a 
82. "Lei ganha forma mas subsistem d iver',Jc'nci as , .. J,I:1, 17 Dec. 1990; Interview, Rangel. 
83. See, for example, .. Lei ganha forma lt1 .. t8 subsistem divergencias," J.M, 17 Dec. 1990. 
84. Ibid.; HQIl9.J5.Q09.J;;U", Art. 9. 
85. "Lei 8asica de Macau ja tem aprovada";~ as SlJas grandes linhas," J..M, 16 Mar. 1991. 
86. Interview, Ana Soares, advisor to t.11:' adjunct secre'tary for transi ,tional affairs, 
Macau Government, 7 Feb. 1991; Macau ha$ no d ,i.r space of its m\ln and no airport so the Sino-
Portuguese Joint Declaration contains none ( .j( the provisions found in the Sino-Bri,tish accord 
authot'ising continued Hong Kong management (tOr ci vi 1 aviation. including partici pation in PRC 
delegations negotiating air service agreem'21', l;~';; with foreign governments (interview, Soares; 
see I:iQfl9 .... Kon9 .... ,J.Q, Annex I [IX]). 
,1 ' 
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near carbon copy o'f that drat",n up -Fur' the British colony. PRC drafters are 
cautiously avoiding concessions to ti~:lcau that might spark pressures for 
t'evision 'o'f the Hong Kong Basic L3hlll future. In the opinion of one Hacau 
drafter, they will agree to a distinct pt'ovision only when it is 
inapplicable to Hong Kong. 87 Joao de Deus Ramos~ Hacau's adjunct secretary 
for transitional a-f'fairs, says, in thr~ end, Hacau and Portugal are unable 
to fully benefit from theit, largely harmonious relations with China: 
We have no unequal treaties t·~ith China and we are good guys compared 
to Hong Kong. This has been tile political position of China since the 
beginning of the negotiations .... But when it comes down to everyday 
problems, the tendency is for China to solve them in the way that 
Hong Kong's problem was solved. They are three years ahead of us and 
mos.t of the problems have been encountered before. 88 ." 
Given the distinctive identity and illstitutional problems confronting Macau 
as it prepares for the transfer of administration in 1999, this near mirror 
of the Hong Kong Basic Law that Chin,::\ is offering Macau seems inappropriate 
and could hamper local support for "one country, two systems" and the 
ability of political, legal and international institutions to support the 
enclave's autonomy process. The proulems facing these institutions, and the 
Portuguese and Macau gove rnnlents' t~esponse to them, a re the focus of the 
remaining chapters. 
87. Interview, Rangel. 
68. Interview, Joao de Deu9 Ramos, adjl.lnr.;:t. secretary for transitional affairs, Macau 




The need for China to treat MaCcL. l dif 'ferently 'from Hong Kong is apparent 
when examining the enclave's capaci .. y fOt"' dual loyalty, which th~ 
experience of other autonomous terr~,itories suggests is needed if Macau's 
autonomy arrangement with the PRC i s to work. Dual loyalty or dual identity 
is the notion that Macau people must have enough attachment to Macau as a 
discrete community that they are willing to defend those values and .. 
institutions that distinguish it fl~uHI China and, at the same time, enough 
attachment to China that they are willing to live within its jurisdiction. 
In Hong ~ong, the balance appears to be tipped towards local identii;; its 
willingness to live under the PRC 1.5 the more fragile of the two c-omponents 
needed. In Macau, the opposite appe,jt~s true .. The community's sense of 
distinct local identity looks the ~1J : ~dker' party while its ~lillingness to 
cooperate \"Jith China has traditionally been strong. China may perceive 
Macau's situation as the more desirdble combination of the two, pushed by 
its fear that anti-PRC government f0c lings in Hong Kong make the territory 
a dangerous base for subversion and possible demands for self-determination 
and independence .. These views ignol'"l; the dangers posed to the lIone country, 
two systems ll project by the feeble :,)tate of local identity in Macau. They 
wrongly assume that China's allianc8 with traditional Chinese elites in 
Hacau 'will alone carry the scheme to success. 
Numerous forces have undermined the development of a strong, distinctive 
Macau identity amongst the enclave' s Chinese majority. Portugual's 
particular style of colonialism and the tenuousness of its authority in the 
enclave have contributed to its wE;a!<lleSs, as have the lack of appeal of 
Portuguese language and culture to local Chinese, the durability of Chinese 
88 
culture and nationalism and the cultural influence of Hong Kong. 
Furthermore, the Macanese community , where Portuguese culture has 
penetrated more success"fully, is unJil<ely to be in a secure numerical, 
,'- . .... 
legal or political position to de"fel"j Macau's uniqueness after 1999 .. There 
are signs that the younger ,generati()i"1 of Macau-born Chinese feel more 
attachment to Macau than do their el<:lers .. However, thei r identification 
with Portuguese culture remains wea!.: and they are not likely to be 
att racted by recent Portuguese and t'jctcau gove rnment efforts to fortify 
Portuguese culture in Macau .. On the other hand, many show an appreciation 
for values and institutions associated with liberalism such as the rule of 
law, civil rights and freedoms, demucracy, however hazily defined, a~d 
laissez faire capitalism, values tl.}hO:3(~ future in Macau is uncertain ,,1 
On the other side, Macau people='~. identification with China is not as 
strong as some might assume. It is f)lagued by the Chinese government's 
tendency to equate national a~d ethllic loyalties with loyalty to the 
central government .. The jump makes ~:>olTle Macau Chinese uncomfortable because 
of their deep distrust of the Chinese authorities. Furthermore, although 
Chinese cultural national identity is extremely durable, it is also highly 
portable. Immigration patterns for M~cau and Hong Kong residents suggest 
Chinese nationalism does not necess~i~ily lead to commitment to stay in 
1. It is difficult to define an ambiguous t.erm like liberalism without identifying it with 
Western civilization and getting bogged down in its various competing strands in history and 
the partisan connotations it carries in CUrl l~llt pOlitical debates in Macau and Hong Kong. I 
use the term here to refer ·to a belief in th::? "elevation of pl'ivate li fe over and against the 
claims of the community or the state" and th,~t "1 iberty is the natural human condition" 
(Mi 11 er" 6.1.ac.kw~11 .... .r;;t1c.y.c.l~u?a~d.ia. .... Q.f. ... EQl.it.i~~~1 ... IhQ!J9ht. , p. 285). Modern 1 i ber a 1 i Snl 0 ften 
~ncludes a belief in limited state intervention in economic matters. It is also linked with 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, whicl ', ~~eeJ< to constrain state power and PI'otect 
citizen rights through various institutional and legal devices in the pOlitical system 
(ibid. t pp. 103 •. 458--459). It is this broad L:;conception of li beral ism that finds SUPpOl't in 
Macau. Nevertheless" its var ious su bscr i ber :s-; i\ppear to d i f fer among themselves and wi th many 
Westerners in their understandings of indiviJualisrn and ci·tizens rights and freedoms as well 
as the role of such tools as democracy and 8t.1j);:\ra·tion of powers in securing them. 
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their territorial communities. Some Jdditional link is required if Macau 
people's attachment to China is to i 1,,!5ul t in a community commi tted to 
making MaCBt/'s autonomy process wor; , ... 
Definin~ and Me~~uring Dual Identity 
Taking the pulse o'f Macau people 'is di fficul t because ,virtually no 
quantitative data on their attitudes exist. With the exception of three 
public opinion surveys done in 1989 and 1990, which do not directly ?-ddress 
the question of identity, I have haJ to draw the bulk of my data from 
qualitative sources, including in-depth interviews with a small number of 
local political leaders, government officials and a few ordinary cit·i"zens. 2 
To add to the difficulties, the scholars who have asserted the impbrtance 
of dual loyalty in the autonomy process have provided few details of what 
they mean by the concept nor how to operationalise it. Consequently, I 
stress that my attempt here to de'fin8 dual identity and assess its presence 
ln Macau is only exploratory. 
Since "one country, two systems" lS a political arrangement and the 
autonomy process a political proces:.>!, the political component o'f identity 
is most important for our purpose here, although related questions of 
ethnic and cultural idl=ntity are a1:::>0 relevant . Political identity refers 
to an individual's "willingness to be a member" o'f a political community.3 
2. My interview sample is not representa~ive of the Macau popUlation as a whole or of 
elites. Therefore, the patterns I identi fy a;'t.:' only ten'tative. Future survey studies are 
needed to determinewi th certainty the intllH't:3i ty and dis,tribution of attitudes in the 
COflV'ouni ty and how they alter' over time as M<?cc:\u experiences pol i tical, social and economic 
change. Although the at,titudes and actions of ordinary people cannot be ignored, my emphasis 
on elite views reflects their importance ill t/;~;\cau, a dependent polity where democratic 
processes are not deeply entrenched. Kuan Hsil'I '··Chi argues that elite bel iefs and choices are 
cri tical for pol i tical change in Cl depend(';'lYt pol i ty (Kuan Hsin-chi _ "Power Dependence and 
Democratic Transition: The Case of Hong Kon'J," [Paper delivered at ,the American Political 
SCience Association conference, Los Angeles, Sept. 1990J, p. 1). 
3. I have borrowed "this definition 'from lung Wing Kwong, who also discusses several 
conceptualisations of pOlitical identity (Sct: Yung ~Jing Kwong, "Poli·tical Iden'tity of 
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Almond and Verba speak o'f political culture as those "specifically 
political or'ientations-'-'attitudes t. : )~'Jards the political system and its 
various parts, and the attitudes to . y, ~i.t"'d the role of the self in the 
system."4 Therefore, I define dual iuentity to be a political culture 
characterised by a double p'olitical identity, that is, a political culture 
in which elites and the general population direct their loyalties and 
demands at both the local and the L:.lI"ger political communities. 5 In 
addition, dual identity will be stn.)nger if the citizens' support for the 
two polities is both "diffuse" and "specific," to use David Easton's terms. 
The former can be connected to the citizen's perceived ethnic or national 
~:,,:- .-
attachment to the polity and t"'e 'fers to "a feeling of goodl~ill" tying the 
individual to the polity, process' Oi' outcome through strong ' ties of loyalty 
and affection regardless of the specific rewards acquired from belonging to 
the polity. The latter refers to attuchment based on the specific benefits 
and advantages the indi vidual . gets f I"om the polity .. 6 
This chapter tries to assess the degree to which such a political 
culture exists in Macau and will be able to support the community's 
autonomy process .. It first looks at tile historical factors that have 
in'fluenced the evolution of residen'Gs' attachment to the local political 
OVerseas Chinese: A Study of the Indonesian Chinese in Hong Kong" [M.Phil. thesis, Chinese 
university of Hong Kong, 1984J pp. iii, 102). 
4. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, IJI~ .... C..iY..ic .... C!J.lt.!Jr.~.A ..... f?Qli:t.icQ,l .... A:t:t.it.!Jr.J.~~ .... and. 
~~r.ar;.Y-.... i.n .... fi.y.~_ .. t.iat.i.Qn~ (Boston and Tororrtr.) : Little, SrO~ln and Company, 1965), p. 12. 
5. This formulation is a variation on Du...:-hacek's notion of a "federal political culture," 
by which herneans a political-territorial c.u!ture in which the national centre and local or 
regional authorities are targets for both citizen grievances and loyalties, and a "confederal 
political culture" where "eli·tes and the public turn to I~egional-territorial au·thorities .•• 
except in the case of major external threat ~(J ·the associated or allied whole" (Duchacek, 
Ier.r.i.t.Qr.ial. ... O'illlOO~i.Qn .... Q.f. ... f?Ql.i:ti.r;.~ , pp. a1-8:!~,). 
6. Oa.vid Easton, A .... f.r..~me.w.Qr.k. .... fQr ..... f?Qli.:tj,J;4.J ..... Analy.$.i$. (Englewood Cl i ffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1965), pp. 124-127. 
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community before characterising that identity and assessing the . 
appr'opriateness of Portuguese, Macc.tu iJnd Chinese government policies .. Next, 
it examines the historic context of I"idcau people's troubled sense of 
identification with China, some reC~ llt manifestations of the proble~ and 
some policy questions that heed addre~:>sing i'f a healthier balance o'f 
loyalties is to be fostered in Macau : 
The Portuguese Legacy 
A communication gap has tradition . ).lly separated the majority of Hacau 
Chinese from the Portuguese governm'~;nt in the enclave .. 7 It is partly a 
consequen'ce of some characteristics ' of Portugal's style of administration, 
which have discc)uraged the inhabitants from developing strong ties -to the 
local polity .. 8 These char'actet~isti(;b are rooted in the particular 
circumstances of Portuguese colonialism in Macau, especially in the 
historic uncertainty of Portuguese authority and the resulting pattern of 
Portuguese and Chinese political accommodation, the noninterventionist 
style of colonial government and thlJ failure of Portuguese culture and 
7. LOt "Political Culture and Participat.-)'on in Macau," pp. 5-6, 13; Lau and Kuan note 
that, even though the British colonial governruent in Hong Kong has enjoyed a certain level of 
legi timacy among Hong Kong people, interrnedi~\ry mechanism have not effectively bridged the 
9U I f between society and the pol i ty. They at tl" i bute the gap to several factors, all of which 
also appear to be present in Macau: the ambivalence, suspicion, and cynicism the people feel 
towards the government encouraged by its weal< ideological and 'moral' legitimacy compared ·to 
traditional or modern Chinese governments; the tradition of excluding Chinese from top 
administrative positions until recently; thG' character of the government as a "'pUre,' 
secluded and faceless bureaucracy"; the ling: ..dstic, $ocio~~cultural barriers between the state 
and the majority of the population; and the d(.)ctrine of laissez-faire and "social 
'noninterventionism," reflecting the idea ·that ·the cultural and social arrangements of the 
colonised should be respected (Lau Siu Kai and Kuan Hsin-Chi, Ihe. ..... Et.hQ~ .... Q.f .... :!;(h~ .... HQn9.. .. KQIlg 
C.hi.n~~ [Hong Kong: Chinese University PI"es:;; ~ 1968J, Pp. 19-21). 
8. Although not the subject of the presl:.:dt~ study, the his·toric evolution of Portuguese 
colonial practices elsewhere have probably influenced Macau despite ·the enclave's 
traditionally peripheral position in the onl ... ..? vast empire. No study exists on this subject. 
However, for a controversial historical cri ·t.-ique of Macau and Portuguese government policies 
in the enclave, a book which the Macau gOVE'I· ... 'III:nt seized and burned in public in 1926, see 
caener all y C. A. Monal to de Jesus, t.ti.$.t.Qrj.c. ... .t.1?\rn~r.:..'y ....... l.n:t~rt.l~:t.iQn~1. ... Ira.i.:t~ ... ..i.n .... c.hina. .... Qlg ..... ~n~L.N~w, 
2nd ed. rev. and enlarged (1926; reprint ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19a4). A 
Portuguese version of his bool< .was finally ~.ubli9hed in 1990. 
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language to penetrate the local Chinl~Jsf~ community .. According to some 
authors, this contrasts with the m~"ked influence of Portuguese culture in 
other former' portuguese colonies 1n (rfrica, Goa and l;JVen t1alacca .. 9 
The reasons for this failure lie in the nature of the Portuguese ' 
presence in the enclave and .the stt"t.!ngth of Chinese culture itself .. In 
recent decades, most Portuguese in 1'1acau have been administrators who spend 
only a few years in the enclave and, because they are not active in 
business, have little need to interact with local Chinese residents .. 10 On 
the other side, the Portuguese langlldge has little appeal to Macau Chinese 
as it is o'f less use in local or ill';.e:"national business than English, which 
is mot"e wide~y spoken i~ the enclavt:.~ ~ 11 Furthermore, until recently, -the 
weakness of Portuguese political authority and the attitudes of local 
Chinese elites have helped stop the government 'from using the instruments 
of the state to involve itself in society in ways that might have 
encouraged stronger ties between the polity and Chinese residents .. "By the 
late 19605 the territory had becorlle :; practically speaking, self-governing .. 
Although a Portuguese Governor held titular control, power lay in the hands 
of the economically dominant Chinese community ....... these community leaders . 
remained untouched by the heavy-handed attempts at political and cultural 
Cassimilation' undertaken by the Por·tuguese in the African colonies,,"12 As 
9. R.A. Zepp, "Interface of Chinese and "ottuguese Cultures," in Cremer, ~cQ.Y, p. 134; 
However, some scholars argue the influence of Portuguese culture in its African colonies has 
not been as deep as some traditional views wl.)uld indicate (see generally 8ender, An9Ql.a,..J.Jod.~r, 
t.~_ ... eQr.:tY.9!Je_~ ) • 
10. Zepp, "Interface of Chinese and Portu'.)uese Culture's," PP. 134-135; Edmonds, MacQ.Y, p. 
xxxi i; Note, for example, complaints in a PGi' l.lJglJese-Ianguage Macau newspaper tha·t the 
majority of the broadcasters working with th'£' enclave's F'ortuguese language station at 
publ icly-owned Radio Macau had been in thetl?1 ri tory for only a shor·t period and spoke as if 
they were still in Portugal ("Radio Macau ~O'::; nova gt'elha ao lurne," J.M, 7 Jan. 1991). 
11. Ieong Wan Chong, "Macau, Ponto de Int,8rcambio Cultural Entre 0 Oriente e 0 Ocidente," 
B~y..i.~t.a .... Q~_ .. Ad.mini$.:ta:~c9..o. .... F?!J .. bl.i.c .... !:.t~ .... M~c.~y 2, j 'Il) • 5 (1 989 ): 398 • 
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a result, although the Macanese are almost 100 percent Catholic, relatively 
few Chinese are Christians and expa,,:i>ion of the Catholi.c congregations has 
not kept pace with population growt: i • .13 FelN Macau Chinese speak Portuguese, 
although numbers are growing sligh"Liy under the government's new push for 
bilingualism among civil se~vants.14 When Macau Chinese plan to emigrate, 
their: destination of choice is not Pal 'tugal, despi.te the fact many possess 
portuguese passports, but Canada, ti,e United States, AU~3tralia or Taiwan. 1S 
Efforts to establish a Portuguese studies programme at the UniversitY ' of 
East Asia have met subdued enthusia~ln from Macau Chinese students. 16 
The Macau gover'nment's tradition of minimal intervention in society is 
evident in the education sector, where it has maintained a hands-off policy 
that leaves most schools under private control. The resulting 5ch061 system 
is highly heterogeneous, decentralised and ill-equipped to help foster a 
distinctive local political identity .1.7 Church organisations run about 56 
percent of the schools and most of the others are in the hands of 
traditional associations. About 86 ~crcent of the students study in 
Chinese-language schools and 6 perc~nt in English-medium schools, which 
12. MacQueen, "Macau," p. 167. 
13. 1eong, "Macau," p. 390; Victoria Lau, Thomas Luk trlan Hoi and Peter Chung, "Macau Roman 
Catholic Church and 1999," Ir.iP.Qd., 1989, nO.2, P. 35; Edmonds, ~ca!J, p. xxxv. 
14. 1eong, "Macau," pp. 368-389. 
15. Two sut~veys done in 1969 found the j".'I".:;·ferred destinations of Chinese respondents were: 
Canada (29%)(29%), the U.S.(2?4)(22%), Austl'~lia (14%)(19%), Taiwan (10%)(8%) Portugal 
(5%)(6%), Thailand (---)(5%), France (4%)(--), Singapore (3%)(--) and Britain (2%)(--); The 
telephone surveys were done by Survey Research Hongkong from 3-19 July and 1-27 Dec. 1969 fot~ 
the Macau office of the Portuguese news agE'i);":Y Lusa. The polls surveyed 300 Chinese and 200 
non-Chinese (100 Portu9'~ese and 100 Macanes::=) r)f at leas"t fi fteen years of age, r andornl y 
selected from the telephone directory (see 9 1;:.'i'lerally "Macau Confidence Index Survey, 
Management Sumrnary," SUrvey Research Hong t'(.III'.j, Aug. 1989 and Jan. 1990). 
16. to Estudos Portu9ueses so terao roais ';'\J.U"OS com apoio oficial," Ir . .i"b.Yn~ .. .. l:.~eM .. t1~c.~y 
(hereafter IM) 14 Jan. 1989. 
17. However, the decentralisation of th:.. system could also help schools aVE:'I~t con"trol by 
the local government shou Id PRC in fluence bG'c(Jme strong a ftet" 1999. 
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also teach obligatory Chinese language and culture classes. Besides the 
Macanese and expatriate Portuguese students who attend Portuguese-language 
schools, the only Macau Chinese stl.lUt.:.!nts obliged to study Portuguese are 
those from poorer families forced t c attend inexpensive government-~un 
schools, which still use Chinese ac, tl'le main language of instruction .18 
There are no territory-wide examina~ions. students learn little about 
Macau's history, geography or political system because curricula are 
modelled on those o'f mainland China, raiwan, Hong Kong or Portugal. 19 - All 
textbooks are' imported, many from Hong Kong .. 20 "The students grow up with 
references that are strange to them . " 21 
This dependency on the outside alld paucity of government involveme~t has 
until recently extended into postsecondary studies, where the lack -of a 
local university until 1981 for'ced t!acau students to study abroad .. Many 
never returned to the territory .. High tuition costs meant the University of 
East Asia, which was established irl Macau by private Hong Kong interests in 
1981, accepted mostly Hong Kong and other foreign students .. 22 This began 
changing in 1988, after the Macau government bought its undergraduate school 
and began transforming it into a more locally oriented institution. 23 
16. Wong Siu-lun, "Chinese Entrepreneurship in Macau," pp. 36-39; F'hilip Hui Kwok Fat, 
"Development of Higher Education in the Cont!,~xt of Political and Economic Changes: The Case 
of Macau (M.Phil. thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1990), pp. 47-46. 
19. Hui, "Development of Higher EdlJca'tioll," p. 47. 
20. Ibid. , PP. 2, 47, 51. 
21. Comment by Alexandre Rosa, advisor tu the Macau Adjunct Secretary for Education, in 
.. Lei da educacao consagr a ensino porwgues," Q.:!m~r,c..iQ .. _g_e: .... t1ac.a!J (herea fter c.t1) 22 Feb. 1991. 
22. The Jesuit University College, se't up in 1594, was the first European-style university 
in Asia and was an important centre for educa:tion IJntil the expulsion of the Jesuits from 
Macau in 1762. Some students and professors 1,,}IJlj fled China in the early 1950$ set up 
universities in lYJacau, but the institution~ did not last long (see Hui, "Development of 
Higher Education," pp. SS-56; B.V. Pires, "Origins and Early History of Macau," in Cre-mer, 
Ma.c.~!J, p. 16). 
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Until the early 1980s, participation in local political institutions was 
restricted to expatriate Portuguese, Macanese and a few Macau Chinese 
elites as part of the political acculllmodation that evolved between 
Portuguese and Chinese authorities. 24 The tradition of limiting government 
inte rvention in society and · the eCOi lomy and the paucity of effecti ve 
communications channels between the portuguese-dominated administration and 
the majority of Macau people fed tl-;8 gap that divided most Chinese 
r'esidents "fr'om the colonial politicdl institutions .. Local people have ,also 
been discouraged from developing close identification with government 
because of the popular perception thctt the Legislative Assembly is 
powerless against Chinese and Portuuuese authorities, exacerbated by ·'the 
lack of democratic indoctrination by Chinese and local traditional leaders 
as well as the Portuguese, who were until recently unaccustomed to 
pluralism or democracy in their own country. Differences in cultural 
values, the scarcity of nontraditional elites to counter the influence of 
business, kai fong and labour leader's and the population's high mobility 
further discouraged close attachm!3nt~3 to local political institutions .. 25 
Follo~\}ing the extension of the f ,"'anchise in 1984, the 9 rO~\Jth of a middle 
class in the 1980s, the implementation of some unpopular government 
policies and tensions associated with the 1999 issue, larger numbers of 
23. Tse, "Population and Economic Development in Macau," in D.Y. Yuan, Wong Hon Keong and 
Libanio Martins, eds., f?QP.Ul.;.\t.iQn .... a.ng ..... c..i.:tY. .... Q(.Qw:th .... i.n. ... Mac.ay. (Pt'oceedings of ,the SympOsium on 
Population and City Growth in MacalJ, Univeraity of East Asia, 12 May 1990), p. 94. 
24. After the military coup in Portugal :ill 1974, the Chinese authorities accepted the 
introduction of a. pal'tially directly elected legislature in Macau in exchange for Portuguese 
willingness to postpone returning the enclavG' -to China and a restricted franchise that 
ensured roost Macau Chinese remained pl::>litically inactive. The extension of the franchise in 
1984 was an unintended result of power stru9~les between the Portuguese government and 
Macanese legislators (Lo, "Aspects of Politi .... ~al Development in Macau," pp. 643-844). 
25. Vitalino Canas, "Padroes do fenoment) politico ern Macau" (Unpublishc.-d paper prepared as 
teaching material for the Law and Publ ic Adl;l.inistration Programme, University of E,~st Asia, 
1969), PP. 12-14; Lo, "Political Culture anu r'articipation in Macau," PP. 5-6, 13. 
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Chinese elites became more active ir ; politics .. Some government policies 
could al$o help close the gap betwe~ 11 citizens and the government. 
Localisation efforts mean mor(~ Chi" .>8 and Macanese are training for the 
,"" . ... 
administratioh's senior ranks. The ,Jvernment is taking a ,more active role 
in society and the economy through participation in massive infrastructure 
projects~ housing programs and education and legal reforms. However, in 
general, most ordinarY ·Chinese an3 st.ill politically inactive. 26 
Contrary to their weak identification with the local polity and 
Portuguese culture, Macau Chinese dn~ heavily in'fluenced by both Englis~, 
and Chinese Hong Kong c~l ture. Wealthy Macau Chinese are often ~..,ell 
integrated into Hong Kong society ar Id both li ve, and run businesses there as 
well ' as in Macau. 27 Hong Kong-'produced television., films and pOPul~r music 
pervade Macau '$ electron~.c. media an(~ cinemas , although with some limited 
competition from one local Cantone~;t:! and one Portuguese television station 
and two Cantonese and one Portuguesu radio channels. Hong Kong-printed 
newspapers, magazines and books circulate widely along with local 
=: ", 
pUblicatibns. 28 As a result, "when traditional Chinese ways are abandoned, 
\ .' 
: i 
the [Macau] Chinese are opting 'for (,rllerican, Japanese Ot" Hong Kong-style 
Westernization rather than PortugLJe~ .. ,e or European customs...... [The] 
26. LOt "Political Culture and Political F'articipation in Macau," p. 15; Idem, "Aspects of 
Poli tical QeveloPment in Macau t" pp. 846-850 j Using categories of ideal ·types of poli tical 
cuI ture proposed by Almond and Verba, Lo argu~'s that Macanese and Portuguese el i tes in Macau 
have a "participant" orientation, meaning cit.iIens are oriented to both ,the input and ou·tpUt 
components of the p,.:>li ·tical ·system. Both Chi"Il?se elites and ordinary citizens have 
traditionally had ,a relatively ~·f."arochial" (,: iG'ntation, meaning citizens expect nothing from 
the poli·tical sys'tem. However, since 1984, Cl ',inese eli·tes have deveioP\?'~ a more participative 
orientation. Ne\A1 Chinese emigrants without t'L.C.lU ident.i ty cards ten.d to~'Jards a "subject" 
c:;:wientation, that is they "reac·t to OlJtpt!~S • ai;her than inputs and to the system rather ·than 
the self" (idem, "political CuJtl~re and Part~d.:: ipation in Macau" [Occasional Papers, Facul ,ty 
of Social 5I:.iences, University of East Asia, jll.lcauJ. 
2.7. Cdnas, "Padroes do fenomeno politico' ~':m Macau," p. 13. 
28. Ieong, "Macau," p. 398. 
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Cantonese culture o'f Macau Ilas 1i ttle to distinguish it 'f rom that o'f 
Hong Kong. The language is the same although the Cantonese of Macau have 
incorporated fewer English \",ords il ..> thei r speecll.. The Chinese o'f Hong 
Kong often say that Macau's Chinese ,earn slower paced, although th~s is no 
doubt changirig as Macau:ls ~conomy p ', .. ks up speed .. It 29 
Local Identity 
There'fore, the community identit\;-, tllat Ilas emerged from this legacy is 
deeply penetrated by values and cl.ls ... ums from both China and Hong Kong, but 
shows some li'fe of its own due to t..t(~ significant political, social and 
.:~ ." 
economic changes influencing the enr:lave. The political elites interviewed 
all said most local Chinese do not identify strongly with their community 
as a distinct cultural entity nor ~\I .: , Lh its political institutions, values 
and processes .. The comments o'f a bu~"iness leader regarded as pro-Beij ing 
were typical in 'that they blamed Po, :.uguese-·styIe colonialism and Macau' s 
years of economic stagnation for a i~ck of strong local identity: 
The Hong Kong educational SyJ' ,0m has been very successful in tllat the 
people are more likely to id,;:.! I :ti fy themselves as a Hong Kong belonger 
and not as a Chinese ..... They are very proud of themselves in Hong 
Kong, of what they have done, but here in Macauthe Portuguese have 
never been the saffie type of ~)lonisers. They have an education system 
only for the Macanese, the mi.~ed people, to learn Portuguese .. For the 
rest, they don:lt bother to sponsor any education system. So the 
Chinese, they more often gro~'; up identi fying themselves as Chinese 
wi th China....... Macau is a sOla LL place, infer'ior in economic 
development and people identiJ y themselves more as Chinese with China 
because of this. In Macau, ~\}e ·Jet our water from China, we get the 
vegetables at very favourable prices .. ~o when you are not so 
impressed with the Portuguese ,-,dministration you see the Chinese as 
looking after you ..... the Por:tuguese government really never tried to 
create an identity here .. They never tt~ied to gi ve us any sense of 
pride. 30 
29. Edrnonds, MQ.c.~!J, p. xxxi. 
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At the same time, the uncertainty over 1999~ large influxes of 
immigrants from China and economic 'j lowth jetting Macau into the ranks of 
the newly industrialised countries t,,!,j.Jpeat" to have increased awareness among 
elites of what makes their life clif :" .. 'rent from that of' tbe Chinese across 
the border .. 31 Several respondents I" l,,!~~,ponded nostalgically when asked ~lhat 
they value most about their community .. Business leader Edmund Ho said: 
We have a small community, a ~~,,:,all populatio"n .. We can sol ve problems 
together easily .. The pace o'f life is slower, more relaxed .. A lot of 
people like that.. It's that tll~y value .. 32 
Leong Kam Chun, a nontraditional, r,Y"~ 'rorm-'minded deputy in the Legislati ve 
Assembly, commented in a similar fa~l~lon despite his political differences 
... ~ .-
with Edmuhd Ho: 
Macau is a small place. We all have good connections with each other .. 
We, especially twenty years a00, were one big family so I find it is 
a very good place for someone who doesn't want to earn much money. We 
call it "Hacau street" becauso .it is a community that is like a 
street, a very enjoyable isla:ld .. 33 
This nostalgia seems a weak basis . 'for a lasting local identity gi ven the 
economic development destroying old hacau and, particularly since the late 
1970s, the influx of new immigrants from China who are causing its 
population to mushroom .. By 1990, mo:"e than half of Macau's population, and 
perhaps as many as 60 percent, were born in China. Fewer than 42 percent 
were born in Hacau. 34 In Hong Kong, by contrast, only about 37 percent of 
30. Interview, Macau Chinese busines3 le.J,der who preferred to remain anonymous, 22 Feb. 
1991. 
31. Referring to Hong Kong, Lau and Kuan ::.:-uggest, "This sudden awareness might engender a 
reinforced feeling of attachment t.o the thin03 as they presently are, a reluctance to accept 
chimges in the status quo and a sharpened $(;': .s e of a Hong Kong identity" (Lau and Kuan • 
.E:t.bo.$. , p • 40). 
32. Intervie'W, Edmund Ho, businessman, dC'::dty in Legislative Assembly, Basic Law drafter, 
21 Feb. 1991. 
33. Interview, Leong Kam Chut'l, accountal.~, deputy in Legislative Assembly, 21 Feb. 1991. 
the population was China born in 19B1 and 1986, while tllose born in Hong 
Kong fluctuated between 56 and 59 p;: I'cent between 1971 and 1986. 35 
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Paradoxically, tile arr'ival of these lIew immigrants in Macau appears to Ilave 
strengthened the sense o'f local ick~I,'~,ity felt by the enclave '$ long-term 
and Macau-born Chinese residents. I'k,.ei .. ~ever, tllis heightened sense of 
attacllment to Macau migllt only serv~ to increase pessimism that Macau's 
distinctness will not survive 1999 and, thereby, trigger distrust in China 
and emigration. Sevl3ral o'f my irTfon,,3.nts expressed anxiety that the rapid 
arrival of so many new Chinese imrni~Jrdnts was eroding Macau's community 
identity and pr'ospects for' autonomy w They said tile newcomers are more 
attached to China than Macau, less educated and poorer and have a different 
culture from local Chinese. 36 One il:formant said, "They don't want to 
work," while another called them "ci '· iminals."37 Catherine Mok, a Macau 
Chinese journalist with a Portuguese passport, revealed her anxiety about 
1999 and the future of political fr~edoms, particularly freedom of the 
press, as immigrant numbers increase: 
I'm afraid now the situation in Macau has changed so much I maybe am 
losing my love for Macau. So ijk~ny immigrants are coming ft'om China. 
'Their education and their culture is so dif'ferent from ours. And so 
many of our friends have emigr\)ted too . . W.~ .. , ....... t..h.~ ..... .Q.r.tgJn§J ..... 1::1.§g.§.!d 
p'.~9.p.l~ .......... §..r.~ ...... t..h.~ ...... ffi..t.n9..r.i.t'y .... JJ.9..W .. ~ . .J~.~ ...... g§'1J.nQ.t. .. .... q.~.y..~1.9.p ... ... t1.§..g.g.!d ..... .9.J.9.n~ .. 38 
34. As much as 81.1 percent of Macau's pt:JS:oUlation growth in the 1971-1987 period was due 
to immigration, particularly from the neighG0uring provinces of mainland China (Tse, 
"Population and Economic Development in Macc.l'.I," p. 79). 
35. Paul C.K. Kwoog, "Population and lrnnu. s:wation," in T. L. Tsim and Bernar-d H .K. Luk, 
ads., Im ..... O .. t:h~r .. .J:iQn9 .... KQng ... .R~P.Qr.:t (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1989), p. 371. 
36. Interview, Alexandre Ho, 22 Feb. 1991; rntervi~J, h~i Rocha. 
37. Interview, restaurant owner who pre i" _'/'red ·to remain anonymous, 4 Feb. 1991; Interview, 
business woman who pre'ferred to remain anon~ ; ilf)U$, 21 Feb. 1991. 
38. Interview, Caterina Mok, chie 'f, inh"',i::.'ltion radio department, Chinese channel, 
Teledifusao de Macau, 22 Feb. 1991. 
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Despite the government.-citizen g, 'tp identi'fi(~d by some scholars, public 
opinion polls have found some suppo, ' t for the enclave's current political 
and legal systems, which could refl~ct the intensified attachment some 
...... .. ... . 
people feel towards Macau because Cl '!' anxiety over 1999 .. A September .1990 
public opinion poll found tl~ice as ; ',i\ ,~ny respondents ga ve th(~ pe rformance of 
the government of the then Macau G0/crnor CarIos Melancia and the 
Portuguese administration favourablu ratings than those who gave them 
unfavourable ones .. However', respondi_!lrts were less favourable tO~lards .the 
legislative assembly.39 In a survey done nine months earlier, Macau Chinese 
respondents showed equally strong dn.3-ferences 'for use of Portuguese and 
English judicial systems rather tha:-l a Chinese judicial system after ' 1999 
and preferred judges to be o'f both iJ()rtuguese and Chinese nationality after 
the transfer of administration .. 40 ll 'lcse pre'ferences could indicate 
rejection of the PRC political system as much as actual attachment to 
Macau's political institutions. Howuver, the Macau government's recent 
localisation, infr'astructure developlllent and other policy efforts could be 
improving citizens' feelings aboutl~he colonial government and its 
institutions .. 41 
39. Macau Instant Poll, 20,-22 Sept. 1990; The survey found 41 percent of rE'SpOndents gave 
the peyformance of th(~ Melancia governmen·t ' .... ;.::'ry good or quite good ratings while only 18 
percent said it was very poor or quite poor.i Pi fty-two percen't ra'ted the Portuguese 
admin istr ation ' s per forrnance as very good Ot~ qu i te good whi le on 1 y 26 percent very poor or 
quite poor. On the other hand, 24 percent sai.d the assembly's work I,lJas very good or quite 
good while the same number rated it very poor' or quite poor. The telephone survey, which did 
not take account of the respondents' ethnici 'l~y, surveyed a random sample of 500 people in 
MacalJ. 
40. Macau Confidence Index SUrvey, Dec. ; t~}l:)9; Thirty-five percent of Chinese chose a 
Portu9'Jese judicial system and 32 pe,"'cent ch.J~~? an English system while only 8 percent wanted 
a Chine$e one. By contrast, 76 percent of PortuguesE' and 78 percent of Macanese prefer red ca 
Portuguese system. In their preference of Ju:.J0es, 57 percent of Chinese wanted bo,th 
Portuguese and Chinese judges, 16 percent ~lJa : li~ed only Chinese and 5 percent wan 'ted only 
Portuguese judges. Eighty-nine percent of Po, tuguese and 73 percen·t of Macanesl? wanted both 
Portuguese and Chinese judges. 
41. Lau and Kuan argue Hong Kong's comp,:\c ..... ti veIl y rapid local isation of the ci vi I service 
and .et perceived willingness of the colonial 9 ,,,;vernment to consult the public have mitigated 
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Either way, the attitudes o'f Mac':'11.I Chinese lr.Jill be decisive in providing 
the local identity needed if a poli c,, :i cal culture of dual loyalty is to 
exist in Macau after 1999" For' thej I ' part ~ the Macanese are attached to 
both Macau and to Portuguese cuI tUt"I. ~~" One Macanese commented: Cl My farnily 
has been in Asia for' five generatioi:~) and I 'feel I belong here" I'f I can't 
stay i_n Macau, Portugal is my first clloice of places to go,,"42 However, 
emigration and assimilation are reducing the numbers and strength of the 
Macanese, rendering them less able to defend Macau's distinct institutions" 
Significant emigration has already whittled their numbers to 10,000-15,000 
or perhaps 1ess. 43 Emigration could I-~duce the populat~on by at least half 
again in the run up to 1999 as the i'i.Jcanese leave to escape economic and 
political uncertainties and restricted career opportunities. 44 The 
traditional Macanese role as intern:L~diaries between the rulers and the 
ruled will -fade away as Chinese speJ.kers come to dominate the Macau 
administration .. Although their ,dist ':.llct culture is protected in the Joint 
Declaration and the upcoming draft o 'f' the Basic La~J, legal provisions alone 
are unlikely to keep the majority of Macanese in Macau unless their trust 
the gap between the government and the peoplG' somewhat. A distinct ethos or political culture 
is taking shape in Hong Kong despite the colt.::·ilial school system and style of administration, 
as well as the still low levels of political p.'3.r·ticipation and other barriers, which also 
still exist in Macau (Lau and Kuan, Et.hQ~, j:'.p. 176, 169, 192). 
42. Interview, Rangel; See also Lo, "Aspl)r..:. ts of Political Development in Macau," p. 838; 
Interview, Jose Roch'igues, Macanese lawyer aiHJ deputy in the Legislative Assembly, 21 Feb. 
1991; Patricio Guterres, "Macau e os macaen~')!.?," QM 4 Jan. 1991. 
43. ,After Hong Kong's founding in 1841, t~he Macanese were among the colony's firs't 
residents, working as clerks, translators, w,lrehousemen and bookkeepers in banks, trading 
companies and the colonial administration. r t 'IC;1 later moved to Shanghai and other China 
treaty ports and, following the Second World War and the 1949 Chinese Communist victory, many 
wc.ont overseas. The 1966-67 Cultural Re·volutj t:;i'1 riots in Macau and the uncertainty that came 
wi th the 1974 Portuguese Revolution prornpto(? ut-hers to emigr,:tte. By the late 1970$ -there were 
overseas Macanese communities in Californi.3.) Portugal, Canada, Australia and BI',uil (Silva, 
All . .J;),y.r ..... y~e.;$).:te.r.d.ay.~, pp. 15-17,28-52; Edmond'3} M~c.~y, Pp. x,xiii-xxiv). 
44. A Dec. 1989 survey found 65 pe'rcent ;y f the Macanese will leave ·the ·territory, mos·t to 
settle in Portugal. Abol..lt 52 percent of the 1'l.Jcanese civil servants said they planned to 
e-migrate (Macau ConfidGnce Index Survey, DE'( + 1989). 
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in PRC authorities and the future M . .lCdU SAR government improves .. 45 
Absorption by the dominant Portuguc~~ and Chinese cultures is also reducing 
the numbers of Macanese and their (; ~ . :.:. tinctive hybrid culture .. The trend 
toward assimilation is evident J.n·~.I~ pattern of intermarriage between 
Macanese and Cantonese and the neal ~ disappea~ance of the distinct 
Portuguese dialect once spoken by '1..1':3 Hacanese .. 4·6 Increasing numbers regard 
i 
Cantonese as thei t" mothe r tongue .. 4 7 (~S a result, thf3 Hacanese and thei r 
sense of identity with Hacau are in cl weakened position to act as the ' core 
of a broadly based local culture th.:.t t. might also include longer-term 
Chinese residents .. Carlos Harreiros , president of the publicly owned Hacau 
Cultural Institute said: "UnhappilYt Macau's collective culture is in 
-
crisis, maybe since the beginning of the century ....... The educated, those 
bilingual persons who should be the le~ders today, most of them left .. The 
molding of a community identity has been seriously harmed .. "48 
Assessing POi~tuguese Policies 
Given the uncertainty of the lOCdl identity component of Hacau's dual 
loyalty, efforts should be directeel at building support for local political 
institutions among local Chinese a~ well as enhancing the confidence of the 
Macanese so they will stay in Macau. To do both is difficult .. Some Macanese 
and Portuguese tend to see preservation of Portuguese linguistic and 
45. Mac.a.!J .... ,J.D., Art. 2(6) Annex I (V). 
46. Called li.ng!J .... ~ag!JjJ~t.~ or Mi..\c.a.,i,$.:ta., ti ,e language is a Portuguese creole combining some 
archaic Portugl..lese wi th in fluences from Asiai I lang .... ages spoken along the routes of Portuguese 
merchants and seafarers (J .M.R. Lume, "Centr:.: for Portuguese Language and Culture," in 
Cremer, f1a.c.ay .. ; .... .f;.i..:ty. .... Q.f .... c.Q(.or.o~r.c.~ .... and ..... C!Jl.:t.y.r.e., p p. 119-121; Edmonds, t1~c.a!J, p. xxx; Zepp, 
"Interface of Portuguli'se and Chinese CulturE's )" Pp. 127-128); On in·terrnarriage see .Ieong, 
"Macau," p. 388. 
47. Ieong, "Macau," p. 389. 
48. Interview, carlos Marreiros, presidt!'i .t. Macau Cultural Ins·titu·te, 5 Feb. 1991. 
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cultural heritage in Macau as the key to protecting the enclave's distinct 
identity. On the other hand, Macau l~linese have little or no attachment to 
things Portuguese and, along with CI .. ·L nese authorities, are sometimes 
critical of the spending of public llioney on Portuguese cultural programs. 49 
Both the Portuguese and Macau governments have made the promotion of 
Portuguese language and cuI tUt'G cornerstones of their transition 
policies. 50 The Macau government's initiatives include encouraging the 
teaching of Portuguese in Macau and j::Ji .... omoting bilingualism, mostly among 
Hacau Chinese civil servants and nC~1 recruits. Officials defend the policy 
as essential for a smooth preparativl I for 1999 because incoming Macau 
Chinese b'ureaucrats must be able to communicate with outgoing PortugLiese 
administ rators and read the mountail"l~:; o·f Portuguese-language laws and othe r 
documents left behind. 51 This ratic: Idle does not negate the potential 
diplomatic, business and othe r pe rs()nal benefits Portugal and indi vidual 
Portuguese could well gain from maiiltaining Macau as a partially 
Portuguese-speaking territory after 1999. Recognising that Portuguese 
language and cuI ture do not have th;,~ same appeal as an international 
commercial language like English, the Portuguese government and some 
private and public foundations have taken a leading role in prombting their 
spread abroad in a bid to expand th •. :! country's political and economic 
49. For example. an editorialist in a F\jj·tuguese-language Macau newspaper expressed the 
sentiment: "Kacau is Macau because of ·the ·PorLuguese, their language. their culture and their 
humanism. If not, how would one distingtJish !')\i-t.ween it 'from Zhuhai or Canton?" ("Lingua 
Portuguesa: pr ior:i dade I ero," M~!:;a!J._ .. Ho.j~, 22 F eb. 1991); The Chinese government has pressu red 
Macau authorities to remove a statue of JO:'lO Ferreira do Amaral, a Macau Governor who lost 
his life trying to reduce the authority of Chinese officials in Macau and establish free 
trade IJJith China (Patricia Tse. "Diplomatic t.ug-of-war over Macau," S.CMf?. 9 July 1990). 
so. See, fot' e'xample, "f'tlurtjet~a Nabo aS~:; r.I!Ii''';· €'m plenitude as funcoE's de Gover-nador de 
Macau ,.. J.M, 29 Sept. 1990. 
i 
51. Intervielt-J, Rui Rocha; Interview, R.:m .~c·l. 
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ties. 52 Asia, particularly the capi1al-rich countries of East Asia, have 
become increasingly important target ::::- , 11acau's geographically central 
location, cuI tut"al and educational ' ... ~)ti tutions and status as a territory 
where Portuguese will remain an off ~cial language for nearly sixty more 
years make it a cl=ntrepiece in this I't.~gional strategy .. 53 O~le analyst has 
linked Portugal '$ granting of F'or'tut,u8se passports to Macau Chinese to 
Lisbon's need to cement political cl!;rj economic links with East Asia .. 54 
Promoting Portuguese language and clJlture in Macau is also a question of 
pride for many Pot"tuguese as they l(~.Jve their last overseas territory.55 
For the Macanese, it is a matter of I~:thnic survi val .. 
Ho~~ever, some of'ficials admit thD'L prospects for the long-te rm survi val 
of Portuguese language and culture ~i. rl Macau are bleak .. Even if they were to 
survive, they ,,,,ould not likely encoui 'age local identity among Macau 
Chinese .. Government efforts would f i i Id greater support among local Chinese 
if they equated Portuguese cuI tu re lIe ri tage, not with the Portuguese 
language, but with those values cHllj institutions that are already 
appreciated by some Macau Chinese, :)articularly the younger generation born 
I 
locally.. The responses of my infon:,~.d rts and othe r evidence suggest 
appreciation for the rule of la,,,,, d~lIiocracy (however ill defined), some 
52. Jose Medeiros Ferreira~ eQr.t.y9a.l .. * ..... ~!;~ ~ .... I.::r.QximQ$ .... ~Q .... f.lI:lQ$. (Lisbo'a: Funqacao Calouste 
Gulbenkian, 1988), pp. 26-32; See generally h:.:rnando Cristovao, N.Qt.ic.i~~:L.~ .... P.rc!.Ql~m~$. ... JJ.~ 
p.a:!;..r.,ia. .... d.a..J .. in9Y9.- (Lisboa.: Institu·to de CultlJ,' ~\ e Lingua Portuguesa, 1987), es~'">Cially PP. 71-
73; Efforts include promoting stl.Jdy of the r:\jr"tuguese language, research and publ ishing on 
Portuguese history, culture, language and lit';.wature, exhibitions, festivals, contes·ts, 
performing arts groups, preservation of hist'.Ji'ic bui ldings and sites and aid to communi ·ties 
of Portuguese descent. 
53. Lurne, "Centre for Portuguese Langu.:3.9,;' ':',nd Culture'," Pp. 121-123; Edmonds, ~c.,;,\y, p. 
xxxii. 
54 . Edmonds, Mac.ay, p '. 1 i i i • 
55. Interview, Hui Rocha; Interview, ChI' j sl~ina Almeida\, deputy direc·tor, Education 
Department, 7 Feb. 1991. 
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political and civil rights and frecclollls and capitalism is strong in Hacau 
among younger, better educated pol i ':,iGal leaders considered synlpathetic to 
China as well as among democracy d<,I. :i.vistsN Ng Kwok Cheong, founder of the 
Macau Democracy Development Union cl,i.cl an organiser of the 1989 rallies J.n 
support of PRC student movement, s\:l.~.ti he has no interest in preserving the 
Portuguese language in MacaUN Howe\/,':r', he wants to keep and build on the 
principles of liberal, democt"atic al'(J reformist government that were 
enshrined in Macau's Organic statut~ and the Portuguese Constitution .after 
the 'fall o'f the dictatorship in Por l., ugal in 1974 .. 56 Alexandre Ho, a reform-
minded, nontraditional local Chinesu member of Macau's Legislative 
Assembly, said if the Portuguese· re(tlly wanb~d to win Macau's long-term 
loyal ty they should do more to deve "'~)P a more democrat:i c government and 
s t t"engthen protection for rights anJ F reedoms . .5 7 Edmund Ho, who some 
suggest will be Beijing's choice fO t' SAR chief executive after 1999, 
expressed support for traditional 1 ib;3r'al values associated \4Jith minimal 
government interference in the eCOrl()HlY and in society, including the right 
to freedom of speech, association a/Id the press, the rule of law and a 
reliable, independent judiciary .. 58 
Although its depth should not be exaggerated, the solidarity many Macau 
people demonstrated for' the Tiananr;It..!1l Square student protests in 1989 
suggests these values might enJoy ~;Oj ; 'le support in the general population 
and could serve as the core o'f an ellk:rgent Macau identity. Some government 
officials and heads of public institutions appear to be on the same 
56 .. Intervie'~/, Ng Kwok Chc:'ong, pt'esident.., 1"!aCi\U Democracy Development Union, 4 Mar. 1991. 
57. Intet'view, Al exand re' Ho • 
. 58. , Interview, Edmr.md Ho. 
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wavelength. Jorge Rangel, the Macan~S8 president of the Macau Foundation, 
said: 
The only way the Macanese earl urvive is to link themselves with 
(Chin~~~) Macau belongers. I L81ieve the most important things are 
those values and attitudes we share with them. This alone will save 
us, not so~e Portuguese songs we can sing .... Our priority must be to 
strengthen these Wes{ern vaILl',:~~; and this sense of freedom and the 
right to participate in such (;j I:~ay that they cannot be destroyed .. 59 
To Sebastiao Povoas, adj unctsecp~tf~t"'Y for justice, the fight to preserve 
an independent legal system in t1a~au is a fight for Portugues(~ culture: "We 
failed the fight of language, of art l'litecture, of education .. La~,) is all 
there is le-ft. I. 60 
While_ much remains to be done, ~.c"ile current actions of the Macau _ ~_-
government could strengthen this political identity by closing the gap 
between government institutions and the citizens. The translation of 
Macau's laws into Chinese and the ti\::.ining of local Chinese to assume 
senior positions in the civil servi;':::e and legal system are pt~oceeding, 
albeit not fast enough for some critics. The government has moved towards 
offici~lising the Chinese language, which it has told China it will 
accomplish before the transfer in 1.9')9 .. 61 Based on its policy of 
reinforcing the "collective identit/ and community consciousness" of Hacau 
people, the publicly financed Macau \~-ultural Institute supports both 
59. Interview, Range1. 
60. Interview, Povoas. 
61. In February, 1991, the Portuguese and F'RC governments agreed that Chinese wi 11 be madE:' 
official during the transi,tion period and th;:'.t. Portuguese would bl? an official language after 
1999. The acting governor said the- official;i ~;a~ion of Chinese should happen by the end of 
1991 ("Murtiera Nabo vol ta e diz-se satisfei t;lj, 11 J.f1, 26 Feb. 1991; "Qichen considera sucesso 
a visita a Portugal," J.I1, 26 Feb. 1991); In 1989, a new decree law made i,t obligatory to 
tr anslate proposed laws a,nd laws as we 11 as ,j.::'crees and other government documents and 
publ ications into Chinese, although the POI" L\J0UeSe version of the documen-t sti 11 prevails in 
cases of disputes ovel' interpretation. Chin8'::>':~ is also supposed to be used in relations 
between the public and all government servi\~~~':?3~ including autonomous organisations and 
municipal organs ("Mais urn pas so par,3, a oh.( L,lizacao do. lingua chines":l" [Lusa wire COpy, 31 
Jan. 1989]). 
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Portuguese and Chinese cultural devc?l"'pment to provide f1acau people \lJith 
the symbols and references points 1'1\, ~ded for a stronger collective 
identity.62 A proposed Macau educat i on law tabled for public discussion in 
1991 establishes some common curricl!la standards and attempts to make the 
education system mor'e locally orien : . ~~:d while still respecting its 
diversity.63 The Macau Foundation, u public institution with trusteeship of 
the Uni ve rsi ty o'f East Asia, ha:3 made the training o'f Macau residents to 
assume higher and professional pOSi-L.ions in the local administration and 
legal system a priority.64 GovernrnCitt financial support schemes have 
inc reased the numb(~ r of Macau s tud!?i d:.::;> , who accounted 'for 83 pe rcent of the 
university student body in 1990,-1991 .. 65 The localisation policies, ,.c.-
including increases in both Portugu~.!se and Chinese-language teaching, are 
not without controversy though. 66 Ne ws reports suggest the March 1991 
resignation of Uni versi ty o'f East ~l:.>i.a rector, !-Isueh Shou Sheng, may have 
been connected with his objections to incursions upon the organisation's 
original English-language and inter: k1tional approach. 67 
62. Its programs include publishing lit.E'!·d.ture, poetry, and books abclUt Macau history, 
culture and society in Portugl.Jese, Chinese a: ld English, supporting performing arts, holding 
seminars and displays and preserving histori c buildings ("Cultural Policy-the 1990: To 
integrate th,? cultural dimension in ,the dev,;,H0pment strategy," reprinted in 8~.i~ ... _Q.f 
C.ylt.!Jr.e., no. 1 [Apr., May, June 1987], PP. 1',)0-101; Interview, Marreiros). 
63. Interview, Almeida; ".Lei da educaca~'J (.I~nsagra ensino portugues," CM, 22 Feb. 1991; 
"Ensino LU$O-Chines vai sair do 'ghetto'," Jd, 20 Fe·b. 1991. 
64. "Curso de direi·to e administracao pul.ll ic: governador de Macau" (Lusa, 2 Dec. 1988). 
65. Jorge Rangel, "A formacao de quadro:.:.,. B () future, da administ.racao publica de Macau" 
(Speech, n.d.L pP. 5-6; Id., "Human Resoul ~8~~ Development in Macau," in Yuan, WOng a.nd 
Martins, eQ'p'!J.l~t.i.QO .... ~nd .... c.i.t.y. .... Gr.Qw:t.h. ... irL .. t.1ac.~!.~. , pp. 34, 37, 43. 
66. The university has set up cotJrse$ i'vi' ·teacher ·training (in Cantonese), publ ie 
admiriistration (in Cantonese and PortUgUeSE') .• law (in Portuguese) and translation and 
interpreting and has stepped up efforts to j::'i' l:Jrnote PI:;)rtuguese cuI ·ture and language studies 
(Rangel, "Human Resources Development in MaL.;!.l~," PP. 34, 37; Hui, "Development CIf Higher 
Education," pp. 59--61, 73). 
67. "Macau un i ve·rsi ty rector ,"esi gns," Ur~;:; , 26 Mar. 1991. 
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Local cultural autonomy is protec led in the ,Joint Declaration and the 
draft Basic Law,68 as are such aspecLs of culture as Macau's legal and 
economic systems and way of life. Ht/wever, the strength of these guarantees 
in practice ~~ill depend in part on 'i.hother local people feel enough of an 
attachment to their distin~tive ins 'Litutions and values that they are 
willing to defend them. Honq Kong '~; ' e)(perience suggests the growth of a 
stronger Macau identity alone will t:ot ensure these locally born Chinese, 
those who feel the most identificat~, on with the enclave, will remain in the 
enclave to support its autonomy .. L(.u.: and Kuan found that Hong Kong people 
11 regard theit~ society instrumental1~/ as a place to make a living .. /I 
"Claiming a I.~ong Kong identity was ; /)t tantamount to having a strong sense 
of belonging to Hong Kong, and so il ',Jas not a pOl,\Jerful factor dampenin<;J 
the desi re fot' 13mig ration .... 69 
Therefore, a collective local ick!ltity based on the freedoms and values 
shared by the younger Macau-born Ch ,: i le3e, Macanese and Portuguese residents 
will only build local autonomy if t;"iese people feel confident enough in the 
future to stay .. This depends in lar£.j'~~ part on the actions of PRC 
authorities and their local al1ie~~ .. nll of these parties could gain from a 
more self-confident Macau SAR, arme(1 with a strong local identity that will 
promote and pr'otect its liberal, Cd ; ·.i.talist institutions and values .. Many 
outside investors would be more attrdcted to such a place .. Particularly if 
its fostering is overtly supported bj the mainland government, a Macau 
identity does not have to mean reje~Lion of Chinese authorities or the 
Chinese people. 70 
66. ~ac.ay ..... ,J.Q, 2(5)(7), Annex I (VII)(Vlr ~ :.~ .. 
69. Lau and Kuan, Et.ho~, p. 179. 
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Attachment to China (',nd its Central Government 
Local identity is not enough.. DU, .. d. identity also requi res that Macau 
people feel 'attached to the Chinesd ,,, ,)olity .. On this point, my informants 
gener'ally agreed that Macay people ", I t~ more willing tllan Hong Kong 
residents to cooperate with China .. ~;urveys also suggest comparatively few 
Macau people plan to emigrate .. This could be evidence of a less developed 
sense of local identity in the encl' ~ ,\ve and reflect the large numbers of 
Macau 'Chinese who have a Portuguese ~assport safety net, the relative 
smallness of the enclave's professional and higher income groups and the 
conservativenes:3 and older age of it:::> business people. 71 A survey has found 
Macau Chinese were generally quite confident in Macau's political future. 
At the same time, however, distrust in thl~ PRC government runs high.. It is 
particularly strong among younger, b8tter-educated Chinese, precisely those 
Macau most needs to continue its economic development and localisation .. 
They are proportionately more likel.:r to distrust the PRC government and to 
70. The Hong Kong iden'ti ty "'takes China. ,,.)/,, the Chinese people as t~? reference group and 
marks out the Hong Kong Chinese as a dis,tin..:c.,lve group of Chinese •.•• [It] does not e'ntail 
much [sic] poli'tical overtones in terms of t, ;(./;-)9 Kong nationalism' or the desire for 
political independence, thus indicating the 1.ingering dominance of the uni,tary political 
ideology (da yi tong) which is probably the f ,illdamental p/"'inci pIe in the Chinese pol i tical 
heri tage" (Lau and Kuan, ~t.hQ~, p. 2); On tl '~ ,~' I)ther hand, 60 percent of their Hong Kong' 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with tL • .? statement: "Hongkongese have a lot of common 
cha,"acteristics, these make it di fficul t fo/ ' Lhem to g~t along with the Chinese on the 
Main land" (ibid. p. 178). 
71. Interview, Edmund Ho; Only 32 perceni~ (If Chinese respondents in the July 1989 survey 
said they planned to emigrate, ca total which r(~ll to 21 percent in ,the December 1989 survey 
(Macau Confidence Index Survey, July and Oel~ . 1989). By contrast, in Hong Kc~g surveys taken 
in 1985 and 1966, several years beforJ,i,? the ,] ,J/Il? 4 massacre jolted local confidence, as many 
as 44.6 percent of respondents said they W(,U ld emigrate if they had ,the chance, while 48.5 
percent said they would not. People wh:) ide/'! t,,i fied ,themselves as Hongkonese were more likely 
to want to emigrate than those who identi fi;,~:J t.hemselves as Chinese (Lau and Kuan, ,c :thQ~, pp. 
176, 179). Oi fferences in the IJJording of 'thf: questions maJ<e cornparison:9 di fficult. The Macau 
survey asked whether people· planned to emi~j ,l1,,(;.~ while the Hong Kong survey asked l-'Jhether they 
would emigrate i 'f they had a chance. 
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have plans to emigrate. 72 It is in this age group that problems stemming 
from the Chinese government '$ cone.:::; :." of patriotism are especially evident .. 
Diffuse support based on ethnic ()r cultural attachments to a polity do 
not convert automatically into specific support based on the citiz~ns' 
satisfaction with the oLltPLlt of the political e.ystern .. The two can actually 
conflict within a polity lik(~ the Pj',~C, where authorities tend to equate 
patriotism or nationalism with loyal'Ly to the state .. This equation reflects 
China's traditional unitary political ideology.73 
The fact that the Chinese stCi'L~ was founded on one of the world's 
great civilizations has given inordinate strength and durability to 
its political culture .. The overpowering obligation felt by Chinese 
rulers to preserve the unity (rF their civilization has meant tJJat 
there could be no compromise~. in Chinese cultural attitudes ab"out 
po\~er and authority .. 74 
It is reinforced by the ideology of the modern state, which often equates 
Itstatism lt with 11 nationalism, It despit.I;! conflicts between the two due to 
differences of ideology, ethnicity a nd culture within state boundaries .. 7S 
72. Macau Confidence Index SUrveys, Jul~' i.;~nd DE·c. 1969; The surVe'YS found Macau Chinese 
were generally quite confiden·t in the political "future of l'1acau and satisfied with the Joint 
Declaration, which they thought ~Jas a better dE·al than Hong Kong's agreement. However, they 
said the PRC government wi 11 not comply wi th 'l~ he agreement and distrus-ted the proposed Bagic 
Law. They generally felt the PRC !.AJas likely t.I,) remain the same or become less open in fu·ture 
and strongly objected to garrisoning o-f the j"'LA in Macau after 1999. Those who said they 
plannE?d to emigrate were generally younge'r, butter educated, from better off households and 
were less confident in the political future 'Jf Macau than those who did not plan to leave; 
This parallels Lau and Kuan's findings SUgg';:,·iit. Macau people in this group could "'Jell have a 
greater sense o'f belonging to ·the enclave. lIung Kong Chinese who claimed a Hong Kong identity 
te11ded to be younger, roc)t'e educate'd, higher~1'I CtCcupational status, more trustful of the Hong 
Kong government and les$ so of the Chinese 9~v.?rnment. They were also more 1 iJ<ely to be 
politically involved and had greater politiC~ tl inten:'sts (Lau and Kuan, .~t.hQ$., pp. 184-186). 
73. See generally, Schram, "Oecentral isaL:ion in a Unitary State," especi.~lly p. 81; Lau 
and Kuan, ft.bQ$., p. 2. 
74. Lucian W. Pye, "China: EI;ratic Stat(:' , r: n~strated Society," f.Q.c~ign .... e,f.f,a.ir$. 69, no. 4 
(Fall 1990): 58. 
75. Hannum, A!J:!(,QtlQmy., pp. 23, 71, 4[ .. 4; i; ~: . rll ·lum says nationalism implies "a demand for 
political pOWer by an ethnically, linguistic.dIy, or o-therwise homogeneous gl;oup" while 
"statism," implies "a similar demand for polit..ical power by a group which defines i ,tself in 
terms of existing pol i ·tical and/or terri tori..tl boundaries I;ather than a more personally based 
sense of solidarity •••• Under these definit:ic:1i'ls, s -tatism would mor'e accurately describe th€:,. 
struggle against colonial ism, although the fr';;'qIJent references ·to tnation-buildil"lg' in newly 
independent state's Wo:ruld still be rele'vant insofar as new states seeJ< to build a politically 
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The potential °for' such conflicts i(? ncute in the Chinese l/Jorld, where 
colonialism and civil war have diviclcd the country and created communities 
of di fofering id':101ogy and cul tur'e M : ' , .. Ich conflicts are built into "one 
country, two systems," where the Be~~ing government ostensibly aims to 
accommodate fundamentallycont.radic'Lory political and economic systems 
within one country. The diversity wiLhin the Chinese world, coupled with 
the imperative of unity, has resulted in sometlling PRC dissident Fang Lizhi 
has called "the problem of patrioti~.'liI": 
The Chines(~ tendency to blur tile distinctions between party, 
government and country has made it dangerous to challenge fundamental 
policies or the basic characL'_!j'- of the political system for °fear of 
appearing to be 'unpatriotic 6lid subversi ve ...... What makes Fang,. Lizhi 
...... stand out among Chinese i; it(~llectuals is hi:3 outspoken 
recognition that China has be",.!! -, cursed with what he calls "the 
problem of patriotism," which :3tops all reasoning because once you 
"criticize someone for being unpatriotic it will shut him right 
"76 up. 
The Beijing government has generclJ,ly touted a more flexible VIew of 
patriotism when judging Macau and H~)llg Kong Cllinese .. Deng Xiao Ping stated, 
"We don't require them all to favoL!j' China's socialist system, but only ask 
them to love the motherland and Hon:,J Kong."77 However, the boundary between 
acceptable criticism of the PRC govu:nment and actions considered 
"subversive" and "unpatriotic" remain::> blurry .. Like the people oof Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, Macau residents demonst,uted the strength of their feeling of 
oneness as Chinese during the Tiandllmen Square student movement in 1989 .. 
Belying the enclave's reputation a~ J bastion of pro-PRC government 
sentiments, Macau elites o'f both ti"ddi tional pro-Ch,ina' and nontraditional 
homogeneous community tl) replace or comph:.?fil, .. '.lt~ existing ethnic and o'ther communities" (ibid. 
p. 24). 
76. ,PYe, "China," P. 67. 
'n. "Oeng Xiao Ping c ..... Hong Kong IssuE'," (', ;~;~ij.i.ng, .. .8~y.i~~w, 23 July 1964. pp. 16-17. 
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allegiances declar'ed their support fr)r the PRC students .. 78 Public 
demonstrations between 22 May and 5 June 1989 drew crowds as large as 
100,000-170,000 by various estimat(, :;~ , ~ or about · one in five Macau residents. 
The demonstrators' placards !I songs ~\nd speeches revealed their feeling of 
identity "",ith China as well as their' rejection o'f the Chinese leadership 
and ,their distrust of China's intentions regarding 1999. 79 However, in the 
Chinese government's eyes, their act ions were unpatriotic. Following the 
suppression of the student movement en 4 June 1989, the Bejing authorities 
condemned Macau and Hong Kong, alon~ with the United states and Canada, as 
areas where "reactionaries" were SL!~); ~,orting and helping conspire with the 
students~80 Ji Peng Fei, then dit~ec-;/ur of Beijing's Hong Kong and Macau 
Affairs O'ffice, said the two territ,)t'ies would not be allowed to act as 
bases- to interfere with or attempt 'co overthrow or change the socialist 
system on the mainland. 81 
The problem of patriotism ,will continue to plague efforts to build dual 
loyalty in Macau.. It will exclude fi'om the ranks of supporters of Macau '5 
autonomy those young, university-edIJcated, Macau-born Chinese like Caterina 
78. Among them were the Macau Education {~ssociation, Chinese teachers, university and 
other students, employees of ,the pro-Bei j in'3 i:jQ.c.a~L_Q~ily. ... .ti~w$. newspaper, 1 i ber al ,and pro-
Beijing Legislative Assembly members and Basic Law drafters, three of Macau's deputies to the 
PRC's National People's Congress, a leader of the pro-Beijing Macau General Workers Union, 
casino tycoon Stanley Ho, and some IVlacanese .:md Portuguese groups and individuals 
("Associacoes de pro"fes90res chineses de. Mi.lc,)u apoiaro estudantes de Beijing," ~, 17 May 
1969; "Estudantes de Macau continuam deterrn~l'I':ldos frente a Nova China," G/:1, 20 IVlay 1969; 
"Trabalhadores do ~OU·Mun'exigern a demisso.ol.:h? Li Ping," GM, 231'1ay 1989; "A proposito da 
situacao em Beijing," Gt1, 24 May 1989; "Lib.:rais ausentes da sessao inaugural do Conselho 
Consulta'tive da. Lei Basica," GM, 29 May 198'); "Macau voltou a protestar em massa," Gt1, 5 June 
1989). 
'79. "Macau tambem apOia es,tudantes de Be'i,jing," GM, 22 May 1989; "Ern Macau: Dezenas de 
milhares de pessoas rnani festam-se contra Lei 11arcial," GM, 23 May 1989; After news of the PRC 
crackdown reached Macau, some customers of l..:Jcal branches of the PRC-·owned Bank of China 
wi thdrew their money and closed their accoun v:; ("PopUlares acorrem ern rnassa ,3.0 Banco d.-a 
China," OM, 6 June 1969; "Faccoes mili·tares. r:ivais conf,"ontarn-se," ' ~, 7 ,June 1969). 
80. "Macau incluido na lista," GM, 21 JUi .:;.:.' 1989. 
81. "Redactor da Lei Baeica considera irl ~, ; l.Ificientes garantias de Beijing," Q~l, 24 June 
1989. 
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Mok, who loves China but does not ,accept all the policies o'f its central 
government: 
My blo9d and my home country j.~, China, but before I never thought of 
this. I didn't see it because in Macau, if you are Chinese they think 
you are from China. We are not the same as the people in China. We 
have different cultures ....... 8l~t after ,June 4 especially I had this 
idea of closeness to China veiY sharply .. I wanted China to get better 
and better'" My feeling wasn't 'for the government, but a oneness with 
-- the land and the people.. Minh~'~ te rra [" my land," in POt~tugueseJ like 
we say .. 82 
Policy lillplications 
No magic formula exists for d(3te, !i,ining the balance of diffuse and 
specific support required to create J dual political identity capable of 
supporting Macau's autonomy process. What is clear is that a healthy 
balance of loyal ties requi res actic)j I on the pa rt of the Macau, Portuguese 
and Chinese governments. Hong Kong'~ experience suggests that Portuguese 
transition policies targeted at the younger generations, aided by continued 
economic development, increasing social and political pluralism and concern 
about 1999, could increase residentu' sense of attachment to Macau and its 
political institutions over the lon~term. This will be particularly true 
if Macanese and younger, better educdted MaCBu-born Chinese are confident 
enough in the territory's future tc s"tay after 1999. The current policies 
seem helpful, but could well be too late in coming. They would more 
usefully 'focus on political values :" ,-cther than Portuguese cuI tUt'e and 
language .. 
However, China's actions cannot !)~I ignored .. Without changes in PRC 
policies toward Macau and Hong Konu. strengthening local identity might 
only serve to convince more people \ ,0 leave Macau, believing the community 
62. Interview, Mok. 
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they cherish will never survive thc! transfer of administration to China. By 
taking concr'ete steps to endorse t,111.~ : values and institutions in Macau that 
ar'e suppo'rte9 by younger local Cllinc:J8, China would aid in building local 
identity and win. the loyalty of tho~8 Macau people who love China but do 
not tr'ust its current government .. ~·j.·,~cau p(=ople's tradition o'f generally 
peac~ful coexistence with China and ' their sense of Chinese nationalism are 
invaluable resources whose role in forti"fying the enclave '5 autonomy 
process should not be ignored .. None Lheless, it would be a grave mistake for 
Chinese and Portuguese authorities to ignore the changes underway in Macau 
and assume that old alliances with traditional groups in the enclave will 
alone guarantee a smooth transition in 1999 and a prosperous community 
afterward .. Some members of the old alliance, especially those Macanese and 
Portuguese, might not be available ~ By encouraging more speci'fic 
attachments to China based on concn~te and secure political and economic 
benefi ts for both Macanese and YOUil~Je r Chinese residents" PRC leade rs would 
foster a healthier balance of identities that does not depend solely on 
ethnic attachments and traditional elites .. The liberal values shared by 
many younger Macau-born residents ClI'e a potential foundation for such a 
dual identity .. As the next chapter indicates, election results show that 
support for traditional elites is still strong. However, the growth in 
voter support "for reform-minded independent political leaders in recent 
years and the high level of distru~;t many Macau people feel toward the PRC 
leadership make it imperative that new means be "found to build residents' 
attachment to both the future Macau SAR and to China .. The following 
chapters explore some internal polit.ical and legal as well as international 




POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ~ND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
The configuration o'f local political institutions and patterns of 
participation written into the orioi.nal autonomy agreement, and ~/hich 
evolv,e in practice afterward, have 'the potential to help 'foster a political 
culture of dual identity .. The desi~iil and autllority o'f local government 
institutions and their relationshi~ with the central government can also be 
where central-local conflicts are mo.st apparent .. In ,autonomy processes 
where both ' the larger ?-nd local polities share similar democratic values, 
concern has sometimes centred on tlk! central government's authority to 
appoint the local chie'f executive or' central government representative to 
the autonomous territory .. Their powers to dissolve the local legislature, 
veto 'local legislation, determine its constitutionality or challenge it in 
courts in the larger polity can also be controversial. All of these 
tensions are likely to be present in the case of the Macau SAR. In 
addition, there will be others creatt·d by contradictions between the 
political values of China's "democratic centralism" and those liberal 
values accepted in Hacau~ As the pt~evious chapter revealed, these liberal 
values may be some of the key elemen'ts that autonomy seeks to preserve. The 
task is to develop institutions and practices which balance the people of 
Macau's desire to protect their distinct values and control decisions 
affecting their interests with the c8ntral government's desire to protect 
its fundamental interests and sover8ignty. 
This chapte~introduces Macau's current and post-1999 political system, 
then evaluates the latter by considering two problems which have surfaced 
in other autonomy arrangements N Tht:~ first concerns the potential for 
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disrupti ve conflict created when th,';! local chief executi ve are accountable 
to both the local electorate ' or leg.l,slature and the central authorities .. 
" . " The second concerns the role o'F 10C ... Ll democratically constituted political 
institutions in central-local conflicts. While by no means the only issues 
that will confront Macau's politica~ institutions, these two have proven 
troublesome in othet~ autonomy arranoements. In Macau's case, they could be 
aggravated by 'Factors specific to t.he enclave, particularly the likely 
shortage of local people qualified to !lold government and judicial office 
and positions in the senior ci viI ~3(3 rvice afte r 1999. 
Current Political Institutions 
Under the Organic Statute of Macdu, an act of the Portuguese Assembly of 
the Republic first passed in 1976 and amended in 1.979 and 1990, Macau has 
an executive-centred political systcln led largely by political appointees 
from Portugal, although a locally-constituted Legislative Assembly 
("Assembleia Legislativa") has tak(;d a more important role in recent 
years .. ! The highest ranking executive and the representative of the 
Portuguese state is the governor C"governador"), a Portuguese expatriate 
who is appointed by the Portuguese p r'esident afte r mandatory local 
conSUltations with Macau's Legislative Assembly and representatives of 
local interest groups. 2 The governor' nominates and the president appoints 
no more than seven adj unct sec reta r'ies Cl sec reta r'ios adj untos 11) to act as 
1. Afonso and Pereira, "Political Sta"tus .:lnd Government Institutions," pp. 43-44. 
2. OSM, Art. 3( 1 )(2)(3); The governor l'e~)t'~~gent9 the Portuguese state in all matters 
except those concerning the legal system, lIJh ich is pat't of that of Portugal. The POt~tuguese 
pn~sident is empowered to represent Macau in roa'tters relating to foreign relations and 
international agreements although he may dcl,:o',Jate his authority to ·the Macall governor if the 
matter is of exclusive concern to the enclav(~. However, international agreements cannot be 
applied to Macau without prior consultation (ibid.; Afonso and Pereira, "Political status and 
Government Institutions," PP. 40-41). 
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his or her advisors. 3 Unlike Hong K<).19, \o'/here the governor and principle 
secretaries are career civil servarl'v':>, the governor is a political 
- " 
appointee whose mandate is subordil'l':.i l~e to the Portuguese pr'esident ,'s five-
year term of office. The a~jjunct sc, .. r'etaries are with rare exceptions 
Portuguese expatriates who change ~I - t U, each new governor. 4 The adj unct 
secretaries advise the governor and direct central administrative 
departments and government agencies~5 The governor also gets advise from a 
Consultative Council ("Conselho Con~>ultivo") o'f ten members serving four-
year terms. The governor appoints five of its members from among leading 
residl;ents of Macau while Macau's rTlullicipal assemblies and key interest 
groups elect the other five. 6 The council's decisions are not binding. 7 
Unlike Hong Kong's Executive Council, where five out of fifteen members are 
senior civil servants, Macau's governor is the only official member of the 
Consultative Council and can only vote in case of a tie. 8 
The governor has concurrent lawm~king powers with the Legislative 
Assembly unless competence is confert~ed exclusively on the latter. 9 The 
assembly has twenty-three deputies ("deputados") who serve four-·year terms, 
3. Ibid., Art. 17(1). 
4. The cabinet of the new governor Vasco Hocha Vieira includes t~\IO Macau-born adjunct 
secretaries, both of them MacaneSf3. All of th~? adjunct secre-taries appoin-ted by the former 
governor were dismissed ("New cabinet for Mr..C2_U," HISS, 17 May 1991). 
s. Afonso and Pereira, "Political Status and Government Insti tu -tions," pP. 45-46 .. 
6. QSM, Art. 44(1)(2)(3). 
7. Ibid., Art. 49(4). 
8. Ibid., Art. 42(2), 50(1); Norman J. t'iiners, "Constitution and Administration," in 
Richard Y.C. Wong and Joseph Y.S. Cheng, edz., Ih~ ... _O_t.he.r_ ..._HQng .... ISQng_ ... B~J?Qr.:t .... l~Q (Hong Kong: 
Chinese University Press, 1990), p. 5; Undl2l the Organic Statute's 1990 amendments, the 
adjunct secretaries and other government offi,~ialg can attend its mee-tings but do not have 
the ."ight to vote. Previously, three senior u1"ficials were permanen-t council members while 
the governor appointed two local residents CAS loembers (OSt1, 1976, Art. 44[3J[4J). 
9. QSM, Art. 5, 21(1), 22(1), 31(2). 
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but is only partly directly elected. The governor appoints seven deputies 
from among local residents and eight. seats are filled through indi rect 
elections among members of local m<,jr'j,:\l , cultural , welfare and economic 
organisations, with representatives from economic organisations holding the 
largest number of seats by law. Only a minority of eight deputies are 
elected directly by universal sU'f'fl~,jg8 .. 10 These seats are contested by 
candidates linked with permanent civic associations or candidate committees 
and are allocated according to a sy::stem o'f proportional representation .. !! 
Unlike their counterparts in Hong Kong, Macau's governor and adjunct 
secretaries have no seat in the ass.(:,?ilIbly, which instead elects its .'-,-
president and vice-president from among its own members.!2 However, the 
governor can influence the assembly through his power of appointment and by 
referring a bill back for review after it has been approved by the 
assembly. Nevertheless, if the assembly subsequently passes it with a two-
thirds majority, the governor cannot refuse to publish it unless it IS 
unconstitutional or conflicts with Portugal's overriding guidelines for the 
Macau government .. In these cases, a bill subsequently passed by a two-
thirds majority must be sent to the Constitutional Court in Portugal, which 
will determine its constitutionality and whose decision is binding. 13 
10. Ibid., Art. 21(1). 
11. Afonso and Pereira, "Political statu ~::; and Government Institutions," p. 49. 
12. Ibid., Art. 2; Miners, "Constitution ,:U1d Administ.ra't.ion," PP. 6-7; The governor may 
attend sessions of the assembly but has no I :is.Jht to vote' (OS-M, Ar't. 37[1J). 
13. OSM, Art. 40(1)(2)(3). 
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Post-1999 PolitIcal Institutions 
The Sino-Portuguese Joint ' Oeclar~. i,ion lat~gely aims to preserve the 
current executi ve-·qominated, exten·kd . .1y appointed , semi-democratic , 
political system in the future HacaLl SAR, while swapping Portuguese 
authority for that of the PRC .. 14 Th(~ SAR government and legislature will be 
Itcomposed o'f local inhabitants .. " Th~J majority of the members of the 
legislature Itshall be elected, It al tllough whether directly or indirectly is 
not specified .. 15 The chief executive: \Ad.ll be "appointed by the Central 
People's Government on tile basis of the results of elections or 
consultations to be held in Hacau." 16 Other principal officials--inciuding 
the equivalent of the current adjuJ'Ii..:'t secretaries, procurator-general and 
principal officer of the police ser'vice--" t~ill be nominated by the chief 
executive of the Hacau Special Adrnidistrative Region for appointment by the 
Central People's Government. ltl7 Thus, the chief executive and principle 
officials of the SAR gov~rnment will be political figures, as they have 
been in Portuguese-administered Hacau .. In this respect, Hacau will not have 
to_ undergo the same adjustment as H\)ng Kong .. In the British territory, the 
governor and principle officials arl:; having to adapt to politics and 
14. The following comment. about. Hong KC)j'l<] t;ould as easi I y have been made about Macau: 
"Like every other colonial constitution, the poli·tical system in Hong Kong is dependent on 
an external force for it3 legitimacy, relativ-?ly immune from political pressures 
originated from the ' society, executive-cente,'ed t'ather than legislative-dominant, and 
operatiVe in a top-down policy-making mode. Isn't it convenient for China to remain in 
ultimate control of Hong Kong if these essel".tial features are preserved while those 
'colonial' components such as appoint.ment 0 r the governor by the Queen are removed? In 
essence, it involves nothing more than the, I2p},\cernent of t.he master" (Lau Siu-Kai and 
Kuan Hsin-Chi, "Hong Kong in Search of a Cons ensus" [Occasional Paper, The Centre for Hong 
Kong Studies, Chinese University of Hc.'lf"lg KOi~9, Nov. 1985), p. 23, cited in Ambrose V.C. 
King, "The Hong Kong Talks and Hong Kong Politics," .I~~Je.$. .... ~nr.;l .... ~S.t.y.d .. ie.~ 22, no.6 [June 
1986): 72-73). 
15. t1ac.a!J .... J.Q, Annex I ( I I I ) .. 
16. Ma~a.y. .... J.Q, 2(3), 7. 
17. Ibid., 2(3), Annex I (II)~ 
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elected representatives increasingl; invading the once exclusive 
policymaking role of the colonial b . :n3aucrat .. 18 
The Hacau ' Basic Law now being dr .\ rtecJ will elaborate on these general 
specifications .. News reports suggest it will also secure a dominant role 
for Chinese nationals and expand t112, authority of the legislature over that 
of th~ current system~19 They suggest the Macau Basic Law will closely 
follow the provisions of Hong Kong'~ Basic Law in that the chief executive 
will have to be a Chinese national of at least forty years of age who has 
lived in Hacau for at least twenty jears .. He or she will likely be chosen 
by an electoral colleg~ of 300 peo~le. The Consultative Council would- also 
be completely made up of Chinese nationals according to this proposal. 20 
Unlike the current system, the chief executive will not hold legislative 
powers after 1999 .. 21 However, other authority given the chief executive in 
the Hong Kong Basic Law--and likely in Macau's too--will likely ensure his 
or her influence over the legislature .. The chief executive will not only 
lead the government, sign legislation and budget bills and promulgate laws, 
but have the power to return a bill to the legislature for reconsideration 
within three months ori the vague grounds that it is incompatible with the 
interests of the SAR. If the legislature passes the same bill again by at 
least a two-thirds majority of all members the chief executive can dissolve 
the legislature, but only once during his or her term of office. This power 
18. Kathleen Cheek-Milby, "The Changing Pcditical Role of the Hong Kong Civil Servant," 
eac.i.tic. .... A.f.fai.r.i&? 62, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 221-2:22. 
19. "Redaccao da l.ei EJasica reune no Zhuhai," J.I:1, 12 I"lar. 1991; "Nacionalidade dos 
·chefes' nao ob-teve consenso," J.M, 15 Dec. 1990. 
20. "Redaccao da Lei Basica reune no Zhu :l<:li, J.t1, 12 Mar. 1991; "Nacionalidade dos 'chefes' 
nao obteve con sen so , " J.M, 15 Dec. 1990. 
21. Harald Bruning, "Po~Jer$ de-fined for t..c.p position," HKS, 19 Mar. 1990. 
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of dissolution can also be used i"f l.l,d legislature re"fuses to pass a budget 
or important government bill. 22 Thu~l , the relationship envisioned is one of 
mutual regulatioh between the legisi~tive and executive branches with much 
of the final say resting with the Ci Ij.ef executi ve .. 
The Chit.~f Executi ve 
Nonetheless, these p rovisions c()i~.ld put the cl1ie"f executi ve in the 
difficult pos'ition of having both CdlTtral and local masters .. He or she will 
be politically accountable to the central government, which has ultimate 
power of -appointment, but will also be answerable to the SAR legislature, 
whose support he or she will need t.o pass legislation, and to the SAR 
Election Committee, which will select the candidate for chief executive .. 
Edmund Ho, a Basic Law drafter and d5sembly vice-president, says Beijing is 
unlikely to fully surrender its pow~r to appoint the chief executive: 
Even if he is appointed by Beijing he must have autonomy under the 
Basic Law. Having two masters is the nature of the system. It would 
totally be an abnormality in an autonomous region or a province or 
whatever at this level to have ' someone there without this 
criteria ...... No central gover/lillent would give up this power unless 
they have the intention to turn the place into an independent 
country. Even if they don't i:ltend to use it, they need the formal 
power to appoint the chief exccutive .. 23 
Ho also argues that the chief exec~ 'tive needs Beijing's support in order to 
balance competihg local interests: 
It is much better for Macau if he is controlled by the central 
government and accountable t.0 the citizens of Hacau. Othen",ise, we 
23. Interview, Edrnund Ho; In fact, the CCi'! tral gCNernments of both Finland and Denmarl< 
have given up their powers to appoint th.? chief executives of the Aland and Gre€nland 
governments. See pp. 46-47 of the present s t .udy. 
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would h~ve problems~ In Hacau there are so many interest5~ He needs 
some backing from BeijingM 24 
It is understandable that the BeJjing authorities want both symbolic and 
actual influence in the SAR governml," tI t .. However, as discussed previously, 
making the chief executive responsil)le to both local and central political 
organs has hampered the operations of autonomy arrangements in southern 
Sudan by encouraging confrontational solutions rather than those that build 
patterns of compromise and cooperat 'Lon ~ 2.5 When the inevitable conflicts 
over policy or jurisdiction break out between the local legislature and 
central government, Hacau's chief executive will be under pressure to 
engineer -a solution that pleases a11 sides ~ If he or she is unable Ot<-
unwilling to do so, the central government will be tempted to force him or 
her to veto or dissolve the legislaLur'e~ Such actions would paralyse local 
lawmaking. They would also encourag.2 local distrust of the central 
government and the belief that the chief executive is nothing more than 
Beijing's puppet. On the other hand, if the chief executive were to side 
with the local assembly, Beijing will be tempted to dismiss him or her~ 
This would disrupt the local government and exacerbate rather than diminish 
central-local conflicts~ 
The Aland and Greenland autonomy arrangements have avoided the problem 
by using parliamentary-style regional governments. This makes the local 
$xecutive solely accountable to the local legislature~ They then place 
responsibility for representingna'tional sovereignty and liaisoning with 
the government of the autonomous territory in a separate central government 
appointed official. In the case of Aland, Helsinki authorities appoint the 
24. Ibid. 
25. HannUffl, Ay;tiollomy., p. 324; See also p. 44 of the present study. 
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central representative after local consultations. He or she has always been 
an Aland resident in recent years.26 
Although there is nothing to prev
'
2nt the Macau chief executive from 
choosing members of the legislature ']:5 principal secretaries, a system 
fashioned on the Aland or Greenland fllodel would be a departure from Macau's 
traditional quasi--presidential stylI) government .. t10re importantly, such a 
system seems unrealistic because it would requir-e China to give up its 
power to appoint the chief executivl~. This seems unlikely, at least in the 
short term. However, the failures of the Sudan system might still be 
avoided if Beijing were to exercise its authority to appoint the cl1ie~f 
executive in a formal manner only, in practice leaving the choice to Macau 
people expressed through direct elections .. In this way, the chie'f executive 
would hold office at the pleasure of the local electorate. ~Jhen central-
local conflicts arose, they could bt3 resolved through political and 
judicial channels and other constitutional review mechanisms, allowing the 
day-to-day functioning of Macau's political institutions to continue 
uninterrupted. If Macau's system of selecting the chief executive is 
modelled on the Election Committee 3ystem in the Hong Kong Basic LalAJ, the 
chief executive could well be a PRC Gupporter anyway and Beijing's 
~ppointment power would be unnecessary.27 By using it formally only, the 
chief executive would be less tinged by his or her association with the 
central government and thus be able to play a more conciliatory role 
between the two polities and related factions within the SAR. Central 
26. Hannum, AY.:tono.r:oY., P. 343, 372,. 
27. J:io.o9 .... KO'09 ... J;!1", Art. 45, Annex I and 'Dc'cision of the National People's Congress on the 
Method for the Fonnation of the First Governl1l1;.;'nt and the First Legislative Council of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
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government political representatives in Macau--who will be present behind 
the scenes in any case--'could be clea rly identified as such .. 
' . . 
Under the model used in the Hong Kong Basic Law~ the central government 
will have many other ways to control the SAR. The NPC is empowered to amend 
the Basic Law and it:3 Standing Commi',ttee to interpret the Basic Law and 
declare laws previously in force in the territory in contravention of its 
provisions. 28 The PRC leaders' influence with traditional elites in Macau 
should reassure them they will have considerable power over the enclave 
anyway and encourage Macau '5 chief e)<ecuti ve and legislature to cooperate. 
Thus, the changes prqJosed do not aim to thwart China. Instead, they ~aim to 
encourage both the Macau executive dnd legislature and the PRCgovernment 
to develop habits of mutual tolerance and cooperation rather than 
confrontation when disputes arise, while ensuring stable government In 
Macau .. Furthermore, the more Macau pl30ple believe the local chief executive 
and principle secretaries are responsive to local interests and not only 
those of the Chinese government, the more likely it is they will come to 
support local political institutions. If this were to happen with Beijing's 
blessing, it would also foster trust in China among Macau people and 
encourage their identification witll the central government, helping to 
create the dual identity the autonomy process requires. 29 
The Civil Service 
This dual identity is more likely to develop if the executive is 
supported by an effective, strongly locally oriented civil service. This 
28. Ibid., Art. 158, 159, 160. 
29. The role . of democracy, including dire'et ~'l6'ction of the chief executive, is discussed 
in more detail on pp. 129-137 of the present. ~~tudy. 
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does not mean the admini~3tration sh<..>uld be anti-Beij ing. Rather, it should 
be made up of local people, account~ble to only the Macau government, 
politically neutral and possess "re.~.:\tive 8utonomy."30 An e"f'fective, 
impartial bureaucracy with relative autonomy is the backbone of an 
effective government in any developc~ and complex capitalist society.31 
Therefore, its cultivation in Macau is both a political and an economlC 
imperative. The enclave's governmer,"t has in recent years taken a more 
active role in bringing about the educational, legal, infrastructural and 
other improvements needed to develclJ Macau's economy and society _ The size 
of Macau -'s bureaucracy has already lIIul tiplied in response to its neea" to 
manage a more complex community_" It grew from 5,063 to 13,125 employees 
between 1981 and 1989, a period of double-digit gro~\Jth for ~1acau 's Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and o'f rapid population increases due to 
immig ration .. 32 
The Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration recognised the bureaucracy's 
critical role in assuring a smooth tl~ansition in 1999 and stability and 
prosperity afterwards .. It guarantee3 all Macau public servants regardless 
of their nationality continued employment in the SAR administration under 
pay, allowances and benefits no less favourable than those prior to the 
30. The term .. re lati ve autonomy" refers "to .. the degre'e to which the state e 1 i te can act 
independently in its relationships wi"th ot~1t?1" elitE'S and lo'Jith capitalis-t enterprise .... This 
relative autonomy is necessary in capitalist socie"ties because "the state elite must resolve 
conflicts which arise betw€·en di ffe/'ent factions within the capitalist economy .... If the 
state elite could not "fulfil a mediating or arbitrating function, conflicting interests would 
ultimately have a destructive effective on th(;o economic system" (Scott. P.ol.it.ic.~l_. "C~nge., p. 
253 at note 80). 
31. I bid.. PP. 250"-251. 331. 
:32. Governo de Macau, Be.c.Yr_~Q$. ... "HYm~nQ$.. " "" ~I"~"\ "" " "AQ.min.iJ?t.r",c.aQ".".P.Y.b.li.c.~. " .. Q~_"."Mac~~L.12e.Q (Macau: 
Servico de Administracao e Funcao Publica," 1'390), p. 7; MacalJ·s GOP growth rates averaged 
16.2 pet'cent between 1984 and 1968 (A$.i~""".Y.Q~r"bQQ.k" " .. l~~Q [Hong Kong: Review Publi$hing Ltd .• 
1990J, p. 7). 
126 
transfer. 33 Appointments and pr'omot50lls are to be based on "quali-fications, 
experience and ability" and "Macau)::;; previous system of employment, 
discipline, p'romotion and normal rl~)0 in rank .... shall remain basically 
unchanged .. " 34 
Despite these guarantees, the MacQu civil service's serious shortage of 
local people in its senior ranks bt~inqs into question its ability to serve 
Macau's autonomy process effectively during the transition and afterward. 
A-fter years of unilingual Portugue~3'J administration with expatriate 
Portuguese dominating the senior civil service, few Macau Chinese have the 
linguistic and technical skills to assume the tlighest positions in the 
government bureaucracy .. 35 The goverTIIII I3nt attempted to bring nlore local 
people into the senior administration in the early 19805, but localisation 
did not begin in a systematic way until 1988 as part of efforts to prepare 
the enclave for 1999. 36 By early 1991, Macanese occupied the directorships 
of a few departments and agencies but local Chinese had not yet reached the 
33. J1ac.av .. _J.D 2( 3), Annex I (VI). 
34. Ibid., Annex I(IV); The Joint Declara;tion also provides ·that all pensions and 
allowances for publ ie servants who retir~ ;3, ftt: 1' the establ ishmen t of the SAR are guaranteed 
on terms no less favc:..'Il.wable than before reganJless of the E'mployee's nationali ·ty or place of 
residence. "The Macau SAR may appoint Portuguese and other foreign nationals previously 
serving in the (XJbl ic service in Macau or c.urn:mtl y holding Permane-nt Identity Cards Cif the 
Macau SAR to publ ic posts" except ce'~tain principal official posts. Portuguese and other 
foreigners may also be invited to hold advi~;;c'ry, professional and technical posts (ibid. 
Annex I[VI]); For a ' discussion of these provisions of the Sino-British Joint Declaration see 
ChE.~k-Milby, "The Changing Poli·tical Role of the Hong Kong Civil Servant," pp. 220-221. 
35. Until Septembe,' 1984, Chines~ nation31s were not permitted ·to work for the Macau 
government (Donald Cheung, "Macau lets Chinese join service," SCt1P., 5 Aug. 1984); Among the 
13,125 civil servants working for the Macau 9uvernment on 31 Oec. 1989, almost 78 percent 
were born locally, either in Macau (55.6 PE'I·(;;€.mt) or the PRC (22 percent) (Gove,'no de Macau, 
B~r'~MJj!Jr.oa.nQ$. .... d.~ .... Ad.r.o.in.i$.:tr.ac.a.o. .... f?!J.b.l.ic.a, ... d.~ .... Mf.Ac.ay ..... 6.9., pp. 12, 16-17, ' 53, 71); According ·to 
AUg. 1990 figures, however, Portu9uc-'Se-born people accounted for 51.8 percent of ·top 
management and 61.6 pel'cen·t of middle manc'lge rll!?nt positions (interview, Rui Rochcl). 
36. Interview, Hui RCJCha. 
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directors ranks .. 37 Aggravating the f.~ low pace of localisation, the number of 
expatriate Portuguese civil servant.) has increased in recent years due to 
higher recruitment in Portugal to ~.taff the expanded numbers of government 
initiatives. Whether these .gover'nme.rt activities are primarily an 
"intensification of Portuguese colorli~lism or a response to Macau's economic 
and social development is a matter o'F dispute .. 38 
Localisations efforts are also hampered by uncet'tainty over how many 
Chinese and Macanese civil servants will stay in Macau after 1999. Almost 
71 percent of Macau civil servants dre Portuguese nationals with the right 
to live in Portugal or~ after 1992, anywhere in the European Community. 
Almost 77 percent of these are Macau-'born Chinese and Macanese, precisely 
those t.lrgeted 'for promotion und(~r the localisation policy .. 39 Whether they 
will emigrate before 1999 is in large part a function of their confidence 
in the enclave's future economic and political stability and autonomy and 
whether they believe their Portuguese passports will protect them after the 
transfer of administration. The lil<l::!lihood China will restrict senior 
positions in the SAR government to Chinese nationals and will continue to 
dig in its heals on refusing to accept dual nationality has not helped 
their confidence. These central government policies could prevent many 
37. The directorships occupied by fvlacanl;?~:;E:' included "the economic, Chinese affairs and 
education departments, the Macau Cultural Irl'3ti tute, Macau Foundation, citizens' advice 
bureau, culture bureau, municipal government':.. and a public hospital. Rui Rocha says one of 
these senior Macanese civil servants is more Chinese than Portuguese (ibid.); See also Yee 
and Lo, "Macau in Transition," p. 3; "Macau civil servants given deadlinE'," Sc.MP., 19 Sept. 
1989. 
38. J.A. Oliveira Rocha, "Sistema Politi(.;;() d~l.' Macau" (Unpublished teaching materic'~l 
prepared for the Law and Public Administrati-::m Pr09tJ amme, University of East Asia, 1990), p. 
5 at note 5. 
39. Governo de t1acau. B~:c.Yr.$.Q$. .... H!yWJ~t.lQ$. .... Q"h\.. .. OQ.m.:i.ni$.:tr.ac~Q ... E\J..b.lic~ .... d~ .. .. t.1~c.~Y .... l.~e.9. , P. 62. 
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Hacau Chinese -From -filling top administrative and judicial positions unless 
they choose to gi ve up thei r Portu~Ji ,K~3e passport .. 4·0 
A Portuguese government pronlise '!~U integrate some permanent and longer 
serving Hacau civil servants o-F Portuguese nationality into the Portuguese 
bureaucracy could prove another impc0iment to localisation .. 41 The 
government believes about 4,000 civil servants are eligible and estimates 
1,000 could take up the offer although no exact figures are known yet. 42 
Details of the scheme have not been finalised, in part because of delays ln 
discussing the matter in the Joint L.i.aison Group. However, those eligible 
would likely retain the right to a F'ortuguese civil service contract --,.even 
i-f they remain in f1acau after' 1999, ~."l1ich could encourage more to stay 
on .. 4·3 
If localisation is not successful, personnel shortages could disrupt the 
Hacau government administration and legal system at critical times before 
and after the transfer in 1999. Alrcedy, the growing complexity of Macau's 
economy and society, the politicisation o'f its residents and their 
increasing demands on government are placing more pressure on the civil 
service's efficiency, autonomy and legitimacy.44 Shortages of key local 
personnel would be particularly dangerous should they encourage the Macau 
or SAH governments to fill vacant po.licy-making positions with PRC recruits 
or cause PRC leaders to intervene wi th their own people to avert an 
40. Interview, Range 1; See al so pp. 83·_·04 I.)f the present weir 1<. 
41. Emily Lau t "Portu9uE-se parachute," F.i;.:lB, 12 Oct. 1989, pp. 26, 28. 
42. Interview, Rui Rocha; "Macau civil $(;" , vants given deadline," SCMP.t 19 Sep·t. 1989 .. 
43. Interview, Rui Rocha. 
44. scott has SU99E!sted these pressures .-·n e undermining the relative autonomy (If ·the Hong 
Kong civil service (Scott, P.9..1 .. i :ti.c.al .... ChQ.IJ.9!~~ tJ. 253). 
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administrative breakdown .. A senior IJdl 'eaucracy even partially sta'Ffed by 
civil servants fr'om China would undermine t.he administration's legitimacy 
as an autonomous, impartial and MaciJ.u ·"oriented institution .. It could create 
an elite public service divided betw8en those accountable to the Macau SAR 
government and those answerable to the PRC government. This would hurt 
Macau's economic and political stability and the development of local 
political identity, not to mention t.rust in the goodwill o"f the PRC .. 
Therefore, localisation is essentidl" While both the Macau and 
Portuguese governments and Chinese ;~ ;.uthori ties recognise its importance, 
Beijing in particular could do more to encourage the process by taking 
steps to build confidence in Macall'~~ future autonomy that would encourage 
Macanese and Chinese residents to"stay after 1999. Lifting nationality 
restrictions on all or some senior (:1drninistrati ve and judicial positions 
would be a positive step towards recognising Macau's unlque problems and 
gaining local trust. 
Direct Elections and 0AR Political Institutions 
Given the potential for direct central government control over the SAR 
government through the executive and, potentially, the civil service, 
defence of Macau's autonomy process could depend to a significant degree on 
the ability of the legislature to ~: Llpport local interests and act as a 
focal point for local political identity. A democratic legislature--one 
directly elected by universal suffrage--would be better equipped to play 
such a role. However, it would also face serious limitations both to its 
establishment and its subsequent opol~tion. 
To begin with, a democratic legi::.:>lature alone is not enough. Kuan 
argues, "In case the "full legislatur"e is popularly and directly elected 
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while the head of government is not., 'further institutions are required to 
make government policies depend on the expression o'f preferences .. "45 This 
is particularly the case in politicdl systems like Macau, where the chief 
executi ve is appointed by ar) autl10ri ta rian cent ral gove rnment. Both the 
chief executive and legislature must be directly elected if there is to be 
respon~ive government .. 
Nevertheless, using democratic executive and legislative bodies to 
secure local autonomy poses a dilemma. According to Robert Dahl, "a key 
charact.eristic of a democracy is th:.::: continuing responsi veness of the 
government to the pre'ferences o'f it:3 citizens, considered as political 
equals .. "46 Given the high degree of distrust most MacaLl people feel to~~ards 
China, an SAR government without sO.lIe amount of "democratic respectability" 
'will have difficulty gaining the kind of brc.ad local public confidence 
needed to foster dual identity .. 4 7 H0~:·JeVer, the experiences of southern 
Sudan and Eritrea indicate that cn2dting local institutions with democratic 
legitimacy could undermine Macau's cl Lltonomy because the central government 
in Beij ing would pe rcei VE? them as d th reat to its own legitimacy.. I n both 
of the African autonomy processes, the authoritarian Sudanese and Ethiopian 
central governments distrusted democt~atic institutions set up in the 
southern 'Sudanese and Eritrean auto(lomous territories. This contributed to 
their distrust in the autonomy arri=fngements as a whole and encouraged their 
45. Kuan, "Power Dependence and Democr.at.:.i c TI'ansition," p. 3. 
46. Robert A. Dahl, p.Ql.y.a.r.c.hy.., ..... p."'r.t.i.~.:i.P.(.~.~;i.Qn .... ~nd ..... QeP.Q~.:i.t.iQn (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1971), p. 1. 
47. The term "democratic respectability" i s bon'o~\)ed from Arnbrose Y.C. King, who has made 
similar cornments about Hong Kong (King, "HOI')';) I(ong Talks and Hong Kong Politics," pp. 74-75); 
The importance of "democratic respectabil it,y" is inherent in the concepts of sel f-government 
and sel f-determin.3.·tion (see p. 39 of the prE:·;.;cnt worl<). 
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eventual violation of the agreement~ .48 This dilemma underlies the tensions 
surrounding the question o"f democr,3,cy in l1acau .. 
Although Macau has had a minority of directly elected members in its 
legislature since 1976, -Fifteen yell"s longer than Hong Kong, there are 
~ntrenched barriers to the legislature's transformation into a fully 
direc·tly elected institution .. The pr~imary one is the opposition of the 
Chinese leadership to establishing directly elected governments in the 
SARs.49 Over the years, a coalition of interests formed by PRC authorities, 
traditionalpro-PRC Chinese elites, the Portuguese administration and 
traditional Macanese etites has bar~r'cd further democratisation .. 50 The-.-small 
group of independent, reform-minded local Chinese deputies now 1n the 
assembly -has tried to crack their POI/~f3r monopoly .. In 1984, Alexandre Ho, a 
Catholic liberal closely linked wit:-, Macau and opposed to China 
sympathisers, won a directly elected seat in the assembly .. He and two other 
re"formers won hal"f the directly ele<>ted seats in the assembly in 1988 .. 51 
However, traditional elites still control the chamber and, therefore, the 
process of amending the Organic Statute .. 52 Revisions made to the statute in 
48. See pp. 47-48 of the present study. 
49. As a Chinese territory under Portugul!se administration, Macau is a dependent pOlity. 
It will remain so after 1999, when it will have some as yet uncertain degree of autonomy, but 
will be a local 90vernment under the central government of China's unitary state. According 
to Kuan, in such dependent polities the choic6'3 of the rulet's in the hegemonic country are 
critical for poli tica.l change, including de'mocratisation (Kuan, "Power Dependence and 
Democratic Transition," p. 1). 
so. Lo, "Colonial Policy-Makers, Capitalist Class and China," p. 211; For discussion of 
events which ' led tC) establishing a partially democratic legislature in 1976 (see P. 66 a 't 
note 26 and p. 95 at note 24 of the present vlorl<). 
51. Lo, "Aspec'ts of Political Developmont in Macau," PP. 216 .. 
52. under the 1976 version of the Organ.ic Statute, the assembly was exclusively empowered 
to initiate a.mendments (Afonso and Pet'eira, "Political Status and Governmen't Institutions," 
p. 36). Under the 1990 revisions, a.ll revi~.ir.)ns mus't be proposed by ei ,ther the assembly or 
the governor in consu 1 tation with the asselllt)1 y. Any changes to the proposal made -by the 
Portuguese Assembly of the Republic must be approved by either' the Macau governor clr the 
assembly (QSM, Art. 30[1][b]; Pot'tJJgal, c.Qn~;tt.i ,t!J. :~.i.Qn, Art. 292). 
1990 included an increase in the nUlflber ()'f deputies in the assembly from 
seventeen to t~\Jenty-three, ~~hich tllu Nacau government maintained was 
necessary because of the dramatic p(~ulation increase since 1976. 53 
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However, the new seats were . allocatt~d so that the proportion of appointed 
and directly and indirectly elected ~eats remained the same. The new law 
also redivided the indirectly elected seats in a way that assures the 
dominance of business interests, giving four seats to business, two to 
labour, one to the professions and one to social assistance, cultural, 
sporting and educational groups.54 According to two Macau Portuguese 
lawyers, .one of ~ll1om is now an asselllbly deputy, this triangular system of 
selection--a combination of directly elected, indirectly elected and 
appointed seats-'-ensures all major ethnic and interest groups are 
represented in the legislature. The governor uses his power of appointment 
to stabilise and balance its composition so that it can mediate interests 
and achieve political consensus. 55 An alternative view is that the system 
secures the power of traditional elites. 
Prospects for democratisation uncjer 11 one country, two systems" are just 
as uncertain. Hong Kong's Joint Oeclclration pr'omises lithe legislature of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by 
53. "March date for voters in Macau," til\~, 7 Dee. 1990. 
54. "Lei electoral aprovada na A.l. .... I~J, 2 Mar. 1991. 
55. Afonso and Pen'3'ira. "Political st.3.tlJ .~ a.nd Government Institutions," PP. 48-49; The 
1976 and 1980 elections were conducted und~~r .:~ restricted franchise in which all adult 
Macanese and Portuguese were permitted to "''I,) tr?, but on 1 ythose Chinese who had 1 i ved in the 
territory for five years could cast ballots. Macanese and longE'r-terrn Portuguese I'esidents 
dominated the directly elected seats and eOCfiI? o'f the appointed ones,. while local Chinese 
dominated the indirec·tly elected seats and ~;ome.' appointed ones (Canas. "Vias de Partici pacao 
Pol i tica da3 oi ferentes Comunidades de Mac\lu," in Yuan,. Keong, Mar·tins, P.QQ!Jl~:t.iQn.~.~nd ..... C..it.Y. 
Gr.o.wt.,h,. pp. 301-302 at note 2); After the n :stl"ictiot)s on Chinese voters were lifted in 1984. 
Chinese deputies dominated the indirect~ and direct seats, securing a majol'ity in thl? assembly 
for the fi rst time. The governor then used Li~ pOf.,\Jer Cif appointment to ~-nsure Macanese and 
Por'bJguese representation in thr? assembly (C~~ila$, "Vias de Participacao Politica,." Pp. 302-
303 at note 4). 
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elections. 1156 Macau's indicates only that a majority of deputies will be 
elected without specifying whether- directly or indirectly.57 Although a 
majority of relevant political activists and <aroLlps in Hong Kong demanded 
democracy during the drafting of tl ' k~ Hong Kong Basic Law, China ignored the 
views and had the final say.58 Hon~J Kong's Basic Law, Macau's blueprint, 
gives no date by which directly elected members will command the majority 
in the SAR legislature, vaguely proJllising that lithe ul tirnate aim is the 
election of all the membens of the Legislative Council by universal 
suffrage .. 11 59 News reports about Macdu's Basic Law drafting process suggest 
the enclave is unlikely'to get anything more and could end up with less. 
According to one unnamed MaC8U Basic L.aw drafter: III think that Macau and 
Beijing are in .agreement not to diminish the percentage of directly elected 
[deputies], that there should occur a diminution of the appointed 
[deputies] and a consequent increase in the indirectly elected 
[deputies] .... But it seems clear at this moment for both sides that the 
direct election o'f 100 percent w'ould not de'f(~nd the interests of Macau .. 1160 
Hacau people '$ participation in (k:~monstrations support lilg the 1989 
Beijing pro-democracy movement suggests they felt S0me sympathy with the 
PRC stUdent '$ vaguely defined deman,je, for democracy .. However, there is no 
statistical data available on whetll13r there is attitudinal support for 
democracy in Macau, n0( how local people understand the concept" A J'uly 
56. HQO.9 .... KQ09 .... J.D., Annex I (I). 
57. tlac.ay .... ,J..D.. Annex I (I I 1 ) • 
59. t:lo.n9 .... Koo9Oh.E!.L.' Art. 68, Annex 11 andl~hc- Dt?cis:ion of the Na·tional People's Congress on 
the Formation of the First Government and th~? First Le'::Jislativ,? Counci 1 o 'F ·the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region. 
60. "Organizacao politica divide redactc""E'~:; '" J.tl, 11 Sept. 1990. 
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1989 telephone survey actually found little evidence of popular demands for 
democratic reform .. When asked ~lJhat "l.llc~ government should give priority to 
during the tra-ilsition, only 6 perceL'!:. o'f Chinese and 1 perc t3nt o'f Macanese 
respondents ment.ioned democratic policy .. 61 Still, particularly during the 
demonstrations in 1989, some Macau leaders publicly declared that 
democratisation is the only \~ay in ~-Jhicl1 the enclave '$ autonomy can be 
secured against encroachments from China .. 62 Furthermore, many political 
elites and Po~tuguese administrators believe the SAR's political system 
will not be democratic unless the p:~c itself becomes more democratic .. 63 
This belief, which also' exists in '-- long Kong, is one of the reasons M~Gau 
and Hong Kong people cannot r'emain indi ffe n3nt to political developments in 
the PRC despite Beijing's warnings that the SARs must not interfere with or 
try to alter the socialist system ill till:? PRC .. 64 
The strength of PRC influence in l'iacau has made its political leaders 
cautious about expanding direct elections in the enclave even when they 
claim to support democratisation in principle .. Businessman Edrnund Ho said 
directly elected seats have to be balanced by indirectly elected seats to 
61. Macau Confidence Index SurvE'y, Jul y 1909; Chinese reSpOndents thought education, 
social wel fare, housing and ,'oad transportation should be top priori ties, whi le education, 
social wel fare·, roc--dical services and housing wl:?t'e top priories for the Macanese. Hcx.~ever, the 
survey might not be a reI iable indication of popular sen·timents. I t did not ask the 
respondent $p~:.ci fj call y abou·t demC)cr acy, bu t. I' a-ther 1 i sted housi n9, educa'ti on, transport., 
social welfare, industry, financial service:::;, medical assistance, airport cons'truction and a 
category callc...cf "other areas." 
62. Lau and Kuan argue that demands for dE:iilocracy and poli tical partici pation in Hc.1ng KOiig 
have not been demands for control of the pol it.y by society so much as demands fo,' means to 
E11sure that the pal i ty is distance.'CI from socic-ty. The residents' concern is that, under "one 
country, two systems, "the influence of -the pr~c' :~ interven'tionist, total is,tic ideology wi 11 
mean the social and economic spherc'S of 1 i f(~' wi 11 no longer be autonomous from the pol i ty. 
The Basic Law enshrines the autonomy of ·thr2 sc)cial, .?Conomic and legal realms from the PRC, 
but not that of the pal i ty (Lau and Kuan, .f.,tbQ$., Pp. 191, 193-194). 
63. See, for exanlPle, "Editorial," GM, 2' ~ r1ay 1989; "A proposito da situacao em Beijing," 
GM. 24 May 1989; InterviE'W, Leong; Intet-vi(:'w, Rcunos. 
64. "Redactor da Lei Basic.:\ considera in 01,,1 Ficien"te:3 garantia9 de Beijing," GM, 24 June 
1989. 
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ensure business people have strong r'epresentation .. \I I personally believe in 
democracy ........ [but] if we had a deo.ocracy mainly dictated by people who 
have very little education and litt18 business experience, they would 
simply socialise Macau .. "65 Some MaCdllese and Portuguese adnJit they have 
little to gain "from expansion o"f dil~!~ctly elected seats because their 
candidates would always lose becau::':>8 of the hugely superior number of 
Chinese voters .. Jorge Hangsl, a MaC,.1neS(3 leader, said complete democracy 
would mean ItMacau will be controlled by the business people and by China, 
those who have the means to attract the public. 1t He argued that indirectly 
elected and appointed s~ats or seats chosen by directly elected deputies, 
are ways of giving representation to other groups .. 66 Caterina Mok, a Hacau 
Chinese journalist and democracy activist, said Macau cannot be truly 
autonomous if its government is not democratic, but a higher proportion of 
directly elected seats would not make Macau more democratic until civic 
education levels have improved .. 11 If ~)(= open up now, we will only have the 
traditional business community, the labour unions and the kai fong 
association parties control everything .. "67 Ng Kwok-Cheong, the local 
.Chinese founder of the Macau Dernoct'(1cy Development Union who resigned his 
management post at the Bank o"f China because o'f his pro-democracy 
activities, agreed. Ng said his inHns'diate goal was to encourage development 
of a more pluralistic society in Macau through better civic education for 
65. Interview, Edmund Ho. 
66. Interview, Range}. 
67. Interview, Mok. 
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young people so they l~ill be less vulnerable to the influence of 
traditional political elites .. 68 
The results of the 1991 interim dt.;sembly elections, in which only 18 
percent of registered voter$ took p".u"'t, suggest these fears are justi"fied .. 
Unipr'o, a, pro"'-China civic associatjo~, took 50 percent of the popular vote 
and both of the ,seats up ' for grabs. While in part a consequence of the way 
seats are allocated under the Hondt method of proportional representation, 
Unipro's sweep also demonstrate~3 th'~ ability o"f pro-PRC organisations such 
as the Macau f<ai Fong General Union to mobilise their supporters, 
particularly when the 37 percent vote "for liberal nontraditional groups is 
split. Alexandre Ho's group allied ~\d_th some democracy activists to J~Jin 
only 21 percent of the vote .. Another' re"form-minded group led by deputy Wong 
Cheong-nam won only 16 percent of the ballots .. 69 A' new electoral law 
'approved for the 1992 elections couJ.d improve the chances of these 
nontraditional elites .. It adopts a new proportional method of allocating 
seats designed to help groups that l'~ln smaller percentages of the popular 
vote elect deputies to the chamber .. "I he aim is to avoid monopolisation of 
the legislature by the largest political groups .. 70 
In the end, Macau will be better' off if whatever level of democracy it 
achieves , enjoys Beijing's support, however grudging, so that elections can 
enhance both local political identity and trust in China. Whether this is 
possible remain:3 to be seen .. In the meantime, the enclave's partially 
democratic political system mi£lht pr'ovide a forum in which trust and 
68. lntervie""" Ng; Adarn Lee, "No regrets-: i'.\:; ac:,tivist bank chief; qui 'cs f.,"IOst," ~c.MP., 1 Fe·b. 
1991. 
69. Lo, "Pro-China forces will benefit {,,'om split liberal vote," SCMI?, 19 Mar. 1991. 
70. "Lei electoral aprovad-a na A.L.," :rl:i~ Z Mar. 1991. 
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tolerance between the two communitiu:.:> and rival local groups can 'develop .. 71 
The danger, and it is a serious onc, is that the dominant influence of 
Chinese autho~ities and traditional elites in Macau's political system will 
weaken the SAR legislature and government's willingness or ability to 
encourage expansion towards a fully ~irectly elected political system. 
71. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to O(,?illocraCy: Tov"ard a Dynamic Model," Comp.ar.a:t.i.y.~ 
eoj.i.:ti.~~:2 (Apr. 1970): 363; Kuan, "Power DE'pendence and Democratic Transition," p. 29. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
The legal system in an autonomy arrangement has a critical role to play 
in enhancing local political · identity and elite and citizen trust in the 
process as a whole. Since the poterlLial for political disputes related to 
central-local battles and violations of basic human rights is significant, 
autonomy arrangements based on commitments to the rule of law, independent, 
impartial judiciaries and constituti.onal control mechanisms acceptable to 
both polities ha ve a g reate r chance o'f su rvi ving.. Such a consti tutiona 1-
legal order can remove some conflicts from the more contentious political 
arena and provide regularised peaceful processes for settling disputes. It 
can encourage elites to tolerate opposition and authorities on both sides 
to play by constitutionally entrenclled rules, rewarding them with the 
legitimising approval of the court or other constitutional control body 
when they do and shielding citizen:::> from arbitrary government .. As a result, 
the rules of the autonomy process Cdn evolve in an orderly, less-
threatening fashion in response to tile changing needs o'f all parties .. The 
citizens' trust in the political system can grow. An independent, impartial 
court rooted in a strong legal sYGtem can help stabilise an otherwise tense 
political environment.! 
On the face of it, the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration appears to 
protect Macau's Portuguese constitutional-legal order and its roots in 
judicial independence and impartiality and the rule of law. The Joint 
1. See, fot' example, the introduction ·to ;Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., 
Q;n$.:ti..t.Yj;.iQOalis.m .... ano ..... D.e.moc.r.ac.y. (Cambridge: CambridgE' University Press, 1986); Richard 8aum, 
."Modernisation and Legal Reform in Post-Mal,J China: The Rebirth of Socialist Legality," 
S_t.MQ.i.~$. __ in .. _C.Qlllp.ar.a..t..i.y.~ __ c.Qfl1Ol!Jn.i.$.m 19, no.2 (Summer 1986): 69-71, 72-73, 100-101; Davis, 
C.on~:ti:tY:tiQflal_ .. C.on.fr.Qnt.at.i.QO , pP. 54-55. 
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Declar'ation promises the SAR "independent judicial power, including that of 
final adjudication and a continuati(Al of Macau's current legal system 
basically unaltered ·for fifty years . 'rhe Portuguese language, in addition 
to Chinese, can be used in the courl.~ of the future Macau SAR and the 
rights and liberties of Macau people, notably the right to access to law 
and to justice, will be preserved. 7. H()wever, weaknesses in the enclave's 
current legal system make its ability to act as a stabilising influence 
after 1999 uncertain. 
Macau's current judicial system is politically and administratively 
dependent on that of Portugal and dominated by the Portuguese language and 
legal traditions. 3 This dependence, coming after three centuries of m:rxed 
Portuguese-Chinese jurisdiction that lasted until the middle of the - last 
century, has created a cultural and linguistic gap that separates the 
enclave's legal institutions and personnel from most of Macau's 
overwhelmingly Chinese population .. 4 Spurred by the approach of 1999, 
Portuguese authorities have begun taking steps to bring the law closer to 
the people by reforming some laws, t r'anslating them into Chinese and 
training bilingual lawyers, judges and other legal professionals .. However, 
shortages of specialised translator:3 and otller expertise make the task 
slow. Macau is forced to recruit S0ill8 of its professionals from the PRC, 
2. r1ac.aM .... ,IP, Art. 2(2)( 4)( 5), Annex I (V). 
3. Alberto Costa, "Continuidade e Mudanca no Desenvolvimento Juridico de Macau a Luz da 
Declaracao Conjunta Luso-Chinesa," Be.v.i~t.~ .... J.IJI~ . .i~.ic.a.. ... d.e. .... ~c.ay 1 (Apr ./June 1988): 57. 
4. Several of the Portuguese officials 1 interviewed expressed concern tt~t local 
residents show little attachment to the encldve's legal system. There is as yet no 
quantitative study on Macau people's attitudes towards the law and local legal institutions. 
Wi th the exception of some scant survey dat\~\, the arguments made here are based on 
~ualitative evidence from in-depth interviE'w:~ and other sources and require fut .. ther 
veri fication; The term "language gap" has tJ';:en used to describe the Hong Kong situation at 
the time of the 1966-1967 riots (Tomasz UjE\jski, "The Future of the English Language in Hong 
Kong Law ~" in Wacks, IM .... fyt.yr.~ .... Q.f. ... t.h~ ..... l..'-\~~ ..... i.n."JJ.ong .... ~QOg, p. 174). 
bringing the risk of mainland legal values infiltrating and damaging 
Hacau's fragile legal order. The ROH:all civil law roots common to the 
Portuguese and PRC legal systems cOILld increase this risk further. S 
lAD 
This chapter' begins by describinu the history of Hacau's legal system, 
its current dependence on Portugal Jnd its distance from many Hacau 
Chinese. It goes on to discuss the ydvernment's reform efforts and their 
accompanying problems and dangers" Finally, it considers the implications 
of these developments for the task uf building mechanisms for central-Iceal 
constitutional dispute settlement for the Macau SAR" Although Portuguese 
reform efforts have perhaps come too late and are fraught with 
difficulties, a window of opportunity exists for capitalising on the 
enclave's history of legal dualism to develop a hybrid system with the 
potential to se rye Macau' s autonomy G.nd ''''in rnore loyalty from Hacau people. 
The History the Legal System 
Like other aspects o'f Macau life) the enclave's legal system has been 
shaped by the tradition of dual Pbt~ tuguese and Chinese authority that has 
characterised much of Macau's 4SQ-year history, subject to sometimes 
extreme fluctuations in the relative strengths of the two polities" Until 
the mid-nineteenth century, Hacau generally operated as a mixed legal 
.5. Systems rooted in the common law tradition of England are generally uncodefied systems 
based in part on judge-made law through the doctrine of stare decisis, or the recognition of 
·judicial precedents, and in many cases jud le U-J.l review of the consti ·tutional i ty of executive 
and legislative acts. By contrast, legal systems rooted in the traditions of Roman civil law 
typically use five basic legal codes (the civil, commercial and penal codes and tt~ codes of 
criminal and civil procedure). They tt'aditionally adopt a strict separation of the judicial 
and legislative and executive functions, thus rejecting both stare decisis and judicial 
review of executive and legislative acts. How~ver, the traditional distinctions between these 
two legal traditions have blurred in recent d~'cades with the increased use in the civil law 
world of fixed constitutions and constitutional judicial review, recognition of judge-made 
law and creation of specialised statutes out..side the traditional codes) as well as with the 
decline of legislative supremacy (see genl?r':llly, John Henry Merryman, Ihe. .... C.iv..il .. J .. a.w 
I.t:aQit.io.n ....... An._.I.nt.r.QQ.!.lc.t.i.QO ... _t.Q_ .. t.h~ .... l"e:g~l ... $y.s;~.~,:~~~m~ .... Q.f. ... W~~t.~.r.n .... fyr:QJ?~_ .. and ...... l..at.in .... Br~r.i.c.an , 2d ed. 
[Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985J, especially pp. 151-158). 
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jurisdiction in which Chinese resid'Jllts were subject to Chinese imperial 
laws administered by a Chinese proCLlrator and the non-Chinese to Portuguese 
laws administered by local Portugu~3c officials. At various times, the 
Portuguese and the Chinese both cld:.L'.lf.Kf jurisdiction over cases involving 
both Chinese and non-Chines~ residentsN 6 The sharing of authority was not 
always harmonious. 7 However, it was 'not until the late 1840s that Portugal 
was able to take advantage of China's weakened position to bring formal 
legal jurisdiction under exclusive Portuguese control. Governor Ferreira do 
Amaral (1846-1849) managed to extend Portuguese legal authority over civil 
and criminal matters involving Chinese in MacBu. 8 
Over the next decades, Macau's judicial system was increasingly 
integrated into that of Portugal, a situation which only began to change 
after the signing of the Joint Oec13ration a century later. 9 The 
consequences of this integration still affect the relationship between 
6. Jose Antonio de Oliveira Rocha, "Formacao Histol'ica do Sistema Politico de f'tk'lcau" 
(UnpUblished paper prepared as teaching material for the Law and Public Administration 
Programme, University of East Asia, 1990), ~IP. 4-14; Afonso and Pereira, "Political Status 
and Government Institutions," pp. 30-31. 
7. In 1744, Portuguese authorities promulga·ted pe'nal laws relating to crimes by Europeans 
agains·t. Chinese subjects and gave the Portu',Juese procuratl:>r powers to deal with petty 
offenses while the Chinese authorities tried to apply the Chinese penal code to foreigners 
charged with committing murder in l'1acau. By 1749, the viceroy of Guangl hou issued an edict 
prohibi ting Chinese subjects to profess the gospel, further requiring all residents to seeJ< 
permission from the mandarin before buildin<;l a house and pronouncing other penal laws. The 
viceroy also reasser 'ted exercise of Chinesc.~ ~(;'nal jurisdiction in the territory in a letter 
to the Portuguese king. In 1787, attempts by the local Portuguese government, the Leal 
'senado, to strengthen its jurisdiction over ,t.he increasing number of Chinese 1 i ving around 
the Macau city walls led to conflicts wi·t.h Chinese residen·ts and imperial authorities and 
resulted in dismissal of the senate procun:\t.or (Oliveit'a Rocha, "Formacao Historica do 
Sistema Politico'," P. 6, 14-15, 18; Afons() ,tnd Pereira, "Political status and Governmen·t 
Institutions," Pp. 30-32 and notes 9 and 10). 
8. Afonso and Pereira, "Political Statu:::> ,Jnd Government Institutions," P. 32; Oliveira 
Rocha, "Forroacao Historica do Sistema Pol.i ·tic(.J," Pp. 14-15, 18. 
9. Vi talino Canas, "Relacoes entre 0 Ordenamentc Consti tl.~cional Portugues e 0 Ordenamento 
Juridico do Terri torio de Macau," R~v.i~;r~~" .. ,J.w:.iQic~" .. d~ .... M~c.",!.l 1 (Apr ./June 1968): 52; Afonso 
and Pereira, "Political Sta'tus ,and Government Institutions," p. 34. 
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Hacau's legal system and local Chinese residents. lO In 1879, a decree 
applied the Portuguese Civil Code to rtacau but allowed for the recognition 
of Chinese cl!stoms and usages in SOlill3 cases under a separate procuracy for 
Chinese affairs ("Procuratura dos Nc!gocios Sinicos"), which was created in 
1868. In 1894, however, the Portuguese government dissolved this special 
pr'ocut~acy while expanding the application of the Portuguese Commercial Code 
to Macau .11 Problems caused by the cU.ssolution of the procuracy led the 
government to set up a commission, on whose recommendation a special ' 
tribunal for Chinese residents was ~stablished in 1917 and used until the 
19405. 12 Meanwhile, the Colonial Act of 1933 provided that "the legal rules 
o-f the Metropolis and of the Portuguese Colonial Empire" were to be 
implemented in Macau. By the time P0t'tugal' s long-standing dictatorship was 
overthrown in 1974-, MaCBU had the ~3tatus o-f an autonomous region, but its 
legal system was fundamentally Portuguese with only minor allowances made 
-for local ci rcumstances .13 
The Portuguese Revolution of 1974 and Macau's Current Legal System 
Following the 1974 military coup, Macau neither broke all its ties with 
the old judicial organisation of the newly defunct overseas empire nor 
10. Interview, Jose Antonio de Oliveira Hocha, advisor to the Cabine·t for Legislative 
Mcxfernisation, Macau Government, and law professor, Universi·ty of East Asia, Macau, 15 Nov. 
1990. 
11. Oliveira Rocha, "Fonnacao Historica do Sis-tema Politico," pp. 18-19; For a detailed 
discussion of the procuracy for Chinese affairs see Jose Gabriel Mariano, "A Procuratura dos 
Negocios Sinicos," Q .... O'i.r.~it.~h no.2 (Jan. 1991), pp. 18'-22. 
12. Mariano, "A P,locuratura. dos Negocio:3 Sinicos," P. 20. 
13. Afonso and Pe,leira, "Political Status ~md Government lnsti ·tutions," pp. 34--35. 
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acquired all the attributes of Portuqal's reformed domestic legal system. 14 
Although the 1976 Organic Statute g~ve Macau more legislative, 
administrative and economic au"tonol1lY "from Lisbon, it subordinated the 
administration of Macau '5 legal sys'l:('m to that o'f Portugal,. a situation 
that lingers today. Only th~ Portuguese assembly--not Macau's governor nor 
its Legislative Assembly--can pass l~~gislation concerning the operation of 
Macau's courts .. 15 Macau's three COut~ts-·-the Court of Law ("Tribunal da 
Comarca de Macau"), Administrative Court ("Tribunal Administrativo de · 
Macau") and Military Court (" Tribundl Militar de Macau")--are all trial or 
first instance courts t"li thin the Li:3bon judicial district .. 16 Decisions of 
Macau courts can be appealed to higher courts in Portugal with some 
exceptions.!7 Appeals from any 60urt concerning the constitutionality of 
laws and decrees go directly to the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
("Tribunal ConstitLitional"), while the Portuguese High Administrative Court 
hears appeals from Macau's Administrdtive Court as well as against acts of 
the governor, the adjunct secretaries and the Legislative Assembly, its 
president or board. 18 Disputes bet~~een the governor and Legislative 
14. Jose Narciso da Cunha Rodrigues, "A tldministracao da Justica e a Transicao Pol i tico-
Administrativa em Macau," Re:y.i.$.:t.a .... JJl.t:iQ .. ic.a ... o.Q .... t.1~c.ay 1 (Apr./June 1988): 21; One of the those 
'reforms was a Constitutional Court introduced following the revolution. It has thirteen 
judges, ten appointed by the Assembly of thE: Republic and three selected by the court's 
apPOinted judges. Six of the judges must be chosen from among the judges of other Portuguese 
courts and the remaining seven from among jurists (Portugal, C.QO$t..i.:t:yt.io.o, A,'t. 224). 
15. os.~, Art. 3(1), 51(2). 
16. Portugal is divided into judicial dj s tl'icts which are in turn divided into counties 
("comarcas"). The Cour 't of Law is an ordin.::u·y court with two divisions hearing both civil and 
criminal cases. It also has a Court of crirdnal Ins·truct.ion ("Tribunal de Instrucao 
Criminal"), which conducts pretrial inquiries in criminal cases (Afonso and Pereira, 
"Political Status and Government InstitutioIIS," pp. 53 at note 5, 54-56; Edrnonds, Mac.~y, p. 
xxiii). 
17. Afonso and Pereira, "Political Status c;lnd Government Institutions," p. 56. 
18. Q$.M, Art. 19(5); The board of -th,? Lr~gi::$lative Assembly is made up of the president, 
vice-president and first and second secretal'l';:;'s (Afonso and Perei,'a, "Political Status and 
Government Insti tlJtions," p. 56); For a di~)..:..w~sion o 'f cons,ti tutional control in Macau by a 
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Assembly over the constitutionality or legality of acts emanating from 
either body can, and in some cases li,L1st, be referred to the Constitutional 
Court for a d~cision, which is bindil"9 on the assembly and governor .19 The 
extent to which Portugal's Constitution applies in Macau is controversial. 
Antonio Vitorino, a judge on Portugal's constitutional Court and former 
adjunc~ secretary for justice in Macciu, argues that those parts dealing 
with norms speci.fically re'ferring' to t1acau, fundamental principles, rights, 
liberties and guarantees, constitutional control, Portuguese institutions 
\~ith competence in l1acau, courts (limited by the Proposed Law of 
Fundamentals of Judicial Organisation of ~1acau) and pe rhaps some aspects of 
economic, social and cultural rights and economic organisation all apply in 
the enclave .. 20 
Like courts in Portugal, Macau's courts enjoy independence, being 
subject only to the law, and its judges have security of tenure. 21 
Portugal's Procuracy-General of the Hepublic ("Procuradoria-Geral cia 
Republica") appoints a representativl~ to Macau, who may be chosen from 
among penal judges and judges o'f fi rst instance. 22 The local procurator of 
the republic super'vises the Public hinistry Cl Ministerio Publico"), ~Jhich 
mernber of Portugal's Constitutional Court see Antonio Vi tot'ino, "Macau na Jurisprudencia do 
Tr i bunal Consti tutional" ( Paper del i vered i r. 11acau, Dec. 1990). 
19. QS.tI, At't. 11(1)(e), 30(1)(a), 40(3); The Portuguese authorities can also refer 
legislation emanating from Macau's governor or assembly to the Constitutional Court if they 
believe it is unconsti·tutional (An-tonio Almeida and Carlos Veiga, "Oefendo a con·trolo da 
con forrnidade corn a Le'i Basi ca atr aves dos tr i bunai s 1 oca is," Q .... D.ir.eit-Q, no. 2 (J an. 1991), p. 
14). 
20. Vitorino, "Macau na Jurisprudencia wu Tribunal Constitutional," PP. 23-24; Almeida and 
Veiga., "Oefendo a controlo da conformidade com a Lei Sasica," p. 12. 
21. QSI1, Art. 3(1), 53; Afonso and Pen~ita, "Political Sta·tus and Government 
Ins-ti tutions," P. 53. 
22. OSM, 1976, Art. 52(3); This article ~'·"Sl.S omitted from the 1990 version due to the 
changes expected under the proposed Judicial Organisation Law of Macau. 
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represents the ~tate in judicial cases and exercises penal action, among 
other duties. 23 
The personnel and operation of t:· ,1cau's legal system reflects its 
structural position l",ithin the Poriu~luese system. Macau's judges are named 
by ministers of the Portuguese government after nomination by Portugal's 
Higher Council o'f the Bench ("Consf.:!l'ho Superior' da Magistratura") under 
the same constitutional provisions used for nominating, placing, 
transferring and promoting judges t.o all Portuguese courts except the 
Constitutional Court .. There is little input from Macau. 24 All o'f the 
enclave's fi~e judges and all but about a dozen of its seventy-two 
registered lawyers arf3 Portuguese l!xpatriates while the rest of the 
lawyers are Macanese. While some lawyers can speak Chinese, very f~w of 
them can read or write it. 25 8ecau::·e Macau has been without a university 
degree programme in law until recently, lawyers and judges acquire their 
training in Portugal in programmes ~d,thout course content reflecting 
23. Portugal, C.QO$.t.it.Y.t..i.on:t Art. 221, 2:22. 
24. Costa, "Continuidade e Mudanca," p. 57; OSM, Art. 51(2); Portugal, C.on$.t.i:tY.:t..i.o.n, Art. 
219. 
25. Interview, Eduardo Cabrita, co-ordin.ltor, Cabinet for Legal Translation, 13 Feb. 1991; 
Informa'~ion obtained 'from the office of '~he Procurator of t~~ Republic, 29 Nov. 1990; Compare 
Macau ' s si tuation to that of Hong Kong wherE' J in 1967 one inn ine Cou rt of Appeal judges, 
three in twenty-tllJO High Court judges, six in thirty-one District Court judges and three-
quarters of the magistrates were Chinese spe'akers (Ujejski, "The Fu'ture of the English 
Language," p. 176 at note 45). Further, bo·th thl.? University of Hong Kong and the City 
Polytechnic of Hong' Kong have la~J degree programmes. Hong Kong judges are appointed locally 
after rer--...ommendation by the local Judicial Sel'vice:3 Commission, of which the Attorney General 
is a member (Albert H. Y. Chen, ""he Legal S)'~stem," irl Wong and Cheng, Ih~ .... Qt.h~r .. ...I:1o.ng .... ~Qng 
Be.POr.t. .... l9.9Q [Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990], p. 72). 
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Hacau's unique circumstances .. 26 A law degree programme established at the 
University of East Asia in 1988 wiJl pr'oduce the enclave's first group of 
locally trained lawyers in .1993, of them local Chinese .. 27 The 
government is planning to set up a , ~ostgraduate law programme in the 
coming months where it would begin training Macau-born people with law 
degre_es from abr'oad, and eventually those locally trained, to be judges, 
public prosecutors and legal administrators~28 
Macau's courts operate in Portuguese but use Chinese translators when 
Chinese defendants or witnesses appear for questioning .. 29 The court 
administration and justice policymaking bureaucracy is staffed by civil 
servants from Portugal at its most :::>enior levl~ls .. Prior to the start of the 
government's new legal translation programme, fewer than 200 pieces of 
legislation existed in Chinese and these were often of such an 
inconsequential nature and so poorly written that one commentator said it 
26. Costa, "Continuidade e Mudanca," pp. 20, 57; Judges and lawyers traditionally hav~' 
different training and roles in common and civil law jurisdictions. In the common law world, 
judges are appointed or elected later in their careers after first establishing themselves as 
lawYers in government or private practice. Especially at the more senior levels of the bench, 
they are well known pUblic figures whose opinions are widely discussed in newspapers and in 
~blic. By contrast, the judges in civil law jurisdictions are civil servants trained 
specifically as judges after selection in cc.mpetitive exams following graduation "from 
university law school. The public regardsthG'm as high civil servan·ts only. Law graduates 
' follow distinct careers as judges, public prosecutors, government lawYers, advocates or 
notaries and lateral movement between thesr? professions is rare. In most common law systems, 
by contrast, there ~$ one lE:.'9al profession and its memb€:'rs move from one branch of i ·t to 
another (Mer ryrnan, IM .... C..i..y..i.l. .... ~w ... .Ir9..q.i:~.iQn, pp. 34-35, 101-3). 
27. Interview, Povoas. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid.; Povoas said t~~ lack of full s imultaneous translation probably violates the 
Portuguese Constitution, which guarantees aCCQSS to justice as a basic human right (Portugal, 
c.Qn$.!:.j,:tY.t.iQO, Art. 20). 
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left one wondering ,,,,hether lithe purpose was to translate or annihilate 
Portuguese law .. "30 
The Legal System and Macau Society 
These cultural and language barri81~, reinforced by traditional Chinese 
resistance to law as it is understood in Western societies, have hampered 
the penetration o'f Portuguese legal culture into Macau society and limited 
its ability to form par't of a distjnct local identity .. In many colonies, 
law' has been an instr'ument for reshJping society. 
The institution of law in the solonial context cannot be regarded 
simply as the means of maintaining order within a territory; ttJe 
legal system imposed by the colonising power has wider 
implications .... It is an instrument not only of economic by also of 
cultural imperialism. 31 
In this sense, Macau's legal systenl and other aspects of its education and 
governmental systems could be regarded as cases of at least partially 
failed imperialism .. The gr'eatmajority of Macau people are unable to 
interact with the law in the language in which they live their life .. 
Portuguese officials believe as few as 10 percent of the legal disputes In 
Macau are settled in the formal legal system .. 32 
At the same time, Macau Chinese seem to see some value in Macau's 
Portuguese judicial system, at lea~~t compared to that of China .. In a 
December 1989 survey which asked thew what kind of judicial system Macau 
should use after 1999, Portuguese, Chinese or English, only 8 percent chose 
:30. Sergio de Aleida Correia and Pedro Hr.;.)rta e Costa~ "Por uma Politica de Traducao 
Juridica e Producao Legislativa Si lingue no Actual Contexto do Periodo de Tt'ansicao," BeYi~~ 
d.~ .. .Ad.mini~t.r . .t\c.aQ .... E\1.b.li.c.a .. J;!~_ .. t.1a!:&MJ 3, no. 7 (1 990): 136 • 
31. Ujejski, "The Future of the English LangIJage," p. 182. 
32. Intervie"", Francisco Teodosio Jacir,.to, procurator of the ,'e'public, 29 Nov. 1990; 
Interview, Oliveira Rocha. 
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a Chinese system while 3S percent chose Portuguese and 32 percent an 
English system .. Furthermore, ' 57 percc~nt wanted both Portuguese and Chinese 
judges rather than only Chinese jUd l]8S on the Hacau bench .. 33 Some observers 
have concluded that, if there is cO, lflict between the legal system and the 
people , it is o'ften not because the community is resistant to the law, but 
becau_se the law's message is difficult for the community to understand and 
its channels of justice di f 'ficul t to access .. 34 
Traditional Chinese attitudes toward law have contributed to the 
alienation of local ChinesE; from the! legal system .. 3S In traditional China, 
legal codes and institutions did not have the prestige and importance they 
gradually' gained in many Western societie:3 .. The judiciary was not isolated 
from political authority and there was no independent legal profession. 
Instead, law was seen as "a regrettable necessity, principally an 
instt'ument to be used by the state to enforce its will upon subjects who 
had not submitted to other means of social control .. "36 People regarded the 
courts with suspicion .. The legal sy:3tem played little role in people's 
private daily activities .. Political ethics, rationality and precedent were 
the main restraints on imperial pOW01~ .. Although judicial tribunals existed, 
"the Confucian pJ,ilosophy of harmony preferred unofficial conciliation to 
33. Macau Confidence Index Survey, Dec. 1989; In -their 1985 and 1986 surveys, Lau and Kuan 
found 47.6 per cent of Hong Kong responden-ts disagreed 01' strongly disagreed that the legal 
system of Hong Kong was foreign and unsui taul~ ·to Chinese socie·ty whi le 34.8 per cent agreed 
or strongly agt'eed that it was (Lau and Kuan, t:; .t.b~!~, p. 127). 
34. Cot~reia and liorta e Costa, "Po,' uma F'Qlitica de Traducal), .. pp. 132-139 .. 
35. For similar arguments about the inflw:mce of tradi -tional Chinese legal culture on 
con tempo r ary Taiwan, main land China and Hong I<ong see Edward J. Epstein, .. China and Hong 
Kong: Law, Ideology, and the Future Interaction of the Legal Systems," in Wacks, Ibe. .... .fut.!..lr.e. 
Q.fu ..:the .... l.:aY.L.in ... .uQO.g .... ~QO.9, pp. 40-41 and not(i' 7; Lau and Kuan .•. e;t.b.~~, pP. 131-13,5; Lau, Kuan, 
and Wan Po-san, "Legal Attitudes," in Lau, It.t.:m, Lee Ming·-kwan and Wong Siu-lun, eds., 
Ind . .i.c.a:tQ.r:;LQ.f. .... S.oc..i.al .... D.~y.G:.1.Qp.rn~nt..l ..... H.Qn9. ... KQo!3 ... J.Sl.s.~ (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asi,:t-
Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hort9 Kong, 1991), pp. 214-,222. 
36. Cohen and Chiu, e~Qp.le..~.~ .... C.hi.n~, 1: 17. 
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official adjudication~ Traditional social groups disposed of an enormous 
volume of potential litigation thrc/Lioh a variety of techniques that ranged 
from persuasion to ostracism and CO(!I~cion.'·37 
Aspects of Macau's Portuguese civi l law heritage could also hamper 
citizen identification with 'the 1egd1 system~ Civil law education and 
judicJal processes have tr'aditional:ti' been more abstract and less oriented 
to solving concrete problems than their common law counterparts~38 Civil 
law judges, who traditionally hav~ comparatively limited discretion and 
authority, do not have the image of "cultural heros" or "-father figures" 
often associated with common law judges. Rather, they have the image of 
- . 
civil servants per'forming "important but necessarily uncreative 
functions."39 
In addition, many of Macau's law~ are out of date and do not serve the 
needs of a community undergoing rapid economic development and social 
change.. I n such situations, it is COillmon for people to either resort to 
informal means of regulating their social and economic relations40 or 
import legal concepts from outside. For instance, Macau's commercial laws 
37. Ibid.; See also Epstein, "China and Hong Kong." pp. 40-41 and note 7; R. Randle 
Edwards, "Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese l.aw Today, " in Edwards, 
Louis Henkin and Andrew J. Nathan, eds., 1:i!J.r.o~n ... .R.i9b:~:$. .... in .... CQO:~~mPQr.gr.y. .... Cb.i.n~ (Ne,,,, York: 
Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 44-47; Louis Henkin, "The Human Rights Idea in 
Contemporary China: A Comparative Perspecti VI:." in Edwards, Henkin and Nathan, H~u.oao ... .Ri9.ht.$. 
in __ r;Qn:t.~r.oeo.r.ary. .. .J;b.i.n~, pp. 21-22. 
38. Merryman, Civ..i.l .... L~w ... .It.~d..i.t.iQn, pP. 61-65, 66-69; t'lauro Cappelletti, J.uo . .l.c.iF..\l. ... .Bey..i.eItLj.n 
t.hf.L.CQot.e.r.oQQr.J..t.Y. ... l'-1Qr. . .ld. (New Yor k: Bobbs-Mer I' i 11 CC)., 1971), pp. 79-80. 
39. Merryman, Ib~ .... C.i.v..i..l.. .... l.aw ... .Irad.i.:t.i.Qr." pp, 36--37; See also p. 140 at note 5 and p. 146 at 
note 26 of the present study. 
40. Portuguese legal sociologist, Boaver,·tura S. Santos, argues that a legal system in 
which there is a wide gap between th? systerll a.nd the ci tilens 'will develop informal 
mechanisms and intermediaries to lubricate t..hl') system and even subvert it, cre'ating a whole 
in formal dimension ·to the system tha·t is ma(1 ipulated by professionals and other judicial 
functionaries (Boaventura S. Santos. "Discun;o e a F'oder, Ensaio sobre a Sociologia do. 
Retorica Juridica," [Coimbra, 1980] cited ill Costa, "Cclf1tinuidade e Mudanca," PP. 60, 68 at 
note 41). Santos is currently doing a study of the legal system and M;lcau society. 
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are in need of re'for'm and written i.n Portuguese, Cl language 'few local 
Chinese business people can Llnder'st~\lld .. This inadequacy has pushed some of 
them to have their contracts drawn lIP in Hong Kong in English for business 
transactions conducted in Macau. 41 Macau's current legal assistance 
programme was inherited from' the Pt'c.!~'·1974 PortUt;IUese colonial regime with 
only a few minor re'forms. It has b8,~!n ' criticised as antiquated and unsuited 
to contemporary Hacau society, doinu little to aid citizens' access to the 
courts and build their trust in and identi'fication with the legal system .. 42 
Corruption is not a phenomenon unique to Hacau, but the enclave's 
government has been slower in responding to the problem than neighbouring 
Hong Kong" It remains to be seen ~\}I " l(!ther the Macau government's most "recent 
attempt to create a High Commissiorl Against Corruption and Administrative 
Illegality will lead to tangible improvements and increased public trust in 
government .3nd the law. Ironically, the plan was approved by Macau's 
Legislative Assembly on 10 September 1990, only days before Governor Carlos 
Melancia resigned following corruption allegations related to construction 
of Macau's new airport. 43 Portugai's High Commissioner Against Corruption, 
Costa Bras, has opposed the Macau government's plan for the anti-corruption 
commission, arguing it does not give the new organisation enough power to 
act effectively. Like its Portugues8 counterpart, the Macau commission is 
to wield administrative authority but will not have the additional powers 
~vailable to the Independent Commis~ ion Against Corruption in Hong Kong. 44 
41. Interview, Povoas; Such situations confront Macau courts with difficult questions of 
interpretation because these contracts are not accepted as equal to Portuguese contracts, but 
only as evidence of an agreement (ibid.; int..e l'view, Jacinto). 
42. Costa, "Continl.Jidade I:? Mudanca," pP. 60-61. 
'43. Adam Lee, "Melancia resigns as Govl!;.'rn l : I ," $Ct.1e, 28 S€'pt. 1990. 
44. There has been at least one attempt 1:.0 set UP an anticorruption commission previously ,. 
in 1974, shortly after the military' coup in f'ortugal. However, the governor withdrew the plan 
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Preparing for 1999 
Gi venthe uncertain roots t1acau ' :), Portuguese law has in local Chinese 
society, the transfer of legal auth:.n"ity in 1999 presents a complex and 
difficult challenge to the M~cau governmen·t. Scholars have raised serious 
questions about the post-1997 survival of Hong Kong's common law system 
even though it is more self-sufficient and locally oriented than Macau's 
system. The Hong Kong system has alrEJady be£fun bilingual legal drafting and 
has local Chinese judges and lawyers, a local court o'f appeal, t~~o 
established local law schools and g~rlerally favourable attitudinal support 
from local Chinese citizens, among which an influential minority speak 
English. 45 The chances for survival for Macau's legal system, which has 
none of these strengths, appear bleak. The promises in the Sino-Portuguese 
Joint Declaration that Macau's current legal system will endure basically 
unaltered for fifty years, of legal bilingualism and protection for the 
rights and liberties of Hacau people depend in large part on PRC policies 
after 1999. However, much also depends on the Macau government's success in 
the·next eight years in weaning the enclave's legal system from its 
dependence on Portugal and entrenching it in Macau society so that the 
system has some chance of surviving beyond 1999 with the necessary 
only ten days after it was announc~d C"A comi~7sao especial," GM, 15 June 1974; Antonio Prata 
e Paulo Fontes da Veiga, "0 estado da cor ru pcao , " s.a.b.iAQQ, 9 Nov. 1990, p. 24). 
45. See, for example, Davis, CQn$.t.i.:t!J.t..iQI.l&.l .... CQn.fr.Qn:tatiQfl, especially chap'ter 3; Epstein, 
"China and Hong Kong"; Ujejski, ",.he FuturE.' of the English Language"; For a discussion of 
Hong Kong residents' attitudes toward the 16·931 system see generally Lau and Kuan, "Legal 
Attitudes," especially p. 223; The differenc.E's bet~\Jeen Macau and Hong Kong should no't be 
exaggerated. Although Hong Kong had drafted twenty-four equally authentic bilingual 
ordinances by May 1990, previous Chinese trc~n~;;lations of Hong Kong laws are not recognised as 
authen,tic in la\!,} and progress on translati()n is slo\4}. Mos't court proceedings are in Engl ish 
(Cheri, "The Legal Sys·tem," pp. 69-70). 
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community and professional support. The territory's former Adjunct 
Secretary for Justice Magalhaes e Silva expressed the goal in this way: 
The modernisation and universdliaation of Macau's existing law 
constit~tes ... an imperative for the Portuguese government in the 
territory .... such a system will only endure if it makes itself 
realisiic and bilingual, that is, if it corresponds to the 
necessities o'f the time and i~~ accessible to the general population 
of this territory.46 
Given ihe short time left this may be an impossible task. Several aspects 
of Macau's transitional legal policie:3 are considered below. 
The Joint Declaration says the future Macau SAR courts will have pOIf-Jer 
of final adj udication and judges nOlflinated by the chie'f executi ve in 
accordance with the rec6mmendations of an independent commission mad~~~p of 
local judges, la\(~yers and noted public figures. 47 In preparation 'for these 
changes, Portugal has amended its own constitution and the Organic Statute 
of Macau and drawn up a separate judicial organisation law for the enclave. 
The bill, which was introduced in the Portuguese assembly in autumn 1990, 
aims to gradually give the enclave~s judicial system more autonomy from 
Lisbon. It creates a local High Court of Justice, empowered to act as both 
a court of second instance and a court of revision, and separate judicial 
councils for Macau. 48 Officials expect the Portuguese authorities will also 
empower the new Macau High Court of Justice to rule on the 
constitutionality and legality of legislation sometime before 1999. 49 The 
46. Speech by Manuel de Magalhaes eo Silv~:j, at the installation of new lead~rship at the 
cabinet for Legal Translation. 3 Nov. 1989 (my translatic:>n). 
47. ~C.a.!.L.J.Q, Art. 2(2), Annex I(IV). 
48. See ' Por tuga}, c.Qtl~t..i.t.yt.iQO , Ar t . 292 ( S); QSf.':1 , Ar t . 51 ( :2); Pot'tuga}, p.r.QP6~:~~ .. , . .L:~i .... o.~ 
S.aai~~~.d.,a .... o.r.ga.nix.f,Ac'a.Q .... J.yd . .ic..ia.r.ig .... d.e. .... f.':1gc,a!,l, AI~ t. 1, 6, 27 (herea fter P..r,QP.Q~~Q, .... l..,;U"" .... Q.f .. .J;..h~ 
f!.lC1d.ame.n:tal~~_Q.f_ .. ,J.!..ld.ic.ial .... Qr,gani~at.iQn .... Q.f .... t.1a~~~~.t); Adam Lee, "rvlacau given greater power to ma~<e 
laws," SCMe, 19 Apr.' 1990. 
49. Vi torino. "t1acau na Jurisprudencia do Tri bunal Consti ,tutional," pp. 17-22; Interview, 
Povoas. 
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Hacau Lawyers Association, Legisla·t.i ve Assembly and Public Hj n.istry 
magistrates have condemned the bill for not pro~iding the local judiciary 
with sufficient autonomy and -for fdi,l iilg to create a syst(~m that can 
.~ .. .. 
survive, at leas·t in its essential spirit, beyond 1999. 50 According to its 
provisions, some decisions 6f Macau courts and acts of the governor and 
senior officials must still be appealed to higher courts in Portugal and 
only· the Portuguese assembly can pass laws setting out the basic principles 
of the system's .operation .. S1 Because the membership of Macau's new 
judicial councils includes members of the executive and legislative 
branches of the Macau and Portuguef.''2 governments, local magistrates argue 
they neither sa'feguard the separatic)/'l of political and judicial power nor 
guarantee the independence of judges and the impartiality of the 
judiciary .. 52 
The lengthy process of training bilingual locally born legal 
professionals has also begun. The University o'f East Asia '$ new law 
programme, the success of ~\Jhich is ct~itical if Hacau is to br'eak its 
SO.. "A rnant~'r-se a proPcls·ta tal como e's·ta cominha-se para urna fase de gCJVernamental iz acao 
dos Tribunais," IM, 4 oct. 1990; Joao Figueira, "l.E'vante-se 0 I~E'Ut" C;M, 13 Oct. 1990. 
S 1. QS.M, Ar t . 19( 5), 30( 1 ) ( a), S 1 ( 2 ), 66. 
52. "A rnanter--se a proposta tal como esta cominha-se para uma fase de governamentalizacao 
dos Tribunais," IM, 4 Oct. 1990; Joao Figueird" "L~vantt?-se 0 reu," CM, 13 Oct. 1990; The 
Macau Judicial Council ("Conselho Judiciario de Macau") would propose candidates for 
appointment as judges, judges' advisors ("juiles assessores") and judicial auditors to all 
Macau courts save the High Court of JusticG.~ and look aftet' inqui"ie'$ and disciplinary 
questions related to judges, officials of the Macau courts and agents of the Public Ministry. 
It "'JOUld be composed of the president of Ma-cau's High Court of Justice, ·the adjunct 
procurator-general, a lawyer elected by the l..uwyers o 'f Macau and four Cl tilens, ·two 
designated by the governor and ·two elected by the LegislativE' Assembly (1?r..QP.Q~e.~L .. kg,w .. J:~f. ... the. 
fY.nd.arJ.le.nt~l.~_ ... Q.t .. _J.!J.d .. ic.i~l ... _Qr.gr:\ni$.~:tiQo ..... Q.f....I1a.c.!~!..J. , Art. 27, 28); The president and six members 
of the High Court of Justice would bE' appoin ts·d by the governor at the recommendation of a 
newly created High COI.mei 1 of Justicl? of Macau ("Counselho Superior de Justica de Macau") .. 
The high counci 1 would be made up of the 90VG'tnor or his or her appointeE', the president of 
the PortJ..r9lJese High Court I,f Justice, the ' procurator-general o'f thl? rt?publil:, a 
representative of the Portuguese JustiCE' f'tlinistry and an appointee Cif the POt··tuguese 
president. Among its other compe·t~.mces, tht~ high counci I would hi?ar complaints against 
decisions of the High Court of Justice and :thc~ Macau Judicial Council (ibid., Art. 22, 29, 
30) 
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dependence on Portuguese trainl~d judges and lawyers, has encountered some 
problems. Planners initially intended to run a -fully bilingual programme 
with simultaneous translation and I)'i.lingual lecture notes .. However, this 
:" . .... 
proved Lln~\lorkable .. Lecturers nO~J teach the five-·year programme exclusively 
in Portuguese, although students study the Portuguese and Chinese languages 
as well. Some Chinese members of the 'first freshman class of eighty 
students had to \AJithdraw due to language di-fficulties .. As a result, the 
majority of students in the upper-year class are Portuguese, many 
expatriates with little incentive to remain in Macau after 1999. 53 
Ironically, two students from mainlc\lJd China who entered the first year of 
- . 
the programme .in .1990 already speal, fluent Portuguese and t13ve a Chinese 
law degree, making it easier for them to follow the classes than it is for 
many of the Macau Chinese .. 54 ' "he lack of substantial theoretical studies of 
Macau's legal system in any language has forced many professors to write 
their own textbooks. The programme bolds classes at night to accommodate 
numerous students who work full·-time during the day, some in government 
offices specialising in legal work" 
In order to broaden its base of potential professionals, the government 
plans to set up a Centre for Judicial Studies in the coming months with 
postgraduate programmes for Macau--L)(.)t~n Chinese and others ~~ho have already 
graduated in law in the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong, North America, Europe or 
elsewhere overseas .. It will tr'y to entice them back to Macau by paying them 
regular salaries to study Macau's Portuguese law in preparation -for working 
53. Yea and Lo, "Macau in Tt"ansition," P. 19 .. 
54. chinese students maJ<e up approximate:-1 y 40 per cent of the 1990-1991 fi rst-year class, 
but only just over 20 percent of the second-YI;;w.r class and less than 20 percent of the third-
year class (Data obtaine·d .fn:xn the Lat'" and F'ublic Administration Programme, University of 
East Asia, Nov. 1990). 
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locally .. The cf~ntre, whose students ~'~ill eventually include graduates of 
Macau's law programme, will also tr'\Jin j uclges, public prosecutors and law 
administrators. ss This style of po~~1.~jracluate programme could introduce 
foreign legal norms from both commOI! and civil law jurisdictions into 
Macau's legal, culture. However, at least they will be filtered through a 
Portuguese civil law training progralTlme and, to the extent tl1at they 
involve students from places outside mainland China, could provide valuable 
·fertilisation and external support 'for Macau's post-1999 legal autonomy. 
Nevertheless, the time required to train bilingual lawyers and provide 
them with additional training ·for the bench has led some commentators to 
suggest it is -unrealistic to expect Macau will have a localised bilingual 
judiciary be·fore the turn of the century. 56 Eduardo Cabri ta, coordinator of 
the government's Cabinet for Legal l'ranslation, expects Macau could have 
forty to fifty bilingual legal professionals by 1999,,57 These will be 
needed to meet the provisions of tlk~ proposed Law of the Fundamentals of 
JUdicial Organisation of Macau, which requires that judges and agents of 
the Public Ministry be individuals of "recognised civic fitness," licensed 
in law, 1I1ho have lived in Macau ·fOi~ at 'least three years and have knowledge 
of the Chinese language,,58 Only one "third of all the judges of courts of 
·first instance and two out of seven of those on the High Court of Justice 
have to meet tl1ese prerequisites during the first three years after the law 
ss. Interview, Povoas. 
56. See for example, Gary Nai, "Reforrna F~olitica e Juridica em Macau e a Lei ~'lsica," 
B~i.~k,.d,e. .. _Ad,mini.$.:tr.ac.a!:L..P.!J,b.l.i.r.;.a .... a~ .... Mgc.M!J, 1, no. 2 (1988): 221. 
57. Interview, Cabrita. 
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comes into force. 59 still, it is uncertain there will be enough legal 
professionals available to comply ~",.i.t,11 these localisation provisions. There 
are fewer barriers to use of anoth8i' provision of the bill which authorises 
appointment of judge's advisors (" j :':o~ ~ L zes assessores"), who must have li ved 
in Macau for more than seven years dlld have knowledge of the Chinese 
language. 60 The initiative seems a response to arguments by some Macau 
legal professionals that the government must resort to new means to improve 
local recruitment and root the legal system in the local commul1ity.61 
The Macau government's ambitious legal translation programme faces 
daunting political and technical obutacles. Under current law, Chinese 
- . 
versions of Macau laws are valid for reference only and Chinese remains an 
unofficial language 1n the territory despite regular complaints by Beijing 
officials and local people. 62 Language has long been a highly politically 
contentious issue between Portugal (o:l,Ild China, fuelled by Portugal '$ 
slownes's in making Chinese an official language and China '$ willingness--
especially after the Beijing massacre in 1989--to voice objections when the 
Macau government's translations have not met its political approval. 63 This 
tendency does not bode well for China's ability to restrain itself from 
59. Ibid., Art. 19(7). 
60. Ibid., Art. 20. 
61. Rodrigues, "A Adrninistracao da Justi ca," pp. 28-30; Interview, Jacinto. 
62. Yee and Lo, "MacaIJ in Transition," is; Interview, Ng. 
63. In June 1990, Lu Ping rejected the Pc.,.-tuguese translation of the name of the premises 
of the Taipei government's new unofficial trdJ,? and tourism representative in Macal.J. He said 
use of the word office ("oficina" in Portugu~'se) amounted te, granting the establ ishment 
official or semiofficial st.atus. SUbsequently, the Beijing government rejected the Cabinet 
for Legal Translation's Chinese version of the Organic Statute of t<'acau, which called the 
document Cl constitution. Beijing represent3:ti.ves suggested it amounted °to an attempt to use 
the statute to ove,-ride the future Basic La,..., of the Macau SAR, which China insi$ts will not 
have constitutional status (Ye,~ and Lo, "f1;J.':::<l1..l in Transition," pp. 9--10). 
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interfering during the language and translation disputes likely to arise 
after 1999 .. 
Hacau's translation efforts have ;')een bottlenecked by a chronic dearth 
of translators, especially thOSt~ wi "~ II legal training and knowledge of both 
Mandarin and Cantonese .. 64 The short(.\~.1e has postponed the setting up of a 
bilingual legislative drafting system', which would require a team of highly 
trained bilingual legal drafters capable of producing equally authentic 
legislation in both Chinese and Por'Luguese at the time o'f legislative -
promulgation .. 65 For nO~J, the governlilc~nt is concentrating its efforts on 
translating Portuguese language laws into Chinese .. The Cabinet for Legal 
Translation, which was set up in it~) current forrn in October 1989, has 
tried to overcome the shortage of bilingual legal specialists by 
establishing seven translation teaHl~~ composed of one Portuguese--trained and 
one PRC or Taiwan-·-trained specialist'- ~-some o'f them PRC nationals--supported 
by a local translator-interpreter cUld a local Chinese "letrado," a 
specialist in Chinese writing .. 66 Th·3 cabinet is compiling a glossary of 
Chinese equivalents for key Portugu(?se legal concepts to ensure consistency 
i 
and accuracy as they translate ~lacdu"s constitutional documents, its five 
main law codes and other statutes and proposed legislation .. German and 
Italian scholars specialising in Chinese law act as advisors to the cabinet 
64. Yee arid Lo, "Macau in Transition," pp. 18-19; Correia and Horta e Costa, "Por urna 
Politica de Traducao Juridica," p. 136; Hong Kong's own efforts to -translate its laws have 
been hampered by shortages of translators (UjG·jski, "The Future of the Erlglish Language," P. 
176). 
65. Intervie~/, Cabrit,a; Correia and Hort;:~ (; .. Costa, "Por uma Politica de Traducao 
Juridica," pp. 150-152. 
66. IntervietA/, Cabri ta; In some cases the) Por-tuguese and Chinese specialists use German 
and Italian as th,? common language o'f commur,l,:ation and o-F civil la,,,, concepts. 
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and review its tr'anslations -for accur'<3cy. Thl~ bulk o-f the work is scheduled 
fot". completion in time for the tran:j.fer of administration in 1999. 67 
To meet the deadline, the cabin(:!t has begun contracting out some of its 
: ~ .. 
worl< to a private translation firm in f1acau, which employs mainland-
educated translators with n6 legal training. The company is translating 
older, less lengthy laws and the Civ :il Registry Code. Cabrita has said the 
practice does not pose risks because' the Cabinet for Legal Translation 
retains responsibility for ensuring uni-formity in the terminology and -the 
quality of the final text produced by the private "firm.68 
other efforts to attempt to increase community access to and kno~Jledge 
of the law include plans for new le(]islation to improve legal aid services. 
The government is also preparing a Cllineae language media campaign aimed at 
familiarising young people with the law and attracting them to legal 
careers. 69 In December 1989, the procurator of the republic started special 
weekly sessions in which Chinese-sp('aking staf-f are available to answer 
legal questions from members of the public. lO Macau's future autonomy 
depends on the success of these and other reforms in increasing the 
community's attachment to the legal system before 1999. 
67 .. Ibid.; Durir)9 1991, the cabinet's worl< will include transla-tin9 pOrtions of the Civil 
Code, the final vE'rsion of the Company Law Code, the proposed revised Macau Penal Code and 
civil and penal process le-.;islation being revise..i according to the Proposed Law of the 
Fundamentals of Judicial Organisation of I'1ctC<:.\U (Governo de Macau, Gabinete para a Traducao 
Juridica, "Memorando .• Traducao Juridica em 1<)')0," Macau: Gabinete para a Traducao ,1uridica, 
1991) . 
68. Intervi.:'W, Cabrita; The firm's major shareholder is Edmundo Ho, president of the Macau 
Bankers Association, vice-president of the L.€.~gislative Assembly and Cl Basic Lm" drafter 
("Tr-aducao de leis para Chines veai ser feita pOt' empresa privada" (L .. US~\, 15 Mar. 1990)). 
69. Interview, Povoas. 
70. Irrte,'view, Jacinto. 
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Maintaining a Distinct System 
Macau's unique circumstances bri:,CJ special dangers to its legal system 
after 1999.. The belated effor·ts to ... ~d<e the law accessible to the people, 
the Roman civil law heritage Macau ::,hares with the PRC and the enclave's 
reliance on the PRC for badJ',y needed law and tr'anslation expertise make the 
legal- system pat',ticularly vulnerabl,~ ' to erosion. 71 The PortugUf~se 
administration in Macau is trying to create a bilingual, localised legal 
system that will preserve in the Ch:Lnese language the contours and concepts 
of Macau' s Portuguese legal cul tu re .. Howeve r, the translation process 
itsel'f and the involvemf=nt o'f PRC-t:rained law specialists open the law to 
the risk of infiltration--intentioruJ. or unintentional--by the legal norms 
of the language into which they ar8 being translatedoo 72 Changes in the 
interests and biases of legal education and scholarship after 1999 and the 
type of legal personnel they produc'2 also have the potential to 
significantly erode the existing sy~~tem, particularly if links with 
Portuguese and other Western legal ~ultures diminishoo73 These forms of 
"indirect intervention" are possibly "even more threatening than legal 
imperialism because such subtle forces are less perceptible and thus over 
time more insidious .. " 74 
71. "Gabinete de Traducao Juridica" (Lus;:~ . 25 Feb. 1988),. 
72. Correia and Hor·ta e' Costa, "Pelr ume r'vlitica de Traducao Juridica." PP. 132-133, 142, 
152. 
73. Epstein t "China and liong Kong," Pp. ~)t>-'61; Epstein argues that common law has 
infil·trated civil law systems, not because of the "triumph of the common law," its "vitality 
and tel'laci ty" or its .. treatment of concrete (;ases," bu·t because of; the stronger .. pOl i ti caI , 
economic, and sanetimes cuI tural advantagl? cd protagonists of the common law." 
74. Ibid. 
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Epstein asser'ts that translation' o'f the law is one o'f the biggest 
dangers for Hong Kong's post-1997 lc:qal system .. 75 His arguments are even 
more ominous when applied to Macau . {nfiltration occurs because legal 
homonyms are often linguistic equivdlents but do not represent the same 
legal concept, allowing tran~lated ~crms to be interpreted in ways quite 
contrary to their original meaning. Glossaries of Chinese-English 
equi valents, such as the Chinese-'Po,' Luguese version Macau is preparing, 
"merely perpetuate the myth that tt~ .. I.n~3lated terms mean the same as the -
original. Worse still, inevitable ej",-ors in such glossaries will distort 
and ultimately change the meaning altogether,,"76 The dangers will increase 
- -
as Chinese becomes the dominant lan.]uage of law and as la~1 students, 
lawyers and judges lose their ability to understand the law in its original 
language. "It is a cultural aspirat -ion for Hong Kong people to use Chinese 
a:~ a legal language but the price miJY be l1igl1." 77 
Making predictions is difficult.: As Ujejski points out, English has 
persisted as the language of law in many former British colonies despite 
efforts to replace it with the national language of the new country 1n 
question. The shortages of qualified translators, the continued use of 
English to educate lawyers, theund':~rdeveloped state of many native 
languages a'fter years of colonisati')n, the use o'f case law and expert 
witnesses and the prevalence of EngJ.ish in international trade and commerce 
have all contributed to the failurl3 of linguistic decolonisation. How(~ver, 
Ujejski cautions that the evolution of Hong Kong's law could take the 
75. Ibid., pp. 61-63, 73-74. 
76. Ibid., 61-63, 73-74. 
77. I bid., 63. 
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opposite path because, unlil<e their' countlzrparts in otller British colonies, 
English-speaking professional and ~' ~. :ul1ornic elites will not gain pO~ler and 
influence a'fter 1997 and many an~ c: ·· I.. grating, It.Jhile the PRC legal system 
can fill any vacuum left by the weai \l.·:ning o'f English common la~" a 
situation which did not exis't: in ot: F.: r colonies" 78 
These arguments have serious imp .: . ..;..cations for Mac8u, ""here opportunities 
for erosion and infiltr'ation o'f POI LU~Juese legal norms may be greater 
because the Portuguese language is unlikely to survive in the long term and 
because Macau has roots in the same Roman civil law as the PRC.79 This 
common ancestor eases the translat:i.".·n of Macau's codes and legislation into 
Chinese .. There-, are none of the volu .. Linous reports o'f case law to worry 
about, Chinese equivalents already ~xist for some legal concepts and 
similarities in legal education mea;; Macau can bolster its tiny local pool 
of bilingual legal experts with Sp~~i..;ialists trained in the PRC. Some PRC 
of'ficials can understand Mdcau's 1':'1 . 1 more easily than that of Hong Kong. 80 
However , differences in fundamental (:oncepts of la"" and justice, human 
rights, court procedure, rules of (!,/idence and other matter-.3 underlie the 
superficial compatibility in legal ,fol~m, organisation and training .. 
Contradictory PRC norms are bound, 'I.,) seep into Macau as use o'f tile Chinese 
language increases and as Portugues~ influence declines. 
Furthermore, ' judicial systems bd~ed on Roman civil law traditions tend 
to be more centralised and isolated from sociE:ty than those based on common 
'78. Ujejski. "The Future of the English ,!.Ji,9Uage," pp. 170-173. 177, 180-181. 
79. China borrowed fl"om Roman civi 1 law ' ",aI' ing the republ ican period lAJhen i ·t made efforts 
at legal codi fication. It has since borrowed i rClm Japan J which, in "tiJl"n drew from German law. 
Tht? Soviet and Eastern European leg,~l 3ysteh ' ,; have also been influential (Epstein, "China and 
Hong Kong," p. 46); See also Davis, c.Qn$.t..i.t.!/·, : " ~ Qn~l. .. ,"C.QO,frQn:tg.t..iQn, p. 62. 
80. Interview, Cabrita. 
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law traditions. La\-Jyers, judges and case law precedl;!nts play i~ much more 
influential role in the latt.er" whil,:~ ci vil la~\} ' courts emphasise judges 
rendering tightly drafted decision::) dccording to narro~~ rules of 
. ~ ... 
interpretation. 81 The highly concenLl 'ated nature of Macau's court system 
could make it more vulnerable to inFiltration by -Foreign concepts o'f law 
because potential intruders have fowcir centres of influence to conquer. 82 
Hacau's legal system could also succumb more easily because, not being 
dependent on precedent, it is unlikely to get as much direct 'fertilisation 
from Western legal systems as a CplIJIHOn la",} jurisdiction such as Hong Kong 
could have after 1997. 
On the other hand, some PortugueG~~ officials argue that Macau's system 
can survive 'formally mOr(3 easily thdll Hong Kong's because civil law systems 
do not depend on the courts and judicial precedents as much as common law 
systems do and are easier to teach to students. Civil law systems are 
easier to construct and, if damaged, to rebuild. They do not depend as much 
on a particular legal-cultural milieu and courts with high prestige and 
authority as do common law systems. 83 Cabrita argues: Illn Hong Kong no 
intermediate system lS possible. Either it stays or it goes .. However, in 
Macau we can have a poor system survive formally even if at some date there 
are no contacts with Portugal and the spirit of the law is weakened. 11 84 The 
endurance of remnants of Portugues8 law in G08, a former Portuguese colony 
now a state within India, suggests some aspects of Portuguese law could 
al. l1Je t' r yman, ~.i.v.i.l .. , . .l..al'l! .... Ir,ad.i.t.i.QI1 , pp. 3~'i, 36,-37, 108--110 .. 
82. IntervietJl, Paula Escarameia, law pt'oh;.!~;sor, University of East Asia, 8 Nov. 1990. 
83. Interview, POV039; Intervie\IJ, Cabrit.·L 
84. Intervie'l}I, Cabrita. 
well sur-vi ve in MacaLJ despite their position o·r linguistic and political 
disadvantage,,8S 
The future ability of Macau'~. J.E!~J~11 system to maintain external links 
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through hiring outside legal profess ionals is also somewhat uncertain. The 
Sino~-Portuguese J'oint Declaration per-'mits the Macau SAR to appoint judges 
of for:eign nationality and allows Idwyers ·from outside Macau to practice in 
the territory.86 However, if it treuts Macau as it has Hong Kong, China is 
likely to restrict key judicial positions such as the chief justice of - the 
bourt of Final Appeal and the chie'f judge of the High Court to Chinese 
nationals who' are permanent residell :',:3, of the 11acau SAH and have no right of 
." 
abode in ~ny foreign country. 87 Mac.;:~u, even more than Hong Kong, ~lill have 
trouble finding local Chinese legal professionals with judicial training 
and the willingness to forfeit right of abode overseas to take these senior 
positions on the bench. The enclave1s ranks of future bilingual candidates 
are already disturbingly thin. Applying the additional nationality and 
right of 'abode restrictions ·from Hon~J Kong '5 Basic Law would effectively 
eliminate those few Macanese and MaCBu-born Chinese residents with 
Portuguese nationality who might otherwise quali·fy. Treating Macau like 
85. Under the Goa. Daman and Diu Administration Act of 1962, Goa retains its Portuguese 
laws unless they are revoked by the competent legislature. Thirty year's at-tet' the Indian army 
took the territory from t~ Portugue$e by fore
'
?, Goa still maintains Portuguese familY laws 
and many parts of the Portuguese ci vi 1 CodE', although substantial numbers of Portuguese laws 
have been repealed. While some of Goa's laws h,lve been translated into English by local 
bil ingual jurists, they are not officially recognised and the goverrlment has never taken up 
the project o 'F translation. In the case of f:amilY laws, translators employed terms from the 
Louisiana Code of 1870, which might serve ar~ a model fot' Macau should it decide to tt'anslate 
any of its laws into English ( M.S. U$g30nc.J.r', "Apropos Conference held on 22nd March, 1989 
at the Hotel Mandovi orl the Occasion of th€:' V:isit of Instituto Juridico de M.:1cau to Goa," in 
QQ~ .... La.w .... I.i.rfl~;$. 1 [Apr. 1969J: 18-20; "Evoh,tioi"'l of Portuguese Laws in Goa after 19th December, 
1961," in ibid., pp. 37-39; Correia and Horta. e Costa, "Por uma Politica de rraducao 
Juridica," pp. 132-133 at note 3); Louisian.:.l .lnd Quebec provide other examples of civil lal.oJ 
traditions which have survived within common l~w sYstems despite some erosion (Epstein, 
.. China and Hong Kong," pp. 60-66). 
66. Ma~a!J .... J.D., Annex I (IV) • 
87. I:1Q09 .... KQO.9 .... SJ"., Art. 90. 
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Hong Kong in this regard ignores th(~ ::>pecial problems con'fronting its legal 
system as it prepares for 1999. 
On the oth~r hand, legal intrusiulI could also go the other way. As the 
nationality question shows, China's dttitude towards Macau's legal system 
cannot but have an important impact on its survival potential. Some 
Portug~ese legal experts suggest th~ civil law affinity between Portuguese 
and Chinese laws and the relatively harmonious relationship between the 
Portuguese and Chinese duthorities could make China more sympathetic to 
Macau's legal system dnd interested in learning from it. 88 Overall, it 
seems improbable that C~ina would look to Macau for successful examples of 
a legal regime- enhancing economic 311d social development, especially with 
Hong Kong's successful common law bys tenr so close at hand. China has 
already demonstrated its interest'ill importing certain parts o'f the British 
colony's law, relating to such area~ as internal economic affairs, foreign 
trade and investm(~nt, tllrough the Silcnzhen Special Economic lone bordering 
Hong Kong. 89 Ironically, however, th~! vulnerability of Macau's legal system 
to erosion by Hong Kong commercial law could be one of its biggest 
~dvantages from China's point of Vi8W. The Macau government has recently 
prepared a proposed new Company Law of Macau, which includes some 
innovations from the commercial la~\1 used in Hong Kong and others fr'om 
various contemporary civil lat~ Compdny Codes in thf3 Asia-Paci'fic rcOgion and 
Europe. 90 The new law will make Honq Kong legal norms a part of Macau law 
in a codi'fied -Form which China can understand because o-F its own civil law 
00. COrreia and Horta e Costa, "Pot" urn<.:.\ /·'wlitica de Traducao Juridica," p. lS8; Intervie¥J, 
Oliveira Rocha. 
69. Epstein, "China and Hong Kong," pp. ( .7- 68. 
90. Interview, Povoas. 
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heritage and might want to emulate .. Other innovatively updated Macau laws 
might catch the eye of PRC legal ex/,)('rts, making the enclave's legal system 
more influential than Macau '5 size ... (lId history might otherwise suggest 
possible .. Commercial la~'1s ~~oLlld be the most attracti ve but the Macau 
government's proposed revised Penal Code might prove interesting to the PRC 
should the political climate improve. ' The prospect, however small, of a 
hybrid legal system emerging in Mac(;.u of-fers some hope that the enclave's 
legal system could help build Macau's own particular brand of autonomy 
within China .. , One analyst comments: 
With a good team of ~~el1 tr'aillcd bilingual legal experts, there is a 
pos~ibility of creating a unique legal system in Macau after 199:9, a 
system based upon the POt~tugul~!~"e continental law, absorbing some 
practical aspects of the Hong Kong common law (especially in 
commerce) and from the Chinese civil law (especially concerning 
marriage, inhet'itance and family relations .. )91 
The development of such a system would depend in part on the willingness of 
Portuguese authorities to see the goal o'f preserving Portuguesf-~ law and 
language take second place to the goal of creating a made-in-Macau legal 
regime drawing from those parts of neighbouring legal systems that best 
serve Macau people. The spirit of M~cau's law will only thrive if it meets 
the community half way_ According to one Macau official, the only 
significant difference between the future of the law in Hong Kong and Macau 
is that many Hong Kong people see the legal system as an asset and are more 
likely to be willing to fight to defend it after 1997, while the majority 
of Macau people will not. 92 For this r-eason, he and other's advocate such 
measures as translating Macau laws into English as well as Chinese as a way 
91. Ngai, "Pluralism," p. 15. 
92. Interview, Jacinto; For a discussion on the comple'x atti tudes of Hong Kong people 
towards the legal system see Lau and Kuan, ,C:!~hQ~, Pp. 119-143; I<uan, Lau and Wan, "Legal 
At ti tudes ~.. Pp. 207--223; Davi s, C.(;!n$t.i:!f.!J.t..i~ln ~.~l .. _  C.QO.fr_oot..at.iQO, p. 7. 
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to bring the law to the people as ~~cll as attract foreign investors unable 
t<? read PortugUf~~3e or Chinese lalt.Js" ~):s Such a move ~~ould hav(~ to overcome 
the difficulties posed by Macau '$ ~~; llortag€~ of' trarlslators and possible 
.- . .. 
resistance from botl1 Portuguese and FRC authorities M Nevertheless, the 
adj unct secretary for justice said IIC' hopes to translate the revamped Penal 
Code into both English and German alld the new Company Lalt.J into English to 
make them more accessibl(~ both at h0.n13 and internationally M 94 
Constitutional Int~rpretation and Review 
All o'f these factors--Ianguage, L!xternal ties, localisation and 
communitysupport--will affect the 'future ability of Hacau's courts to take 
on one of their I<ey roles in buildinq a viable autonomy process--that o'f 
constitutional controlM Their authority to interpret the future Macau Basic 
Law and review legislation to enSUt~c compliance lAJith its provisions will 
either permit the courts to play an ,]ctive role in setting the boundaries 
of Macau's political autonomy or relegate them to a sideline position. 
However, the courts' constitutional control role in an autonomous territory 
is not necessarily only that of a border guard for local sel'f-government M 
In a common law legal context, Alex~llder Bickel explains constitutional 
lawmaking as a process of communication in which the judiciary, through its 
power of constitutional interpretation and reyiew, conducts an ongoing 
dialogue with the elected branches u'F government and thl3 political 
93. Inter-view, Jacinto; Victor f .S. sit c.H'gues English should be made an official language 
along with Chinese and Portuguese "to rneetthe demands of the business world" (Sit. 
"Industrial Policies for f1acau in the 19903," p. 72). 
94. Interview, Povoas. 
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communi ty as ~':l. whole about the funckHllontal collecti ve values o'f the 
society. 95 Constitutional review mahu:::. 11 the dialogue in this a rea more 
ordered and thus advance:3 stability" ... " the cour-t is not engaged in an 
" .. .. , 
unrelenting search 'for- principle bl..l:. takes account of the competing needs 
of expediency ........ This permits judicial participation in a ~t.Jider 
dialogue .. "96 Mauro Cappelletti comp(.,res this with a more restricted role 
for cons·titutional judicial revie\t.J in civil law countries .. 91 In :30me o'f 
them, lingering resistance to the notions of fixed constitutions and " 
judicial review of legislative or executive acts have led to the 
development of separate constitutiolldl courts .. These often take a more 
timid view o'ftheir role and largely (~xclude ordinary courts 'from 
participating in constitutional cOlltrol. In other cases, constitutional 
control remains the prerogative of fK\litical bodies rather than courts .. 98 
Although important in all societies, stabilising the constitutional 
dialogue through judicial participation takes on major importance in an 
autonomy process, where jostling bct.vJeen political leaders over the 
division between central and local duthority and basic political values are 
fundamental dynamics .. Writing about this phenomenon in Hong Kong, Davis 
argues, "By providing structure fOI~ development and elaboration o'f higher 
norms, constitutional j udicial revi(~\~ is a valued stabilising force. 11 99 
95. Alexander 8i eke 1, :r.h~_ ... L~a~rt .... o.at.)9e.r,QY.~"l.. .. ~~n~t.)cb.; .... .Ih~ .... S.!.tp.r.~me. .... CQ!Jr.t. .... at. .... t.rn ... ~r ... _Q.f 
J?o.lit.i.c~, 2d ed. (Mew Haven: Vale Uni versi t,>1 Press, 1986), p. 117 ei tE:'d in Davis, 
C.Qtl,~t.it.Y.:tiQf1al. .... !:Qn.fr.Qnt.~t..iQn , p • 50 • 
97. See generally Cappelletti, J.!Jd..ic.i~l ... ..r. :~~Y..i~w, especially pp. 79-84; Oavis, 
CQtl$.t.it.!Jt.iQoal. .... c.o.n.fr.9.0t.at.i.oo, pp. 56-60. 
98. Merryrnan, Ihe .... C..iv..i.l .... La.~4J. ... .Ir.ad . .i.t.iQt.), Pp. 133'-140, 156-158 .. 
99. Oavis, C.Qn~t.i:tY.t.i.Qnal. .... C.o.n.fr.Qt.)t.atiQn ., p. !;,l. 
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According to Bicl<el and Charles Dlack, a crucial part o'f the court's 
stabilising affect is its ability to give government policy a legal stamp 
of approval, the reby legitimising i ;~ in tile t3Yt33 of suspicious citizens .100 
: .. ... 
This legitimising role is especially important when citizens' distrust of 
government runs high, as it ' well could in post-1999 t1acau and othe r places 
where - ~ajor political realignments ~lace constitutional control in a 
tenuous position. lOl In this sense, the Beijing government should have 
little to fear and much to gain frcJJi/ vesting constitutional interpretation 
and review po~~ers in the courts of Lhe Macau SAR, especially gi ven the more 
cautious role o'f ci viI law courts ill constitutional control. Empowering the 
SAR's highest -court to function as a constitutional court within the scope 
of its legal autonomy is consistent ~~i th the contempora ry ci viI la",~ 
tradition and with the Joint Declaration and would flow naturally from 
Portuguese plans to authorise the cficlave's new High Court of Justice to 
rule on the constitutional i ty and ltJgali ty of legislation before 1999 .. 102 
So far, the Beijing government seems only partly convinced by such 
arguments. Hong Kong's Basic Law ledves the question of judicial review and 
interpretation in a fuzzy position. It vests the power of interpretation of 
the Basic Law and legislative review in the NPC Standing Committee in 
nlatters concerning central authori ty and local-central relations. The SAR 
courts will have delegated interpretative authority regarding matters 
100. Bickel, Ih~ ..... l..~!l;?t. .... Qao.g~r.Q!J:~ .... S.r.40cb, cited in F.L. Mort()n, "Judicial Review in France: 
A Comparative Analysi$," Am~r . .i.c.oo .... !1.Qy..r.o.~l. .... Q.f. ... !:.QmR'-\r.~:~.i.y.e. ..... l~w 36, n,,). 1 (Winte,' 1988): 102, 
105. 
101. · Mor-ton, "Judicial Reviel,ll in FrancE:~," p. 98. 
102. Vitorino, "r1acau na Jurisprudenci~~ do Tribunal Constitu·tional," pp. 17-22; In·terview, 
Povoas; MacaY .... J.Q, 2( 2), Annex I (I I I ) . 
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within the scope o'f Hong Kong's autonomy.103 However, their power of 
legislative review is implied only . . 1.04 Furthermore, the scope o'f those 
matters considered questions of c8l'1tr'al authority and local-central 
.~ .. ... 
relations is not clearly defined. 
The role o'f the NPC Standin£1 Conw,j.ttee in the Hong Kong Basic Law's 
legislative review formula injects a blatantly political element into the 
constitutional control process, raising questions that go to the heart of 
scholarly debate over the constitutional role of the courts. In simple 
terms, some scholars advocate con~\tit.utional judicial review based on a 
separation of the judicial and executive-legislative branches so that the 
courts can counter the dangers of Ijilfettered democracy. Others argue for a 
more democratically accountable con~:>titutional review process through 
mechanisms that permit political COfltrol over the judicial branch through 
the elected executi ve or legislatur'e . .105 Several scholars assert that there 
are advantages and disadvantages to each approach. Morton argues that the 
."paradox of constitutionalism" is thiJt systems for constitutional control 
must ensure government policies conform to constitutional principles while 
allowing the constitution to adapt to changing political and social values. 
Constitutional control is by nature a quasi-political, quasi-judicial 
activity .. l06 Nevertheless, the argullJents in favour of rnajoritarian control 
of the courts are derived 'from political systems where the legislative and 
103. H.Qt.l9 .... ~Qng ... .s..t..., Art. 17, 15(-3. 
104. Davis, "Pieceme'al Human Rights in Cldrla: The Hong Kong Case" (Paper presented at the 
symposium on Human Rights, Columbia Universit·y, 19 Jan. 1991), P. 11. 
105. Fot' detai 1 eo d i scussi ons of this d€,LJ3 le see Davi S. C,Qo$.t..i.:t.y..t.:i.Qoal .... C,QO.f.r..Qo:t.Atioo. PP. 
46-55; Morton, "JUdicial Review in france," Pp. 69-110; See generally, Cappelletti, J.!JQ . .ic..ial 
BaY.i~w; Mer ryman, C,:i.y.i.l. ..... l..~w. .... I.r..aQi:t.iot.l, pp. 1 ~:~···140 , 156-156. 
106. Morton, "JUdicial Review in France," PP. 100, ltO. 
J.70 
executive branches are democra'tically elected and subject to the rule of 
la~~. This would not be the case in ":,.l'Je Macau SAR .. Public confidence in the 
autonomy arrangements would be hanll );~; (J by entrusting consti tutional control 
. ~ .. ... 
to the NPC Standing Comnli.ttee .. 
An adaptation of the bifurcate~ constitutional control system Davis has 
Pt'opos,ed for the Hong Kong SAR t~oulcl enhance tile legitimacy of the 
constitutional control process in t.ho eyes of mainland authorities and 
Macau people and would be compatib18 ~~ith Macau's civil law traditions .. 107 
Under such a system, the Macau SAR'~) High Court, 1n its role as a 
constitutional court, wc;:>uld have fi!h:tl authority to rule in concrete cases 
on the , compliance of local legislati ve and executi ve acts ~~i th the Basic 
Law. Howev(~r, consistent with the tj"adition of more politicised control 
over constitutionality in socialist .]nd many ci viI la~\) traditions, the SAR 
chie"f executi ve, two,-thi rds o"f the S()R legislatu re or the cent ral 
government could refer certain constitutional questions directly to a 
special constitutional committee made up of an equal number of central 
government and SAR representatives. This committee's authority would extend 
to disputes over central-local govenllnent jurisdiction, central government 
power~ and issues arising from the PRC Constitution. It could be 
constituted under the NPC, but must have more independence and authority 
than the advisory Committee for the Casic Law envisioned in the Hong Kong 
Basic Law. 10B To increase the committee's local legitimacy and 
107. O.~vi$, CQO,~:t.j, .. t.Y,t.io.o~l. .... c.o.n.fr.Qn:tg:t.iQn, pp. 63-64. 
108. The Hong Kon'3 committee will be comr'o~3ed o'Ftwelve member3 appointed by ,the NPC 
Standing Committee fot' a five-year term, six from the mainland and six from Hong Kong, 
including some legal professionals. The Hens) I<.ong members shall be SAR permanent residents 
who are Chinese nationals wi thou·t right Cif abodE' in a foreign coun'try and shall be nominated 
jointly by the chief executive, Legislative' CQuncil president and SAR Court of Final Appeal 
chief justice (Ho.n9 .... KQtJ9 .... ~.L., Proposal by th(;, Drafting Cornmi ttee for the Basic L.aw Cif the Hong 
Kon9 Special Admin istr a 'ti ve Region on ,th,.? Es t-abl ishment of the Committee fol' the Basic Law of 
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independence, the Macau chief executive, legislature and chief justice 
should each designate an equal numb~r of representatives, who, like those 
from the central government, would be subject to recall by their respective 
, .... ~ -
nominating authorities. The committ:~c should not be able to make decisions 
unless all members are present. 109 This clear connection with political 
organs in the SAR ~lJould help pr'event. ' th(~ committee from developing into a 
shadow government that might erod(.~ the author'ity of these local organs. A 
similar committee exists in the Aland Island autonomy arrangement and ' has 
developed into an important forum for consultation and dispute settlement 
between representatives of the Finnish and Aland governml:nts ,,110 
Nevertheless, even if the PRC authorities were to grant the Macau High 
Court constitutional control powers, the civil law heritage of its 'judges 
could hanlper their' ability to participate in the constitutional process in 
the way Bickel envisioned. In addition, constitutional judicial reVlew 
through a separate Constitutional Court is only a recent addition to the 
Portuguese legal system inserted a'ftcr the 1974 military coup. It lS not 
well established in Macau. The Por'tuguese Constitutional Court has ruled on 
the constitutionality of only two r1dcau laws, one dating from 1977 which 
prohibited individuals convicted of 'certain crimes from entering casinos 
and another from 1936 ~Jhich defined cr'ime:3 o'f abuse o'f press freedom,,111 
Neither have Macau's administrative courts been active in reviewing the 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the Standing Corrvnittee of the National 
People's Congress). 
109. A similar sy&tem is used ·to consti tu'te the Aland DelE:'9ation in tho Aland Islands, 
which supervises the territory's finances and iS$ues advisory opinions on th? compliance of 
Aland legislation with the territory's Au·ton .::1my Act (Jansson, Gustafsson, Henril<sson. 
Fagerlund and Johans90n, "Ala,nd," p. 34). 
110. Hannuro, AY.:tQnQf.oZ': , p. 374 . 
111. Vitorino, "Macau no Jurisprude'ncia .jl,) Tribunal Constitutional," pp. 13-14. 
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legality of administrati ve law .. 1.12 Judicial reViE!W has been graft.ed onto 
civil law systems, but it nf-3eds tirrll.) to root" 
A court's . ~uthority consists not .1,, '1 its ability to conlmand, but in the 
willingness of other political 8;.., Lors, and ultimately o'f public opinion, 
to obey .. In a democracy, where accountability is the touchstone of 
political legitimacy, the authority of the constitutional court is 
precarious, especially in the be~linning .. Obedience to constitutional 
decisions must bl:!come a political . habit o'f the people and their leaders, 
and. this takes time. 113 
The processes could be aided if Hor I~I Kong successfully develops its own 
form o'f constitutional judicial revil:HhJ" Since the two SARs will share ' 
simila r Basic La~~s, they nil.ght exch::u"lge judges in constitutional cases" 
Macau legal professionals who initi,llly study law in Hong Kong would 
. -,",:- , -
provide further cross-fertilisation hetween the t~IO systems .. The years left 
before 1999 might not be enough timE] to s(~nsitise Macau judges and othe r 
legal processionals, officials, political leaders and citizens to the use 
and legitimacy of judicial review. !,/owever, it is in the interests o'f the 
SAR's autonomy to make a start now~ 
112. Interview, Povoa9. 




The experience of other autonomOLl:3 territories shows that dual political 
identity and internal political and legal institutions and processes will 
work better to maintain Macau's distinctness after 1999 if the enclave has 
external support for its autonomy process, that is, if Macau is externally 
effective.! PRC authorities have implicitly acknowledged this reality -by 
making provisions for internationalising the Macau and Hong Kong questions 
in the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Oeclarations. 2 However, 
particula-rly since the -1989 Beij ing ~)tudent democracy movement, Chinese 
leaders have balked at the implicat :;',ons o'f their decision .. The final draft 
of the Hong Kong Basic Law attempt:.:> to limit intet~nationalisation. 3 
~evertheless, the Joint Declarations and Basic Law for Hong Kong still 
envision an SAR with a high degree of international personality, including 
autonomous external links befitting Ilong Kong '5 growing regional and global 
1. See pp. 53- 60 of the present s ·tudy ~ 
2. Under the Joint Declarations, foreign n.ltionals can hold some public and judicial posts 
and act as $AA government advisors. The Hong Kong courts can refer to precedents in other 
corrrnon law jurisdictions and both terri tori~'3 can maintain reciprocal juridical assistance 
wit.h foreign states. Foreign investment is protected by law. 80th territories can issue their 
own travel documents. While China has respon~iibility for foreign affairs and defence, it will 
delegate the SARs the authority to maintain their own external econornic and cuI tural 
relations including official and semi-·offic:i .. ll economic and trade missions in foreign 
countries, "conclud,? relevant agreements wi ·t: I states, regions and relevan·t international 
organisations," participate in PRC delega·ticti I~ as permitted by the central government and, 
wi th the aid of China, continue to participate in interna·tional organisations in which the 
PRC is not a member. Foreign consular and ()th(~t' official,. semi-official and non-governmental 
missions can set UP in the SARs. Th? Int'?rn.:\I~ional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Soci.:,d and Cultural Rights as applied ·to Hong Kong 
are to remain in force even though China is not Cl signatory to the former interna·tional 
agreement. Both Macau and Hong Kong can maird~c.\in their status as free ports and separate 
customs territories with their own currencls-'.J. Hong Kong can also keep its shipping register 
and status as a regional aviation centre and ~an conclude some international air service 
agreements (UQQ9 .... KQn9 .... J.Q, 2(2J[4J[5J(6J[7J(')]( 10J, Annex r[ 11 I J[IVJ[VrJ[VI IJ[ IXJ(X][XI][XI r r J 
(XIVJ; Ma~a!.L..J.Q, 2(2J[3J[6J[7J[6J, Annex I (l.l[ IVJ[VJ[VI J[VI I J[VII I J[IXJ[XJ[XIJ[XI I I J). 
3. See generally Michael c. Davis, "Tian~~nl1len in Hong Kong" (Paper presented at the 19th 
Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, T,dpei, June, 1990). 
economic and cultural position as a capitalist free port and financial, 
service and communications centrew 
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The PRC's internationalisation p-.).1icy 'for Hong Kong seeped into the 
Joint Declaration on Macau as wellw with some notable exceptions reflecting 
Macau's lesser international economic status, many of its provisions were 
copied almost verbatim from the ear1ier Sino-'British accordw However, 
Macau's exter'nal economic and cultui"al personality being significantly less 
developed than Hong Kong's, the suit o'f international clothes handed 'the 
tiny Portuguese encla ve is somewha t too big 'for it to wea r w Convinced of 
the benefits for both Macau and Por"tugal of expanding the enclave's 
external economic, political and cultural links, the Portuguese and Macau 
governments are trying to help the territory grow into its post-1999 
clothesw They aim to leave behind cl significantly more internationalised 
Macau than currently exists. Since many territories recognised as states 
have even fewer resources than Macau, the task seems achievable. 
Hacau's potential sources of external effectiveness come from 
individuals, institutions and processes whose external links give them some 
leverage with or autonomy from the PHC government and its Macau allies. The 
external links associated with adherence to international agreements, 
membership in international organisations and maintenance of representative 
missions abroad can bolster the exter'nal e'ffectiveness of both government 
and nongovernment actors in Macauw Participants in international 
organisations and agreements gain c(~rtain rights and must observe certain 
obligations, both of which bring inter~nal leverage. This inter'national 
involvement also gives participan"ts outside networks and forums for 
protecting their internal interest~. Foreign investment in Macau creates 
important external links too. SOllle transnational investors, whose presence 
175 
o'ften depends on adequate institutional and legal protections, are able to 
relocate their assets quickly, giviilq them Cl degree of independence from 
centr'a'l and local authorities and 11:!v(~rage o'ften unavailable to local 
businesses .. Importantly, by boostinu external recognition of Macau's 
achievements, citizen pr'ide in theii" community and trust in their autonomy 
arrangement, external effectiveness also could strengthen local identity 
and, potentially, loyalty to the PRS. 
Macau could also draw on sources of external support more peculiar to 
its unique situation. The ability of t1acau people to leavl~ the territory 
because of the passports and related citizenship rights granted them~y 
Portugal's nationality law could give them some leverage with PRC 
authorities. Furthermore, within Chirla's broader "one country, two systems" 
reunification scheme, Macau acts as the canary in the mine shaft. Because 
it is particularly vulnerable to PRC interference, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
could watch the progress of thl3 Macnu SAR to gage the success of the 
scheme, thereby encouraging Beijing to protect the tiny territory's 
autonomy if only to reassure the two larger communities. 
I stress that these are only potential means of external effectiveness. 
At critical moments, actors with external leverage could be unwilling or 
unable to use their' power to enhance Macau's autonomy. Alternatively, they 
could be interested in protecting some less controversial aspects of 
Macau's autonomy, its economic indelJendence within the PRC for example, but 
not those aspects which Beijing iSflIore sensitive about, such as the 
autonomy of Macau's political and judicial institutions. Although the 
number and importance of nonstate dctors have expanded dramatically in 
recent years, the remaining barrie~s to their full participation in today's 
international system could also limit Macau's ability to CUltivate external 
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links. 4 states are still the J<ey irrt.erne:1tional players in some 
international forums and in diplomatic circles, even though some 
inter'national-governmental organisctions have opened their membersh~p to 
nonstate territorial members .. It is in tile uncertain interstices between 
the lingering state system and the urowing status of nonstate entities that 
Macau must build its external effectiveness .. 5 
This chapter focuses priOlar'ily on assessing the nature and extent of 
Macau's potential external links, di::>cussing where practical the likelihood 
that key actors "will transform them into backing for Macau's autonomy 
process, giving the enclave tile level o'f international effectiveness,that 
successful autonomy arrangements require. It examines the enclave's 
international position wllen the Sino"·Portuguese Joint Declaration was 
signed. Then it turns to some conceptual and concrete issues concerning 
efforts by the Portuguese and Macau governments and others to build further 
external links for Macau through ill"ternational agreements, membership in 
international organisations, 'foreign investment , cultural networking and 
Hong Kong and Taiwan connections. 
External Links Prior to the Transition Period 
Macau began its autonomy p t~ocess ~~i tll st t~ong ties to Hong Kong but weak 
links to the re~t of the world. This relative isolation coupled with 
depC:r1dence ,on Hong Kong re'flected M.J.cau's paucity of indepf~ndent 
c0mmunication links with the outside world. The territory's banking sector 
4. "The SOVereign State and the World System." in Richard Fall<, Samuel S. Kim and Saul H. 
Mend lovi tz, eds. _ I~ar.d.~ .... a .... J..!,!~.t. .... WQr..l.d ..... Qr.d.e..r, vol. 1 (Bou lder _ Cola.: WestvielAJ Press, 1982), 
p. 56; Hedley Bull, "The state's Positive RolE' in WOrld Affail's." in ibid. p. 61; Samuel s. 
K im, Ihe_.J~y.e~:t ..... fQr ..... ~ .... J..Y$.:t .... WQr.1Q ..... Qr.d.~r. (Sou Id'?r, Colo.: Westview, 1984), p. S4. 
S. "The SOVereign State and the World S~i~:; t.ern," PP. !,5-112. 
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was expanding, but its regional 'final1cial role remained limited .. 
Telecommunications were improving, but Macau was no where near the regional 
transportation!, commun:ication~3 and f.,t~dia centre Hong Kong had becom~ .. 
Although there was significant Hong Kong capital in Macau, most other 
outside investors ~'ere deterred ~.Y r1acau's weak in'frastructure and 
comm~nications isolation .. 6 Even foreign firms with strong PRC activities 
did not use Macau as a marketing base. 7 The enclave was not a significant 
t"'e-export point for Chinese goods dl~stined for overseas marl<ets .. 8 
Nor was Macau extensively involv~d in international governmental 
activity,. Its limited social and eec'nomic development--the latter f09.~sing 
on lo~~e r-.technology light manuf act u i~i ng-·-·unde rdeve loped pol i tiea 1 
pluralism, tiny size and political dependence on China and Portugal 
restricted its membersllip in intern.::rtional orqanisations and adherence to 
6. R. Fei tor, "trJacau 's Modern Economy," in Cn::'1ner, Mac.a!.J., p. 140, 148. 
7. A 1984 survey of 100 members of the American Chamber o 'f Commerce in Hong Kong, all 
heavily involve-d in the China trade, found h :-wer than one in three had ever made a sale to 
China through Macau and only six had had dealings with PRC firms based in Macau. Only eleven 
had made pUrchases from or through Macau (Kamrn, "t-Iacau's Economic Role in the West River 
De 1 ta," in Cremer, Mac.av.. , p. 180). 
8. Ibid., Pp. 174-175; By cOl ... trast, at the:' time of the Sino-Bri tish Joint Declaration, 
Hong Kong was already a recognised international economic entity. It was an important 
regional financial and service centre, a major foreign exchange market, a media centre 
serving southeast Asia, a regional and interna·tional air ·transport hub and one of the world '~, 
busiest container pc1rts with an important shi pping registry. large numbers of financial 
blJsinesses and international companies had cl presence in Hong Kong including about 1,000 
Japanese enterprise~ and 800 U.S. corporations, twenty U.S. banks, thirty-six deposi ·t-taking 
companies, thirty-one wholly U.S.-owned insl.J!'ance companies and branches of many U.S. law 
firms (Mineo Nakajima, "The Hong Kong Agreement and its Impact on the Internat.ional Position 
of Japan," in Jurgen Domes and Yu-ming Sha\loJ, ads., HQng .... KQng.: .. ~.A .... C.bine$.~~ ... ,md .... .Io~r.nat..iQO.a.l 
c.QOc.~r.n [Boulder, Colo.: Westvie'W, 1988J, p. 201; Jan S. Prybyla, "The HC1ng Kong Agreement 
and its Impact on the World Economy," in ibid., p. 171; Hungdah Chiu, "The . Hong Kong 
Agreement and U.S. Foreign Policy," in ibid, pp. 185-186). 
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international agreements. 9 Macau's links with Portugal, a country which 
itself has not been active in international organisations until recently, 
probably contributed to the enclave\~j own limited external participation. 10 
In 1980, Macau was a party to only four international agreements. Three 
were textile export quota agreements with Finland and tll(~ European Economic 
Community dating from the late 19703 and the other a multilateral World 
Health Organisation Sanitation Regulation agreement dating 'from 1951. 11 
Furthermore, in 1984 Macau had only one representative office abroad, 
located in Lisbon.12 Diplomats accr8dited in Macau were all based in Hong 
Kong, a situation which persists. 
Internationalising Macau: 
The Portuguese and Macau Government Views 
Particularly since the signirig of the Joint Declaration, the Portuguese 
and Macau governments have recognised the importance of internationalising 
9. "Pluralistic ideology and a high degj-ee of technological and economic development" 
characterise societies highly involved in international organisations (Gerald Chan, Ch.i.n~,._gno, 
1n.1i.~.r..natj.QOa.l'M.O.r.9,mi.$.~:t.i.o.o$.,; __ .ear.:tj,~ip.a:ti.QO. ... ,j,n,, .. NQQ::::Yo.y.~r.nr.oo:nt.al".,Qr.ganj,~a:tj,QO$. .... S.,i,nc.~ ..... l,2:Z1 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969J, p. 157; Kjell Skjelsbaek, "The Growth of 
International Nongovernmental Organization in the TWE't'ltieth Century," in Robert o. Keohane 
and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Ir.~$.o~t..io.nal ... R~la.t.i..QO.~ .... ao,d ... , WOJ~.ld .... .P.Qli.:t.iC,$. [Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard university Press, 1972J, p. 83). 
10. Even though it was a foUnding member of NATO in 1949, an OECD country and a member of 
the UN since 1955, Po'rtugal has not traditiona.lly taken an active role in these 
organisations. It was not until democratic government was established after the 1974 
revolution that Portugal's visibil i ty in int,?rnational organisations grew, culminating in 
membet'ship in the Council of Europe in 1976, aterrn as a nonpermanent member of the UN 
Securi ty Council and membership in the Europec:\i') Community in 1986 (Fet'reira, ~Qr.t.ygal, p. 
91). ' 
11. Peter H. Rohn, ed., Wo.r.ld ..... I.r.~a:ty. .... 1.n~J~~ J vol. 4, 2d ed. ( Santa Bar ba r a: ABC-Cl i 0, 
1983); By contrast, Hong Kong was pal'ty t.:) fOUl'teen agreements including seven bi lateral 
/textile quota accords, a water supply agreement with China and multilateral agreements on 
arbitration, radio and telegraph regulations, international refugee status, broadcasting and 
sanitation as well as the agreement establishing "the Asian DevE·lopment Bank (ibid.). 
12. In 1984, Hong Kong had nine government economic and trade offices and ot.het' official 
representati ves abroad, as well as twenty Hong Kong Trade Deve lopmerrt Counci 1 and sixteen 
Hong Kong Touri3t Association offices. SiX'ty-nine countries had diplomatic I'epresentatives in 
Hong Kong, including thirty-four consulates ' ,'md eight commissioner's offices for' Sri tish 
Comrnonweal th countr ies (Hong Kong Governmcn t, H009 .... Koo9 .... 19.S.:s. [Hong Kong: Government 
In formation Services, 1965 J , pp. 305··307). 
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Hacau .. They see it as a key means o'f establishing Macau's administrative, 
economic and financial autonomy, ma i rltaining Portuguese as an official 
language after 1999 and securing the 'future of a Portuguese-style j~dicial 
system in the SAR.13 The government~ have begun expanding Macau's 
membership and participation in int81"national organisations. The enclave 
has opened a new office in Brussels and expanded its office ill Lisbon and 
has moved to attract foreign inves tluent and enhance Macau's external 
cultural, economic, educational and sporting links before the transfer to 
China in 1999. 14 
The push to build external link~) to support Macau's future politic:§l 
autonomy is r~inforced by the enclave's need for injections of foreign 
capital and high technology to diver'sify and expand its economy .. As a 
small, open economy heavily dependent on -foreign trade, Hacau '$ economic 
health depends on the decisions of the international organisations that 
regulate commercial and economic matters. Its participation in these 
organisations has become increasingly necessary for its economic survival. 
Cultural, social and educational ties abroad also bring much needed 
resources and technical and professional expertise for Macau's development 
e-fforts while providing a source of potential external effectiveness. 
Government officials and other political leaders argue that, if 
established be-fore 1999 and extended under the SAR government, this di verse 
gamut of external links has the potential to $trengthen Macau's internal 
13. "Discut'so do Govet'nador de apresentacao da proposta de lei de au"torizacao das recei tas 
e despesas pat' a 1968," in Govet'no de MacalJ, b.inba~.".d.~" .. Ac.~aQ, .. ,GQv.~r..nat.i.v.a,.J?lanQ",.d.e. 
lnY..~t.j.rooot.Q$., 1968 (Macau: Irnpresa Oficial d(C' Macau, 1988), n.p. 
14. See gener all y Annex 1 in l..i.nh';\~" .. Q.~."Bc.(;'~\!;;L.GQV.~r..n~:t.iv.a. 1988, 1989, 1990; .. Gove,'nador foi 
let' discurso na A. L." J..M, 28 Apr. 1990. 
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autonomy.IS Pot"'tuguese President Morio Soares has said it will be 
impossible to preserve Macau's cultural and historic legacy or the presence 
of Por'tugsl in the Orient :if the el 1,' :.1 ave does not establish itself 
internationally and regionally by 1 '/99 .. 16 According to ,Jorge Rangel, 
"Because Macau is small, if we rely only on ourselves and China, in due 
course China '$ influence will beCOHk~ stronger and stronger until we are in 
trouble.. That is l\lhy we need outsid,;! nurturing .. " 17 
The Joint Declaration as External Support 
Just as international agreements have provided external effectivef1~ss to 
autonomous te~ritories such as Sout:l Tyrol and Aland, the Sino-Portuguese 
Joint Declarations is a pot'~ntial ::':hJurce o'f outside backing for Macau .18 
However, its strength is l~mited by the willingness and ability of Portugal 
or other interested countries or in::Lividuals to compel China to comply with 
the agreement. There are weaknesses inherent in the terms of the agreement 
as well. Like many autonomy agreements, the Joint Declaration leaves many 
issues unresolved .. The technique of using declarations on both sides was a 
means to mask disagreements over fundamental matters like nationality and 
the parametres Qf China's autonomy commitments, leaving ambiguities that 
make its terms difficult to enforce. 19 One scholar asserts that the 
substance O'f the Joint Declaration un Hong Kong is at the disposal of China 
15. "Melancia sublinha papel rnodl2?rador d..;) Portugal," J.M, 11 June 1990. 
16. Ibid. 
1.7. Interview, Rangel. 
16. See pp. 54, 56-59 of the pre9l?nt study .. 
19. Geor9 Res9, "The Hong Kong Agreemerrt~ .J.nd its Impact on International Law," in Domes 
and Shaw, I:iQ09 .... KQO.g~ pp. 133-136. 
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alone and it is very doubt-ful the Uni ted Kingdom could demand restoration 
oof its sovereignty if th(3 PRC does not ful-fil its obligations .. 20 I n the 
case of Macau.; Portugal '5 ability t.u demand restor'ation of its 
administration in case of a breech "yF the agreement by China lIJould be even 
more shaky given it has already acc8pted Chinese sovereignty over Macau. To 
make -matters worse, the Joint Oecl~:li : .]tion is full o-f vague and ambiguously 
worded articles, leaving room for China to claim it is keeping to the 
literal terms of the agreement whilD violating its spirit or intent from 
Portugal's view .. 21 Therefore~ finding multiple alternative sources of 
intern,::rtional support seems critic;J.J. for building conofidence in Macau's 
.• : "::- ,. 
autonomy proc~ss. 
Furthermore, the Sino·~Portugues() accord makes virtually no provisions 
for a bilateral observatory commis~3.ii)n that might help settle disputes over 
interpretation and ensure Macau maillt3ins its autonomous status for fifty 
years .. The main job of the Joint Li .. r i.son Group is "to ensure e 'ffective 
implementation of the Joint Declaration ..... and create appropriate 
conditions for the trans'fer of gover·nment .. "22 However, its ability to 
ensure China complies with the accotd is virtually nil given that the Joint 
Liaison Group will cease to exist Ofl 1 January 2000, only eleven days after 
20. Ibid., pP. 136-136. 
21. Ibid., p. 141. 
22 • f1a~a!,L..J.Q , Annex I I • 
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the transfer of administration to China. 23 Nor is there provision for 
third-party adjudication of disputes over implementation of its terms. 24 
Given China's resistance to such outside involvement and its r~jection 
of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Portugal should 
at the very least seek PRC agreement for extending the life of the Joint 
Liaison Group beyond 1 January 2000. 25 However, in order to agree to such a 
commitment, China would first have to overcome the idea that this would be 
an intrusion on its sovereignty. By registering the Joint Declarations on 
both Hong Kong and Macau with the UN, the Bejing government has already 
made an important symbolic gesture, the fir~t step that would allow;~ritain 
or Por'tugal to invo/-<e trle ag reements be'fore any UN organ. 26 China would 
gain considerable applause by also agreeing immediately to extend the 
mandate of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison Group. By showing its 
willingness to go beyond the terms of the original agreement, it would 
increase its international prestige, improve the confidence of Macau · people 
in the Joint Declaration and win points with Taiwan. In addition, Ress 
argues that extension of the Joint Liaison Group is needed to secure Hong 
Kong's position relative to some strategic international organisations and 
agreements, an argument equally valid for Macau. Such a move would 
forestall requests from third countries, or international organisations in 
23. Ibid., Annex 11(1)(4); The Sino-British Joint Liaison Group v/ill operate until the 
same date, tl.lJO and one-hal f years af·ter $overeignty OV~~I'" Hong Kong is transferred on 1 July 
1997 (tloOSI..../:I;009 .... J.R, Anne>< II(8J). 
24. Hungdah Chiu, "The 1984 Sino-BI~ itish Agreement · on Hc.ng Kong and it~:; Implications on 
China's Un i fication," 1§$.!.J.~$. .... ~O!;J ..... S.:t~!J9 .. i.~:$. 21, no. 4 (1985): 15. 
25. Ress, "The Hong Kong Agreement," p. 141; f-\6'SS roal<es a similar argt./rnent regarding Hong 
Kong (ibid.). 
26.A. Leroy Bennett, l.o:t.~r.n?.t..ion~1 .... Qr9!5niz.!;.tt..ion$, 4th ed. (Engle,wood eli ffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall International, 1988), p. 57. 
which membership of the SARs is expedient for China, that oversight 
procedures be set up to ensure the SARs fulfil their international 
bl · t· 27 o ~ 19a 1.ons" .. 
China could also gain by agreeing to third-party adjudication of 
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disputes over implementation of the Joint Declaration, perhaps through the 
International Cour't of Justice" Portugal '$ desire to maintain good 
. relations with China would prevent it from going to the court except when 
all political and diplomatic channels were exhausted. If a dispute actually 
reached the court, previous cases suggest it might be decided in China's 
favour. The judges sided with the central government in the Interpretation 
.. ":- .-
of the Statute of the Memel Territory and the Lighthouses in Crete and 
Samos cases, both conflicts involving autonomous territories and 
~djudicated by the Permanent Court of International Justice. According to 
one scholar, this indicates: 
An autonomy arrangement may divest the central government of a State 
of most of its powers in the autonomous region, but sovereignty as 
such is not affected. Sovereignty may be purely nominal, nevertheless 
its violation will be regarded as a breach of international law. The 
autonomous region continues to form an integral part of the territory 
of the local State .. 28 
At some future date these rulings might be overridden by new legal norms 
recognising a right to autonomy, which some scholars claim are emerging. 29 
However, since the inclination of the court would likely never be put to 
the test anyway, the real benefit of third-party adjudication would be its 
ability ·to fortify local and international confidence in the Joint 
Declaration .. 
27. Ress, "The Hong Kong Agreement," p. 141.. 
28. Dinstein, "Autonomy," pp. 296-299 . . 
29. Hannl.uo, B!J.t.Qo'Q(OY, pp. 473-474. 
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The Portuguese Connection 
Th~ ability of Macau's colonial links with Portugal to provide channels 
of external effectiveness after 1999 also depend on Portugal's foreign 
policy priorities and its future cultural dnd economic :ties ~~ith the 
enclave. Since its entry into the European Community in 1986 and the 
signing of the Joint Declaration the next year, there have been signs of 
Portugal's belated awakening to the economic potential of relations with 
East Asia and Macau's importance as a strategic jumping off point f9 r 
building those connections. The Macau and Portuguese governments have 
increased their efforts in Macau and throughout the region to promote 
Portuguese cuiture and Portugal's investment and trade potential. 
Nevertheless, the history of Portuguese foreign relations suggests Macau is 
unlikely to shoot to the top of Lisbon's priority list in future. 
Macau and East Asia have been on the fringes of Portuguese external 
economic and political concerns virtually since the mid-seventeenth 
century. For most of the twentieth century, Portugal's eyes instead have 
been firmly fixed on Western Europe, Africa and the United States, the 
sources of lucrative remittances from Portuguese emigrants, of most trade 
and investment capital and, until decolonisation, of most colonial profits 
and raw materials. 30 Far away in south China, Macau has been of little 
importance .. It absorbed compar'atively insignificant. amounts of exports and 
excess Portuguese population. It provided little in the way of raw 
30. Antonio de Figueiredo, "Pot'tugal and Africa," in Kenne'th l'1axwell, ed., P.Q.r,:t.~Ig~l", . .in""t.b~ 
19.e.Q~.; ..... D.il.~r.or.o9..$. .... Q.f.."D.~:mQQr.?.t..i.Q .. "C.Qn$.Ql.iQ.~:t..i.Qn ( Westport ) Conn.: Gr een~"ood Press, 1986), Pp. 90 , 
95-96, 98-99; Rainer Eisfeld, "Por·tugal and Wes·tern Europe," in ibid. P. 41, 43; "lJnlH<e the 
leading industrial nations, the Pt~ojection c)f Portugal's int6'rests abroad is no·t based upon 
capi tal investments, strategic calculations, Ot' technology ,3,scendency but upon the density of 
Portuguese emigration and volume of exports ..•. The ex-tent of thE' Portuguese \diaspora,' 
ltJhich does not coincide with the geographical scope of the histol'ical period of overseas 
E!xpansion, can be grasped by bearing in mind that one ou·t CIf every three POI'tuguese lives 
abroad .•.• Remittances, savings, and ·tourism from emigrants at'e still one of Portugal's two 
biggest single sources of foreign currency, the other being foreign tourists" (Figueiredo, 
"Portugal and Africa," p. 95). 
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matet"ials, pr'ofits or remittances" Nor Ilas Asia as a whole b(~en 
important. 31 In 1973, trade with all of {)sia accounted for less than 5 
percent of the value of Portugal's global two-way trade, while it~ 
transactions ~~ith Western Europe made up about 62 percent .. Western Europe's 
share had climbed to 77 percent by 1988, while trade with Asia had 
incre.ased only mat"ginal1y to about 6 percent .. A Portuguese journalist 
commented in 1986: I1 Although once a pO~le rful force in the Fa r East, 
Portugal today has few experts who know Asia well, not to mention 
distinguished China hands. In Portuguese diplomacy, Asia is far away and 
-forgotten .. 11 32 
Four major events of the 1980s have encouraged Portuguese foreign policy 
makers and business people to take a fresh look at Asia and Macau~ the 
emergence of the capital-rich East Asian newly industrialised countries 
(NICs), China's open door policy, Portugal's membership in the EC and the 
Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration .. The Portuguese and Macau governments 
have begun trying to revitalise Portugal's trade links with Macau, China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan with the aim of securing new export markets, 
sources of tourism revenue and foreign investment. Their policies promote 
Macau, and its own growing commercial ties in the region, as a unique 
Portuguese-language service centre and advantageous window-an-Asia for 
Portuguese businesses trying to expand into China and other parts of the 
region. At the same time, they market the attractiveness of Portugal's low-
cost labour to East Asian investors loo~<ing for tariff-free access after 
31. Ferreira, eQ~tugal, pp. 101-103. 
32. Goncalo Cesar de Sa, "Lisbon's obligation to Macau's future," f.EJ~R, 8 May 1986, pp. 
40-41. 
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1992 to the EC's ,more than 320 million consumersM 33 Former Governor 
Melancia spoke of Macau as China's special European link: 
As a part of the EC and the country responsible for the , 
administration of Macau until 1999, ' Portugal can ~t this time once 
again fulfil the role of a hinge, proving that in the long term, 
Macau's future depends not only on it~ administration launching the 
terr'itory among the new tigers of Asia M M M M but also on the presence 
of Portugal in the nellJ Europe ~ 34 
In addition, Lisbon aims to get immediate benefits from its last years In 
MacauM During the Sino-Portuguese talks, then Adjunct Secretary Carlos 
Monjardino spoke openly of a gentlemen's agreement on commercial matters, 
revealing that Macau would be useful to Portugal's future activities in 
China, but not indispensable: 
We want an agreement with China for certain projects, such ~s 
engineering, road and bridge building, things which we are 
exceptionally good atM We also want to keep commercial links with 
China so that we can sell our products and services. MM M We want to 
build up the infrastructure here so that we can use Macau for these 
links when we are gone. But if Macau cannot do it, we will deal 
directly with ChinaMM .. We want to be assured that Portuguese will 
continue to be an official language here after we are gone. We also 
intend to provide financial help to Macau on cultural and social 
projects after our 'departure. 35 
The benefits are arguably not all one sided. In 1987, the Macau government 
and the Portuguese news service Lusa entered into an agreement enabling 
both Portugal and Macau to expand their information links with Asia M The 
Macau government pays part o'f Lusa's costs in operating news bureaux In 
Macau, Hong Kong, 8eijing, Taipei and Tokyo M In exchange, Lusa, which is 
33. Fer rei ra, PQr..t.Y9£.l., p. 61. 
34. Speech by former Governor CarIos t'leIancia, Jvlac~u, 28 Feb. 1989 ,(my transl~\tion), 
printed in Governo de Ma-cau, M~.~9..!J .. ;, ..... !..~r.o .... Q~$.~.f:i.Q .... N9.,~.iQne.l . ~ .. ... Y..i~.i.t.~ .... ~ .. ..r:1g,~~!J ..... d.~ .. ..s.Y?. .... f:~~~l~n~i.~ .... r~ 
r:r..~_$.i~;~l.~nt.~_ .. ~.f:? .... B~p'y.b.l.i~ .... Qr..~ ..... I:1?..r..i.Q .... ~~Q~r..~~~ .. _.~~i$.G.!J .. r..~Q$. .... ~ .... I:1~:n;$.9.t9~n~ (Macau, 1989); T h~' po 1 icy has 
been ar 'ticulated in other speeches by Por·tuguesl? and l'1aeau officials. See, for example, the 
speech by Portl..~9Ue$e Pre·sident Mario Soares in the same publication and the repor·t on a 
remarks by Portugues)? Education t1inister Robert Carnl?iro in "Ministro Roberto Carneiro: Ma-eau 
t.ern pape 1 importante na re-giao" (Lusa, 29 Se-pt. 1988). 
3S. Em,i 1 y Lau, "Rush to progress," f./;;.EB, 2.5 Sep·t. 1986, pp. 46-47 ~ 
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partly owned by the Portuguese government, provides its wire services free 
of charge in both Chinese and Portuguese to Macau print and electronic news 
rooms .. 36 
Promoting Portuguese culture and language is an important component of 
these efforts, as it 15 in most Portuguese foreign policy initiatives .. 
Particularly when it involves countries that use Portuguese as an official 
language, this cultural diplomacy is a way for a small country like 
Portugal to expand its foreign resources and strengthen the position of the 
Portuguese language in international "Forums and organisations .. 37 The 
Portuguese and Macau governments aim to bolster the numbers of Portyguese 
speakers in the Asia Pacific and in Macau, promote Portuguese literature, 
art, history and other aspects of culture and strengthen ties with 
communities of Macau people abroad. 38 Enshrining guarantees for Portuguese 
language and culture in the Joint Oeclar'ation is part o"F these efforts .. 
However, it is unlikely these eleventh-hour initiatives will 
substantially halt the gradual ero:3ion o'F Macau's Portuguese speaking-
community after 1999. The Macau SAR will continue to benefit from 
Portugal's desire to enhance Portuguese culture in Asia and its support for 
the remnants of Portuguese culture in Macau. However, this alone cannot 
36. Eddie Farr, "Portugue'se ne'f.,IJS agency is ope-nE'd in Macau," 1~1I5.S., 6 Feb. 1988; Intet'vie'w, 
Paulo Ramalheira , chief corre~?pondent, Lusa Nelo'lJs Agency, t'1acaIJ, 17 Mar. 1990; "A Lusa nao 
vai desaparecer de t'1acau, nem agor a, ne'm depois de' 1999," CM, 2 Mar. 1991. 
37. Ferreira, t?Qr..t.!J.9)?.1, pp. 26-32; The foreign policy o 'F Portugal ':3 current government 
includes promotion of technical, social, scient.i fic and linguistic cooperation wi t.h and 
support for Portuguese-sps.?aking countries .3.nd territories, enhancement of cultural and 
linguistic ties with the Portuguese emigrant di<3.spora and promotion of Portuguese as an 
international language. The policy aims to project Portugal as a valuable link to its network 
of former colonie's in south America, Afric~-\ and Asia (ibid., pP. 25-26, 77-78, 82, 85-86). 
38. See gener all y Annex I of .l...i.bn~~ .... g.~~ .... f.)CC9..Q ... . QQy.~r.n~:t:.i.y.~ 1988, 1989, 1990; "Centl"() 
cu 1 tu r al a br i u E'm · Seu 1 ," J..t1, 26 N ov • 1990. 
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ensure Portugal remalns vigilant about Chin~'s adherence to the Joint 
Decla t"'ation" 
The prognosis for gaining external effectiveness through ongo~ng 
economic links with Portugal is not much more encouraging" Former Governor 
Melancia frequently argued that Portuguese culture and other links will not 
survive unless there is a strong Portuguese business presence in the 
enclave beyond 1999. 39 Although there has been some limited success in 
attracting Portuguese businesses in recent years, long-term commercial 
interest remains limited. 40 Portuguese banks are active in import and 
export as well as infrastructure financing. 41 Construction and rela~~d 
companies are participating in short to medium-term infrastructure and 
other public building projects. 42 The 1990 purchase of 45 percent of the 
local electric utility, Companhia Electrididade do Macau, by a group of 
Portuguese public and private sector companies is a notable exception that 
drew praise as a demonstration of Portuguese confidence in Macau's 
future. 43 A bright spot in attempts to build Portugal-Macau business links 
was the announcement in 1989 that some Macau business interests, largely 
from the local Chinese community, planned to invest in a joint-venture 
39. "Melancia quer mobiliza/; agE'ntE'S €'conomicos," J.t.1, 18 "1ar. 1990; "Melancia sublinha 
pape 1 moder ador de Portugal," J.t1, 11 June 1990. 
40. Int€'rvielr/, Maria Louisa de t~ello Braganca Jalles, department chief, Studies Cabinet, 
Economic Services Managemen't, Governmen't of Macau, 7 Feb. 1991. 
41. "GCM vai instalar-se em Portugal ate ao final de 1989," C1~1, 16 June 1989. 
42. "Gabinete Cinco: Complexo Oesportiv() da Taipa" (Lus,~, 20 Jan. 1989). 
43. "Grupo PortUgUE;'s aS$urnie posicao na CEM)" Jtl, 7 Dec. 1990; Other exceptions include 
pla.ns by part of the Portuguese businr?SS conglom~~rate, In'terfin\~, to open an office in Macau 
to expand its activities in the territory, ~\Jhich already include a construction company and 
v,Jeek1y newspaper. There has also been talk of Portuguese participation in Macau's first risk-
capital society ("Grupo lnt~-rfina vai-se instalando," J,~, 23 Fe-b. 1990; "Treze empresas 
Portuguesas na primeira s()cieda.de de capital dl,? risc() a actuar em Macau" [Lusa, 20 July 
1990J) • 
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parquet and wood panelling factory in Portugal that would export to Western 
Europe. However, two-way trade between Portugal and Macau remains tiny, 
earning only US$14.2 million in 1988, partly because both economi~s depend 
on textiles and clothing for a major chunk of their exp~rts.44 Unless 
Portugal's economic position in Europe were seriously disrupted, Portuguese 
business people 's pn~occupation \frith Europe and their general disinterest 
and difficulties in doing business in Asia will prevent them from investing 
in Macau or China in significant numbers before 1999. 45 
On the other side, Portugal's success in making itself economically 
useful to Cllina, particularly through its EC membership, could bol~Jer its 
influence with Beijing on questions relating to Macau beyond 1999. 46 This 
depends to a large degree on the PRC's assessment of the value of its EC 
connections ove raIl. China has t radi tionally supported development o'f the 
EC trading bloc as a balance to the strength of the superpowers and an 
alternative source of technology, investment and trade. However, while its 
commercial contact with the EC is increasing, it remains underdeveloped 
compared to its economic .relations with Japan, the United States and Hong 
Kong. The latter three command larger roles in total trade, joint equity 
ventures, technology transfer agreements and credit supply than Western 
European countries. 47 Nevertheless, over the long term, problems such as 
44. "Grupo de Macau investl? em Portugal," J..M, 14 Dec. 1989. 
45. "China: mercado po·tential para comercio Portugu€'s," J.I:1, 18 Aug. 1990; "MNE a postos 
para 0 dialogo," J..I1, 20 Feb. 1991; Fel"reira, p.~u~.:t.!,~.9a.l, PP. 102-103; Interview, Jalles. 
46. Ferreira, EQ~tu9al, p. 101. 
47. Harish Kapur, C.b.i.n"' .... ?.nQ ..... tb~ .... f!J.r.Q.P.~~n .. J;;QQnQrn.i(,; .... c.Qmr.o~Ani:t.y..; ..... IbG. ... Nf;;:w .... CQnn~:c.:t.iQn 
(Oordrecht: IvJartinus Nijhof"f Publishers, 1986), PP. 76-82, 93-95; Davis B. Bobrow, '~ The 
Continuing Challenge: E;alancing Autonol"ny and Irrterdependence, t. l~$.U~$. .... ~nQ ..... S:t.~LQ . .i~$. 25, no.4 
(Apr. 1989): 44-47; Long·-·term trade growth is hampered by the comparatively high cost of EC 
products of interest to China, EC protectionis·t barriers, Concorn (Comrni t·tee for Mul tilateral 
Export Control) restrictions on the sale o ·f potenti.3.lly s ·trategic technology, better export 
prospects for Soviet technology now. that. Sino-Soviet relatic'ils have improved and European 
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its battle to retain most.~-favoured~-nation trading status lAJith the United 
States could encourage China to significantly expand its political and 
economic relations lAJith Western Europe. Portugal could prove an e,conomical 
and politically harmonious entry point for some Chinese trade and 
investment ventures. 48 
'The links are small so far. Moves to t~~in the Portuguese city of Setubal 
with Zhuhai, the PRC special economic zone neighbouring Macau, are a small 
step in this direction. A lhuhai company plans to export semifinished 
clothing to ' Setubal, where they will be finished and exported into EC 
countries duty free. 49 The Portuguese company Incerpor is opening a: 
. -"::- #-
disposable syringe factory in Zl1ul1ai, the only Portuguese direct investment 
in China, and some large Portuguese companies export to and carry on other 
business in the PRC .. SO Two-~~ay t r'ade between China and Portugal remains a 
miniscule portion of either country's global external trade despite its 
increase 'since diplomatic relations began in 1979. 51 
Overall, Portuguese authorities have had little success convincing their 
compatriots that their economic future lies not only across ' the Pyrenees 
Mountains in Europe, but also across the oceans their trading ancestors 
sailed to the rich markets of the Far East. Portugal's economic and 
cultural presence in Macau and China are unlikely to provide more than 
support for trade and other sanc'tions 'following the 1969 8eijing democracy deroons'trations 
(i bid. ). 
48. Susumu A ..... Janohara, "Falling from Favour," E.fx.~B, 2 May 1991, p. 10-11. 
49. "Pequiro quer g~~roear Zhuha.i and Setubal," J,M, 19 tvtar. 1990. 
50. "China: mercado pote-ncial para comet"cio PortuguesE?," J.M, 18 Aug. 1990. 
51. In 1986, Portug,3.1's eXPoI'ts to Ch,ina accounted for 0.29 per cent of its total exports 
while imports from China made up 0.38 pE'r cent of its total imports ("Dez anos de I'elacoes 
comerciais Portugal/China" [Lusa, 19 Mar. 1989]). 
19.1. 
minimal e)<te rnal support for the encla ve' s autonomy aofte r '1999. Portugal's 
participation in the EC and relationship with its former colonies in Africa 
could prove·.more useful to Macau .. Almost t\IJO year::> aofter the EC i ,mposed 
diplomatic and economic sanction against China because of the military 
. suppreSS10n of the 1989 student democracy movement, Portugal was the first 
stop. on PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen '$ 1991 European visit .. It, was the 
first SUCll trip by a Chinese official since the Beij ing massacre .. 
Portuguese officials attributed the gesture to China's desire to 
reestablish a dialogue with the EC at a time when Portugal's imminent 
participation in the EC leadership tr'oika put Lisbon in a particul~l,.rlY 
influential position. They said China also wants to use its links to 
Portugal as a channel to southern Africa, where Portugal has been active in 
peace negotiations to end the wars in Mozambique and Angola. 52 
Some Portuguese believe their country's international prestige is at 
stake in Macau, its first and last opportunity to depart a colony without 
bloodshed. 53 However, it is uncertain whether Portugal's desire to avoid 
another embarrassing decolonisation prbcess will result , in tragic 
compromises with China or use of whatever limited means Lisbon has at its 
disposal to support Macau)s autonomy. In 1989, the Portuguese government 
demonstrated its reluctance to jeopardise its tenuous position in Macau by 
criticising China too loudly when Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva 
refused to have Macau mentioned in an EC declaration condemning China for 
the Beijing massacre. The declaration noted the anxiety the PLA crackdown 
52. "MNE a postO:3 pat'3, 0 dialogo,." J.I:1, 20 Feb. 1991 
53. Goncalo Cesar de Sat "Lisbon's obligation ·to Macau's future," .f..E.ER, 8 Mc3.Y 1986, pp. 
40-41. 
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had caused in Hon£l Kong M 54· Since the Joint Declaration itself provides no 
institutionalised means fot" resol ving post.-.1999 disputes ove r 
implementation of the Joint Declaration, Portugal will be forced ,to depend 
on diplomacy, perhaps backed by othel-~ interl=sted states or international 
organisations. such efforts run the risk of offending China because of its 
leaders' tendency . to see such actions as -foreign inter'ference in what they 
consider their internal affairsM 55 
International Organisations 
The absence of reliable Portuguese leverage over China a-fter 1999 means 
.. -::- .-
other channels of external effectiveness will be important M Among -these are 
Macau's participation in international organisations of both an 
intergovernmental (IGO) and nongovernmental (INGO) nature. 56 While 
international organisations were once the domain of a small group of 
.54. Ds'spite the unprecedented public demonstrations in Macau, Cavaco Silva argued that 
Macau was not in same position as Hong Kong because it had a semidemocratic legislature and 
the PortUgUE'Se national i ty law created a cl imate of con fidence and s -tabi 1 i ty ("Macau ls'ft off 
EC d ec 1 a r at i on ," H.K.S., 29 J un e 1989). 
55. Hlmgdah Chiu has made similar arguments about ·the limited ability of U.S. policymakers 
to pressure Beijing authorities -to keep their side of -the Join t Declaration (Hungdah Chiu, 
"The Hong Kong Agreement," p. 191). 
56. 1 divide international organisations into intE'rgove'rnme'ntal organisations (IGOs) and 
international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) according to definitions used in the 
Y.~~.r .. b~~~Q_k .... o..f. .. _.lnt.~r.n~t..i.o.n~1 .... Q.r..9~n_i$.~t..i.Qn$. and by Gel'ald Chan, with a fe~\J minor addi tions. 
Accordingly, rGOs are those international organisations which are "based on a formal 
instrument of agreement betlNe-en the governmen-ts of nation stat€'s," include "three or more 
nation states as par-ties to the agreement" and POSSI?SS "a permanent secretariat performing 
ongoing tasJ<s" (Union of International Associations, E'd., Y.~?_r.._b.QQ_k_ ._.Q.f. ... lnt.~:.r..n,;\t.iQn~.l. 
Qr.g?.ni$.~:tiQn$., 1990/91, vol. 1, 27th ed. [Munich, N6'l~ York, London and Paris: K.G. Saur, 
1990J, p. 1642 [hereafter YIQ 1990/91J); Some IGOs also c:ount the governments of nonsta-te' 
territorial communities among their membJ?rs, som~?-times under some form o ·f associate 
membership which restricts their rights and obligations. INGOs "share most of the 
characteristics of intergovernmental cwganisa;tions except tha-t they are no-t formed by 
intergovernmental .agreement, nor are their members nation states. They include organisations 
which accept members designated by government authorities, provided that such membership does 
not interfere with the free expression of vi(~l.\J$ of the .organisations," thus serving "as 
mechanisms for co~operation among ~private' citizens and 'private' na-tional groups in 
international affairs, especially in the economic sc'cial, cuI tural , humanitarian, and 
technical fields" (Chan, C.hi.n~ _ ... Qlnd_ .... ln:t.~.?r.n~:t.iQn~l_ .. _Qr.g,mi$.~ :~iQn$., p. 6); In addition to 
allowing govet'nmental rE'presentatives to participate in thait' activi-ties, some INGOs have 
·advisory status in IGOs or other INGOs. 
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Western states, nowadays they are increasingly inclusive, with 
participation from both non-Western states and nonstate actors. Within the 
latter cate.gory are representatives o-F nonstate territorial communities .. 57 
Macau can take advantage of these changing membership and participation 
patterns, which are re-Flected in the Joint Declaration's provisions for 
participation in international organisations by the SAR. However, it can 
expect to encounter some hazards in making this particular avenue of 
external support effective. 
Intergovernmental Organisations 
A-Fte r Macau' s yea rs o'f nea r inacti vity in the international field, 
Portuguese authorities are working to get China's agreement through the 
Joint Liaison Group for Macau's current and post-1999 membership in several 
IGOsand have indicated a desire to participate more actively in those in 
which Macau is already an observer or member. 58 They have already secured 
Macau's current and post-1999 participation in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Maritime Organisation, World 
Tourism Organisation, Olympic Council of Asia and the UN Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), all organisations in 
which Hong Kong already has membership and PRC agreement for continued 
57. Bennett, l.nt.~r.np...t..iQn~.l .... Qr.gp..n.i.$.~:!;j,.QO$., p. .5 ,. 
58. See generally "Discurso do Governador de aprese'ntacao da proposta de lei de 
autorizacao das recei tas e daspesas para 1988," and Annex I in .6inha-$. .... d.Q .... BG.c.~Q .... GQy.~r.n~t.iy..;t. 
1988, 1989, 1990; "Reuniao . lnternacional de Radio e Televisac),' (Lusa, 6 Apr. 1986); P,~iot' to 
these initiatives Macau was a member, associate f(lI?mber I::W sub-bl .. weau of seven IGOs including 
the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau, Asian~Pacific Postal Training Centre, 
International Criminal Police Organisation-Interpol, Latin Amet~ican Information Centre on 
Migration, World Health Organisation (WHO) Regional Office fot' the We'ste'rn Paci fie, WHO 
Western Paci fie Regiona.l Office for th~? Promotion of Environmental Planning and Appl ied 
studies and the ft.Jorld Tourism Or9anisati~n (1:1Q 1990/91, 2: 765-766). 
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participation after 1997. 59 Again following Hong Kong's lead, the 
Portuguese also want to get China's approval on Macau's current and/or 
post-'1999 membership in, among othet~s, the Asian Productivity Org,anisation, 
the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, the International Olympic Committee and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADS), as well as other communications, culture, 
education and labour and product standards organisations. 60 The government 
is reportedly also seeking PRC approval in the Joint Liaison Group for 
member'ship in UNESCO (the United Nation:3 Educational , Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation), partly in connection with a bid to have the enclave 
listed as a protected ' place of world heritage. 61 
Other types of institutionalised connections with IGOs offer potential 
ongoing channels of external effectiveness for the SAR. The Macau 
government has hosted international conferences on technical subjects such 
as statistics and broadcasting, in some cases under the auspices of 
international organisations in which it is not a member. 62 The setting up 
of a UN University software centre in Macau will bring a permanent UN-
linked international presence to the enclave in a fonn China supports. 63 
Macau officials hope to make the centre a focus for international research 
.59. "Comunicado da reuniao do grupo de 1 igacao , .. J.'/1, 22 Sept. 1990; Harald Br-uning, "Macau 
accepted as GATT member," tJ.K$., 13 Jan. 1991; "Macau in UN 91'OUP," H.K$., 2 Apr. 1991; In the 
1980s, Indonesia blocke-d Macau's atternp'ts to join ESCAP because of its ongoing dispute with 
Port.ugal over the s ·tatU$ of Ea-s't Timot' (Interviel"", Ana Soares, advisor, Cabinet for 
Transition Affairs, Macau Government, 7 Feb. 1991). 
60. "Reuniao ja deu resultados praticos," J.r?:1, 3 JI.~ly 1990; Interview, Soares; See 
gener all y Annex -1 of binb~$. .... Q.e. .... Bc.c.';:)'Q .... GQy.~r.r.t?.t~iy.~, 1988, 1989, 1990. 
61. "Cuellar visit marks entry to UN group," HK$., 12 Mar. 1990; Thus far Maeau has not 
e><.presse-d interest in 'joining the Asia-·Paci fic Economic Cooperation group, in which the PRC, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong are all seeking membership (CUl'ti:.:s Young, "Apec may looJ< at HK en·try, " 
HK$., 5 Mar '. 1991)~ , 
62. "Mundo de estatistica reune E-m Macau," J.t1, 17 Oct. 1990. 
63. "t'1elancia sublinha papel moderador de Portugal," ~1.M, 11 Junl~ 1990. 
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on soft~~are development and related international conferences M They are 
also discussing establishment of an international library that would act as 
a depo~3itQr.y of UN and other international documents, thereby attracting 
related confe r'ences and resea rcl1e rs 'f rom th roughout the' 'region M 64 
IGOs dealing with technical subjects such as trade, maritime transport 
or broadcasting provide some of the best potential 'For building 11acau's 
external and internal effectiveness because of the implicit constraints 
they place on China M Although these organisations are nominally within the 
control of national governments, "in practice, many technical requirements 
make it necessary for governments to operate closely within a set of rules 
",- . ' 
established under the auspices of [the] international organizationsM"65 
For instance, GATT requires contracting parties to be responsible members 
witl1 separate customs territory backed by 'full autonomy in the conduct of 
external commercial relationsM 66 Thus, if China wants Macau to remain a 
contracting party to GATT, it must allow Macau to maintain its status as a 
separate customs territory, includ1ng the authority to secure its own 
customs bordersM 67 The fact that China hopes to join GATT, but is being 
blocked by concerns about its own ability to meet the organisation's 
membership criteria, should encourage China to allow Macau enough economic 
64. Int~erview, Range 1 . 
65. Peter Cal vert, I.bG. .... fQ.r.~ign .... F.?QJ...:i.cy. .... Q.f. ... N..~!tL.~t~).:t.~$. (Br i ghton: I,Alheatshea f 8ooks, 1986), p. 
31. 
66. Re-ss, "The Hc'ng Kong Agree'ment," pp. 14S. 139. 
67. t1aintaining i ·ts customs borders has been a problem for Macau authorities. In autumn 
1990, the U.S. Trade Department threatened to revol-<E- the Macau-U.S. bilateral te'x-tile quota 
agreement, alleging kni·t\hJear from third countries wa~;:) entering the U.S. illegally from Macau 
bearing fraudulent Macau ce'rti ficates of c1rigin. The Macau governrne'nt blamed the problem on 
occasional casE'S o 'f cont,raband from China ·through t'1acau (Hal'ald 8runing, "Truce in US-Macau 
ro~"," HKS, , 29 Nov. 1990). 
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~=)utonomy t9 meet its GATT obligations. 68 Sirnila r const raints could come 
from links with Cocom (the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls) and 
the multifibre agreement, the members of which could threaten t~ merge 
Macau's textile quotas ~Ii th those o-F China should the enclave's status as a 
separate customs territory become dubious. 69 
Similarly, Macau government o'fficials argue membership in the 
International Maritime Organisation, a specialised UN agency encouraging 
intergovernmental cooperation on merchant shipping, shipping safety, 
navigation, prevention o-F sea pollution and reduction o-F shipping 
hindrances, will strengthen Macau's historically uncertain author~~y ln its 
su rrounding wate rs. This could lrnp t~ove ope ration o-F its n(~w deep-sea port 
and allow -For setting up of an international shipping registry in -Future. lO 
Other than protecting Macau's free port status, the Sino- Portuguese Joint 
Declaration contains none of the protections af-Forded Hong Kong's port and 
shipping industry in the Sino-British Joint· Declaration. 71 
Macau's membership in orgahisations of a more technical, less political 
nature in areas like economics, trade, finance, communications, tourism, 
culture, science and sports could also be a fruitful means of external 
effectiveness. Because these organisations might be less politically 
68. Byron S. J. Weng, .. Di vid~'d China and ·th~ Questicln of t1embershi p in Internati onal 
Economic Organisations," in Yun--han Ch.." ed., Ib~ .... RQ1~ .... Q.f. ... I~jJ:':/ao ..... io .... .lo:t.~.r..n~:t.iQo~l ... J~c.QOQroir.: 
Qr.ga.n.i.$.M:~.iQn;;? (Taipei: Ins·titute 'for Nat{onal Policy Hesearch Press, 1990), p. 51 (Hong Kong 
Institute of As:i.a--Paci fic Studies Reprint SeriG's, nO • . 6, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
Apr. 1991). 
69. Y.C. Jao, "Hon~J Kong's Future as a Free Market Economy," in Domes and Shaw, th:m.9 .... KQog, 
P. 223. 
70. Intel'vie(J\J, Soares. 
'71. Msi).c.~Y .... J.D. 2(8) and Anne'x I eX); I:iQn9 .... ~,r;!og .... ;J,.I), 2(6) and Annex I(VI )(VIII). 
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tl1reatening to Cl1ina, the territory's 'freedom of action could be greater .. 72 
Furthermore, their potential for building patterns of external cooperation 
between China and the SARcould lead to t1acau' s membership in m~re overtly 
political organisations. Functionalist theory calls such an effect "task 
expansion,"the idea that "the positive outcome o'F cooperation in one area 
of ~ctivities between the parties in conflict will spread to and facilitate 
cooperation in other areasN"73 Gerald Chan asserts that some "task 
expansion" has occurr'ed in China '$ participation in international 
organisations. It is the result of the PRC government learning and 
adjusting to the realities of international politics through its ~~ 
involvement in IGOs and INGOs which, in turn, have had to adapt to Chinese 
participation, particularly those organisations trying to accommodate both 
Taiwan and the PRC as members. China's admission ' in 1986 to the more 
politically contentious Asian Development Bank using ~he dual membership 
formula worked out for the less sensitive International Olympic Committee 
was the first such case o'f "task expansion" from a nongovernmental to an 
intergovernmental organisation. 74 Similarly, cooperation between China and 
Macau at the internationa.l level--thr'ough parallel memberships in certain 
organisations, Macau's participation in PRC international delegations and 
Macau's advocacy of PRC interests in organisations in which China is not a 
member--could enhance cooperation between the two governments in internal 
72. Among the UN specialised agE'ncies, more' "t6'chnically oriented organisation~~ like the 
International Maritime Orga.nisa:tion as well as ·the Universal Postal Union, World Intellectual 
Property Organisation, Inte'rnational Telecommunication Union and the ~~orld I'1eteorc..'llogical 
Organisations have been less affected by thf? poli"tical s"trains be"twe-en rich and poor nations 
that have rocked the UN syste'm in gener-al (Douglas Williams, I.h~ .... S.'p'~~Q.i151i~.~!:.1... .. B9~n!:.~.i~$. .... g,nd ... " .t:b~: 
V.ni.t.e.d ..... NQ.t..iQU$. ........ B .... S.y.$.:t1#.m. ... i.n .... c.r . .i.~.i~ [Lon d on: C . H u r st , 1987], pp. 27, 37, 196 ) . 
73. Chan, C.bin~ .... ~nQ .... lnt.e.r.n~t.i~xl~l .... Qr.g?.ni~~t..i.Qn$, pp. 8-9. 
74. Ibid., pp. 9, 154-157, 161-162. 
198 
spheres .. It could also encourage China to support 11acau's participation in 
more politically sensitive international organisations. To the extent that 
China regards Macau's international activities as less threatening than 
those of Hong Kong, mutually beneficial MacBu-China cooperation in the 
external sphere could also encourage Hong Kong-China cooper~tion. 
- However, there are some serious theoretical and practical problems with 
the task expansion argument. Distinguishing between political and 
nonpolitical organisations is not always possible in practical or political 
terms, as China's objections to Hong Kong's participation in a recent World 
Meteorological Organisation-sponsored conference attest. 75 Nor ca~~ we 
assume tha~ increasing, central-SAR cooperation at the international level 
will necessarily enhance Macau's autonomy. Some scholars have drawn 
attention to the role of international organisations as important channels 
of transnational communication and cooperation among both state and 
nonstate actors, important inclusive influences moderating state behavior 
and forums in whict", smaller states and non~3tate actors such as Macau can 
more easily express themselves and have influence on the territorial 
system, particularly on major states. 76 Following this argument, Macau's 
participation in international organisation~? could expand both its external 
and internal effectiveness by improving civic pride and public confidence 
in 11 one country, ttl.}O systems" and gener'ally rendering its relationship WitJl 
China more externally transparent. On the 6ther hand, China could merely 
use Macau's membership in international organisations as an extra voice and 
75. BE'nnett, Int.~r.n?t..;i,.Qn?..l .... Qr"g~n.i.$.~t.iQn~, p. 13; "Eamoiln Fitzpatrick, "HK pullout at lAIorld 
panel spar ks row," s.c.r~l?, 8J an. 1991. 
76. Ibid., p. 5; Johan Galtung, "The Nonterritorial System: Nonterritorial Actors," in 
Falk, Kim and Mendovitz, IQw.~r.g.$. .... ~ .... J.!J.$.:t .... ~~Qr.lo ..... Qr.o. !~.r.. , 1: 100; 8engt Sundelius, "Coping with 
Str uctu r a 1 Secu r i t y Threats, .. in Otma rHo 11, c'd., s.r:o~.l..l. ... ~t.~t.f,;:$. ..... in ..... [;;Y.r.Q'p'G. .... ~ng ..... D.ep.~nd.G.nQ~ 
(Boulder, Colo.: Wes-tview, 1983), pp. 293-2'34, 299. 
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vott::! in favour o'f its own int(3rests N Oth(,~r states could accept the 
situation much as they accepted Belorussian and Ukrainian membership in the 
UN despit,e" their being Soviet PUPP(3tS .. Such a dev(~lopment ~Jould seriously 
harm Macau's distinct ,international personality and its ability to use 
international forums to boost its intl3rnal autonomy" It would re 'Fleet the 
argument that international orqanisations are still primarily adjuncts to 
the state system, perpetuator's of the tr'aditional distribution of power and 
authority and a forum in which stronger state powers can more easily boss 
weaker state and nonstate actors. 77 If China dominates Macau's 
participation in 1G03 thr'ough its power over the SAR government, .-t:he 
enclave's membership in INGOs will be critical. 
Nongovernmental Organisations 
Some Macau of'ficials are already convinced that the territory's 'future 
participation in 1G05 will offer little protection if the local government 
falls under PRC swaYN One official said he is encouraging community groups, 
institutions and . individuals to establish ties with INGOs and other 
external actors as more secure alternatives: 
100. 
My first preoccupation is with local private organisations becoming 
members in international organisations. I think these links are 
important because I don't know who will be running the government 
after 1999 .... It is very important that Macau has links with outside 
people in art,with historians, sociologists and others in China and 
in other parts of the Asia-Pacific. N ... I hope we can develop a ~",hole 
series of small connections that will be harder to control centrally 
a"fte r 1999 .. 78 
77.. [--)ennet t, lnt.~r.n9..:!;.iQn~.l.""""Qr"9p..n.i.$.~t~iQn$., p. Er; Ga 1 tun 9 , .. T he Non t€, n o' i tor i al SystE:m," p • 
76. Intervielf.J, Macau government official who asl<ed to remain anonymous due to the 
sensi"ti vi ty of the comment. 
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Taiwan's experience suggests China will be more tolerant of participation 
in INGOs, particularly those whose members are private individuals and 
groups rather than government agencies or national organisation? .. 79 t1acau 
individuals and organisations are already members in more than eighty-one 
INGO~3, most concerned with religion, :3ports, arts and culture, economics, 
professional contacts, training and education and ideological affairs. In 
only nine cases are the Macau members government departments or agencies. BO 
However, should the executive level of the Macau government come under 
strong PRC influence, links with INGOs could provide administrative 
subunits of'the SAR ·government with channels of external communi~~tion. 
Chinese authorities and the SAR executive might tolerate these 
administrative contacts because they are more discrete and potentially less 
threatening .. 
Corporations with Foreign Links 
Because of their desire to use t1acau and Hong Kong as capitalist motors 
and windows-on-the-world for China's economic development, PRC leaders may 
be more willing to tolerate any external effectiveness the SARs gain 
through local investments by corporations with foreign links. I include in 
this group those companies with at least part of their ownership or assets 
outside Macau and Hong Kong .. Some internationalised Hong Kong-based 
companies, those few foreign companies with investments in Macau and Macau 
companies which have diversified their assets offshore fall into this 
"/9. C han, C.h.i..n~ .... a,nd ..... l.nt.!~r.n~:~.i.Qn~l .... Q.rg~/ni.~~:~.iQn:r!, pp . 5, 157 -158. 
80. Interview, Soares; Y..I.Q 1990/91, 2: 76.5-766. 
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category.8! These external links could provide Macau with channels of 
communication to the outside world e 'ffectively outside the control of 
government .. These links potentially give these companies leverage with the 
SAR and PRC governments because of their increased ability to threaten to 
pull their investments out of the community or cause other economic 
shocks. 82 Most of the external effectiveness available to Macau through 
foreign investment channels will come through its economic links with Hong 
Kong. Therefore, I will first briefly examIne the impact of business 
internationalisation on Hong Kong's future autonomy before turning to Macau 
itself. 
An increasing number of Hong Kong companies have considerable external 
resources that give them some autonomy from ·the central government in the 
future, should they chose to use it. A former president of the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, John Kamm, has been particularly 
outspoken in encouraging foreign chambers of comnlerce to acti vely defend 
Hong Kong's status, especially as an international economic and trade 
entity distinct from the PRC in bilateral treaties and multilateral 
organisations such as GATT and Cocom. 83 Some foreign firms and chambers of 
commerce have actively lobbied their governments to provide special 
81. Since the signing of the Sino-Bri tish Joint DE'claration, m,zmy Hong Kong companies have 
begun "precautionary divE'rsi fica·tion" or "precautionary internationalisation." This includes: 
(1) "transfer of liquid assets abroad, leaving only money balances enough for transaction 
purpOSE'S in Hong Kong; (2) establ ishrnent of branches:- or offices in foreign countries or 
acquisition of foreign firms in whole or in part; (3) sale of the firm's equity to a foreign 
firm or formation of a joint venture with a foreign firm in Hong Kong; and (4) removal of a 
firm's regis·tered head office .from Hong Kong ·to a f.::weign country, especially a ·tax haven," 
but nc)t the total abandonment of HC1ng Kong or China (Jao, "Hong KC1ng's Future' as a Ft"'eE' 
l1ar ket Economy," pp. 222-223; vJi 11 i am Ove r hc) l ·t , tiQng .... KQng .... §.nr..f ..... C.hin~.; ..... Ih~ ... .R~~l .... l~$.!J~;$. 
[strategy Paper, Bankers Trus·t Se;·curi ties Re:search, 28 Aug. 1990, pP. 8-9J). 
82. Phi 11 i p Taylor, t1Qn$.t.9..t.~ .... Br.;,t.Qr.$. .... i.n. ... ln:t.!~.I::.n~:t..iQn~.l. .... I?Ql.i:t..i!;,$..~ ..... f.r.Qr.o ... .I(.s5n$.r.~g.iQna.l ... :t.Q 
s.!J.b.$.t.~t.~ .... Qr.9~n.i.~.~t.iQn$. (E~ou 1 de r, Co 1 0.: "'Jest vi el.'J , 1 984 ), p • 204. 
83. Curti$ YOI.mg, "Chamber$ urged ·to tal<t,? role on Clu·tonomy," liK$., 6 Dec. 1990. 
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im~igration visa schemes for their Hong Kong Chinese employees, thereby 
encouraging these employees to remain in the territory. These cases suggest 
it is not .inconceivable that foreign corporation~5 could in -future attempt 
to use their external links as instruments of external support for Hong 
Kong. 84 
- .However, the type of autonomy these corporations would be willing to 
demand for the SAR could be limited. Securing Hong Kong's economic autonomy 
from China is business leaders~ primary interest. To what extent they 
believe Hong Kong's stability and prosperity as an internationalised 
capitalist entity requires political autonomy from the mainland, direct 
elections Or protection for human rights 15 a vital question that cannot be 
answered in full here. Notably, however, some voices in the international 
business community have linked the survival. of Hong Kong's capitalist 
machine---particularly media, financial ,and other information-'based 
international service industries--to the survival of personal liberties, 
media f reedoms and an independent judicia ry· .. 85 The need -for di rect 
democratic elections figures less prominently or not at all in business 
views of Hong Kong's future autonomy.86 For example, William Overholt of 
Bankers Trust Securities Research has said the prospects are poor for full-
fledged Western democracy in Hong Kong, but the chance of "maintaining a 
84. A comprehensive study of their resources and . behavior is bE'yond the' scope of my 
research. Such a study would not easily prov(~ or disprove the hypothesis that transnational 
corporations al'e instruments of eX'ternal support 9ivE'n tha't much of their behavior and 
interaction with government would be conducted privately and would be extremely difficult to 
document. 
85. See, ferl' example, Overholt, HQng .... I5.Qn9 .... ~nQ ... ,C.b.ina\, p. 19; "South~lJard Ho. Censorship 
remains Singapon?'s sore point," HQI19I5.Qng .... lnc..~" June 1990, p. 32. 
66. See, for example, "Busine'ss and .Politics: A Hong Kong Vie'wpoint" (Speech by Paul M.F. 
Cheng, Hong Kong Legislative Councillol', to the Hong Kong Exporters Association, 10 Apr. 
1991). 
high degree of personal liberty, press freedom, and judicial fairness by 
Third World standards, along with stability and prosperity are far from 
hope1ess . , '~ _87 Nave rtheless, he cautioned: 
On its side, the Chinese gov1=r'nment has moved so far toward a hard 
line that it is raising legitimate doubts about whether freedorll of 
press and opinion after 1997 will be ~dequate to sustain 
information-intensive businesses such as regional banking, 
stockbroking, and publishing, and also to sustain a large 
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population of the kinds of sensitive, opinionated, highly educated 
individuals who are the principal resource of such businesses .... 
[T]here remain areas of profound concern for the future,most notably 
the integrity of Hong Kong's judicial system .... Hong Kong'~ economy 
c6uld not survive a major compromise with the PRC system, because 
international firms expect to be able to sue the state, to sue firms 
belonging to the state without prejudice, and to have complex 
disputes adjudicated under the final authority of an independent 
-court system. The further Beijing goes toward assuring the ~etailed 
continuation of such a system,excepting national security and 
foreign policy issues, the more prosperous Hong Kong will be. 8S 
Business analysts cite Singapore's less liberal political climate and tight 
censorship laws as a major barrier to some international businesses and one 
reason why the island state cou1d not easilY replace Hong Kong as the 
region's media and financial centre. 89 These views indicate some businesses 
with foreign leverage might use it to defend Hong Kong's legal system and 
protections for rights and freedoms. 90 
Macau could benefit indirectly from internationalised investment in the 
British territory and any support it brings Hong Kong's autonomy. Macau's 
87. Overhol"t, HQn9 .... K.Qn9 .... ~nd ..... C.bi.n~, p. 7 ~ 
88. I bi d ., 19. 
89. A report by the consulting finl1 BusinG'ss International warned tha"t Singapore"s 
.. restrictions on in forma·tion could be a majot~ se·tback "tr,) some OHQs [opera-tional headquarters] 
such as those of banks ~"ho rely heavily on in-depth information and varied, international 
views. Any censorship o 'f ·the information in international economic and poli "tical publica"tions 
could be a huge disadvantage" ("Sou·th~"ard 1-10+ Censot'ship remains Singapore's sore f..'IOint," 
HQ09K.Q09 .... In!:; .... , June 1990, p. 32). 
90. The U.S. Consul GEneral in Hong Kong has made similar state'ments abou"t "the importance 
of continued protection for rights a.nd freedoms and maintenance of the current legal system 
for Hong Kong'~~ attractiveness as an international business centre (Juanito Concepcion, 
.. Envoy warn:<.3 on HK freedom," HK.$., 2:3 tVlay 1991). 
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ability to bene'Fit from its ov~n internationalised business connections is 
less certainK With the exception of money from Hong Kong, the role of 
outside capital in Macau is small and what there is must compete, tt.Jith the 
influence of mainland Chinese cOt~poration3" 91 In 1985, 70 pe rcent of the 
capital invested in Macau came from Hong Kong, while 20 percent was local 
and -only about 4 percent from othl3r countries" 92 In recent years, the 
Portuguese and Macau governments have more actively promoted Macau as an 
investment location and Japanese, Singaporean, Taiwanese and Portuguese 
companies Ilave interests in tile enclave" 93 The government is trying to set 
up a technology institute and to attract higher-technology indust~y to an 
industrial park to be built on r'eclaimed land betvJeen Taipa and Coloane 
Islands. 94 However, these are long-term ventures whose success in drawing 
investors is uncertain" The new airport and other infrastructure 
developments underway are improving Macau's investment climate, but it lS 
still tarnished by relatively poor international communication links, 
inefficient government administration and poor trade support services, 
inaccessible laws, government documents written only in Portuguese and 
shortages of labour, particularly personnel 'with sufficient foreign-
language training 'for trade-related jobs" 95 
91. Kamrn, "The Macau Connec·tion," pp. '16-48 .. 
92. Government of Macau, "Seminario sobre as relacoes €'ntre Macau fit Guangdong" (A summary 
o'f a seminar on rela;tlons between Macal,..l and Peat'l River Delta region of Guangdong province, 
held 7-8 Jan. 1968, Zhuhai, PRC) pp. 2-3. 
93. See for- example "Macau procura cap·tar investmentos em Espanha" (Lusa, 6 Nov. 1989). 
94. See point. fivI? of "Discurso do Governador de apresentacao da proposta de iei de 
autorizacao das re-cei tas e despesas para. 1990," in .Libn~$ .... Q_(y~ .... f.)C.C.~Q .... QQy.~.r..n~t..i.y.~, 1990, n. p. 
95. Tse, "rvtac;au's Inter-national Trad,.? Relations," p. 62. 
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Furthermore, Macau's financial, media and other information-sensitive 
industries are not yet well developed. As a result, there are no 
signi ficant .. ,t ransnational ':-'3.ctors in these sectors with di rect economic 
stakes in preserving the liberal freedoms and institutions needed to 
operate information-dependent businesses. There ~re few foreign companies 
depending on Macau's Portuguese judicial system to provide a secure legal 
framework for their regional business ventures. 96 In fact, some foreign 
firms have been deterred from investing in Macau because of dissatisfaction 
with Macau's commercial laws and administrative and legal red tape, which 
are only slowly being , reformed. 97 
Much could depend on the leverage of Stanley Ho, whose own business 
internationalisation and diversification efforts in recent years offer 
Macau possible sources of external effectiveness. In addition to making 
significant equity investments in Macau's infrastructure, tourism, 
residential property, land reclamation, banking and television sectors, Ho 
has expanded his Hong Kong, PRC and ove rseas inte rests. He no~~ has 
significant investments in Canada, the United States, China, Portugal, 
Malaysia and Spain in such areas as hotels, shipping, casinos, retailing 
and computer, telephone and light electronics manufacturing. As the bulk of 
his interests are still 111 l1acau and Hong Kong, this strategy 11 will 
strengthen Ho's bargaining power should Peking [Beijing] insist upon taking 
partial, or even total, control of STDt1 .. 1198 , It could also strengthen Ho's 
96. Political and social stability, E'conomic freedom and t.he rule of law are widely 
respected as ~ey institutional factors responsibh? for Hong Kong's economic miracle after the 
Second World War (Jao, ' "Hong Kong's futl,.lre as a Free Market Economy," Pp. 205-210, 226). 
97. Interview, Jalles. 
98. Jonathan Frie'dland, "A ~\Jinning $'treak," f,!;; ,f;;R, 6 Sept. 1990, pp. 56-58, 59; See also 
.. Venda da Tr ansinsu lar pas sou por Hon'~ I<.ong," !lM, lS Aug. 1990. 
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ability to influence other aspects of Beijing's Macau policy should he 
chose tON 
The Taiwan Connection 
Growing trade and investment ties with Taiwan are another potential 
source of external support for Macau's autonomy arrangement. As they 
inct~ease, so might the PRC's inclination to regard t1acau as a small 
sho~\jpiece of its .. one country!' two systems" policy in its attempts to 
entice Taiwan into reunification. In the past four years, Macau has taken 
advantage of the economic opportunities accompanying the more cordial 
relations established. between the Taipei and Beijing governments to 
... "- ~-
establish commercial links with Taiwan. Some Taiwan tourists enter the PRC 
through Macau. Investors from the island are involved in the Macau Jockey 
Club, are reportedly investing in Macau real estate and have expressed 
interest in the proposed industrial park. 99 While still small in absolute 
terms, two'-way Macau-Taiwan t 'rade is growing. 100 In early 1990, the Taipei 
government opened an unofficial tourism and trade bureau in Macau, its 
first presence in the enclave since the PRC forced Macau to expel all 
Taiwan citizens after the 1966-1967 riots. Beijing, which refuses to allow 
official or semiofficial Taiwan representation in Macau, has welcomed the 
office providing it does not engage in politics or issue visas. 10l The 
office could lead to more business and tourism contacts with Taiwan and act 
as the island's unofficial observer on China's implementation of the Joint 
Declaration. 
99. "China pressiona agencia de Tai\.'Jan em t~acau a alt.erar a sua denominacao" (Lusa, 19 
Mar. 1990); Harald Bruning, " Taipei baSf? in t'1acau," H.K$., 18 Sept. 1988. 
100. "Nota a c:omunicacao social sobre 0 cClmercio ex-terno de Macau nCls primeiros onze meses 
dl? 1969" (t'1acau: t1acau Govel~nment" 1990). 
101. Harald Bruning, "China wan·ts Taiwanese office ou·t of Macau," tll5.$., 18 Mar. 1990. 
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Prospects for External Effectiveness 
Bar'ring" ~ moves by China to follo\/I) "flexible policies toward the t1acau SAR 
that would allow it to take full advantage of the range of international 
pa rticipat.ion opportunities pe rmitted unde r the Joint Oecla ration, t1acau' s 
best potential sources of external effectiveness could be participation in 
INGOs and its links witt'l Hong Kong and to some extent Taiwan M The Taiwan 
government's announcement in May 199J. of new immigration rules for overseas 
Chinese showed it has some desire to support Macau and Hong Kong's future 
ButonomYM Under the changes, overseas Chinese can apply for residence in 
.. ~":- ,. 
Tai\/I)an if "extraordinat~yll events happen in the areas where they live, if 
they invest in the island or have contributed to Chinese societYM 102 The 
enclave will benefit from Hong Kong's richer array of external resources 
and more active use of international links to build support for its 
autonomous statusM 103 Macau will have some external effectiveness as long 
as China seeks to avoid major economic or political disruptions in the 
enclave in order to avert confidence crises in Hong Kong or distrust in 
Taiwan. Furthermore, Portuguese and Macau government efforts to fortify the 
enclave's foreign investment, participation in international organisations 
and other external ties cannot hurt and may even help M At the very least, 
they provide a framework of international support ready for use by the 
future Macau SAR should China's leaders permit. They mark the birth of a 
more active and distinct international personality for Macau, which is 
102. "Taipeiopens door to immigra.n~s," $.C~jP', 23 May 1991. 
103. For example, local Hong Kong human rights groups havl: actively used the in"tern;:\tional 
forum provided by the UN Human Rights Committee to protest against th(? 90VE'rnment's record on 
human rights questions (Ursula Yeung, "UN talks on local rights," tiK.$., 5 Mar. 1991). 
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bound to foster some local pride and witl, it, local identity. The danger is 
that, in their anxious efforts to avoid setting precedents that would lead 
to what they .. perceive as tht~eatening development::> in Hong Kong, Chinese 
authorities will do little to nurture the Macau SAR's infant international 




This thesiS has proposed a framework for analysing autonomy arrangements 
involving territorial communities that want to be left alone to pursue 
their distinctive goals but must remain inside the jurisdiction of a larger 
territorial cbmmunity for some purposes. It has argued that autonomy 
arrangements are not static. Rather~ they are dynamic processes 
characterised by ongoing conflict and bargaining between actors in the 
larger and smaller polities. The original agreements outlining the 
boundaries of the smaller polity's autonomy and related limits on central 
government authority reflect the particular distribution of power among the 
parties at the time of the accord. However, because they are compromises 
between groups with different and often contradictory goals, they do not 
solve all outstanding issues. Nor can they anticipate all future problems. 
Subsequent bargaining occurs as the parties struggle to shape the rules of 
the game in their favour, continually renewing the autonomy process if 
their demands are sufficiently met~ or' causing it to break down i-f they are 
not. 
Given these characteristics, I have argued that successful autonomy 
processes develop institutions, processes and attitudes which help channel 
- this ongoing conflict into forums that encourage mutual trust, tolerance 
and cooper'ation. The goal cannot be to construct a wall to protect the 
autonomous community from the central government, particularly if the 
process is occurring within a unitary political system such as China's. 
Instead, the aim should be to foster habits of ·give and take that satisfy 
the essential symbolic and sUbstantive needs of all parties. A workable 
autonomy arrangement is something that can be built. It does not 
necessarily exist at the onset. 
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The experi~nces of several autonomy arrangements of international legal 
concern stretching from Eritrea and southern Sudan, to South Tyrol, the 
Aland Islands and Greenland reveal that four ingredients in particular have 
contributed to the successful construction of viable systems. These 
include: dual political identity in the autonomous community; government in 
autonomous community politically accountable only to local institutions and 
electorates and not to the central government; strong legal systems with 
independent judiciaries "and other institutions for minimising and 
adjudicating central-local disputes which enjoy the confidence of all 
polities; and external effectiveness for the autonomous community. 
Measured in terms of these ingredients, the future of Macau's autonomy 
process is bleak. Distrust in the PRC leadership, especially after the 1989 
Beijing massacre, and weak local identity among many Chinese residents are 
undermining the development o'f dual identity. The probable departure of 
many Macanese before 1999 will only make matters worse. The central-
government-dominated and executive-centred, partly democratic political 
institutions planned for the SAR create a chief e><ecutive dangerously 
accountable to both central and local political masters. The resulting 
-political system will lack sufficient autonomy to win support from local 
people. Belated localisation means the civil service is unlikely to be 
sufficiently effective, autonomous and locally oriented to act as a counter 
balance. Parts of the civil service and legal system could end up 
accountable to Beijing should local staff shortages force Macau to recruit 
personnel in the PRC .. Slow localisation and reforrn, as l",ell as the Macau 
legal system's lack of experience with constitutional and administrative 
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review, jeopardise the SAR courts' capacity to stabilise Macau's autonomy 
process by defending human rights and settling jurisdictional and other 
central-loCal constitutional disputes. Other channels for dispute 
resolution will be central-government-controlled and not oriented to 
engendering mut8al trust or tolerance between the two polities. Macau's 
capacity to strengthen its internal effectiveness through external support 
is fragile" 
Given these weaknesses, it seems likely that PRC values and practices 
will gradually erode Macau's current liberal values, rights and freedoms 
and legal system. The' "high degree of autonomy" China promises the .. !-8AR is 
illusory because the enclave does not have the conditions to build and 
maintain it in the face of overwhelming PRC economic might and political 
power. Assembly Deputy Alexandre Ho laments: 
The fact that Macau exists and the SAR will exist are only due to 
historic factors, because the Portuguese have been here for more than 
four centuries, not because the local conditions for autonomy 
exist .... Our autonomy is forced, not natural. 1 
Nevertheless, keeping in mind that successful autonomy arrangements are 
made, not born intact, there are some small reasons for hope. The 
traditionally harmonious relations that many Macau people and the 
Portuguese authorities have generally enjoyed with the Chinese government 
could be a tremendous asset if they are balanced with improved local 
identity and efforts to win the trust of nontraditional, reform-minded 
leaders and their sympathisers. Although late in coming and painfully slow, 
the localisation, legal translation and legal reform and economic 
infrastructural policies of the Portuguese authorities are beginning to 
bear fruit. They alone cannot save Macau. However, should they manage to 
1. Interview, Alexandre Ho. 
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convince some younger Macau-born Chinese and Macanese to stay in Macau 
after 1999, those who appreciate the distinctive liberal values and 
institutions··-that exist in Macau and have the skills needed to defend them, 
then the Portuguese will leave behind a more internally effective community 
than existed before the signing of the Joint Declaration. 
Preserving the remnants of Portuguese language and culture should be 
part of these efforts. They will help reassure the Macanese, smooth the 
transition and maintain the architectural and other features that make 
Macau attractive to tourists. However, priority must be given to building 
efficient and durable political, legal and administrative institutio~s and 
external links that serve and have ttle support of the enclave's Chinese 
majority. This depends on the willingness of the Portuguese to accept that 
thei~ language and culture are of no importance to most Macau Chinese 1n 
and of themselves. There is, however, some appreciation among younger local 
Chinese that Portuguese culture was one of the vehicles that brought 
liberal values and institutions to Macau and is one, but not necessarily 
the best potential means of securing their preservation and strength after 
1999. The <recent incorporation of aspects of Hong Kong and other non-
Portuguese law into the Macau law codes under revision is a sign some 
Portuguese officials are adopting a pragmatic approach. More must be done 
- to find creative, but not necessarily Portuguese ways of rooting Macau's 
legal and -political institutions, t~ights and freedoms firmly into the local 
community. 
Much depends on the success of government and private-sector efforts 
to develop and internationalise Macau's economy. PRC authorities will 
have a stronger stake in preserving Macau's autonomy if the enclave 
becomes more uniquely valuable to China's broader economic modernisation 
drive as an internationalised, liberal, capitalist business service 
centre for Guangdong province's West Pearl River Delta region. Southern 
China's rapidly growing industrial economy increasingly exposes Macau's 
economic weaknesses and its decreasing ability to compete with and 
differentiate itself from the economy of Guangdong. 2 Should Macau 
successfully improve its international transportation and communications 
links, build a more in~ernationally accessible legal system, cultivate 
financial services expertise and attract regional service industries, it 
will be in a better position to fill a more unique niche in the ,economy 
of southern China. 
Much depends on China's own policies. Macau's localisation efforts 
and its future autonomy are in serious trouble should the PRC 
authorities continue to ignore the enclave's urgent problems in their 
rush to squelch perceived threats to their sovereignty in Hong Kong. 
This will be the case should the Macau Basic Law currently being drafted 
turn out to be a near copy of the Hong Kong Basic Law, as reports 
suggest it will be. A more flexible, Macau-sensitive approach is needed 
on issues such as nationality, selection of the chief executive, human 
rights, judicial finality, interpretation of the Basic Law and central-
local dispute settlement. 
The histories of the Aland Islands and South Tyrol are proof that a 
satisfactory autonomy process can emerge even when the minority 
community is unhappy and distrustful at the onset and the majority 
government shows little willingness at times to making concessions that 
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2. For a discussion of the economic changes underway in southern China and their impact on 
Hong Kong sea El iz abeth Cheng and Michae 1 Taylor, .. De 1 ta force," .f..EEB, 16 May, 1991, Pp. 64-
67. 
give substance to its promises of autonomy_ However, such success 
requires committed support from outside, from Hong Kong, Portugal and 
the broader 'fnternational community .. Emerging norms in international law 
recognise that this support. is not a violation of China's sovereignty .. 
Rather, it is an e'ffective means of ,helping Macau's autonomy process 
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APPENDIX 
Interviews* 
(Conducted primarily between 8 Nov. 1990 - 14 Mar. 1991) 
Alm~ida, Christina, deputy director, Education Department, Macau 
Government, 7 Feb. 1991. 
Cabrita, Eduardo, co-ordinator, Cabinet for Legal Translation, Macau 
Government, 13 Feb. 1991. 
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Escarameia, Paula, professor, Law and Public Administration Programme, 
University of East Asia, 8 Nov. 1990. 
Ho, Ale~andre, deputy in Macau Legislative Assembly, training department 
chief at Macau Government Tourist Office Hotel and Tourism Training 
School, 22 Feb. 1991. 
Ho, Edmund, business person, vice-president of Macau Legislative 
Assembly, member Macau Basic Law Drafting Committee, 21 Feb. 1991. 
Jacinto, Francisco Teodosio, procurator of the republic~ Macau, 29 Nov. 
1990. 
Jalles, Maria Louisa de Mello Braganca, department chief, Studies 
Cabinet, Economic Services Management, Macau Government, 7 Feb. 1991. 
Leong Kam Chun, deputy in Macau Legislative Assembly, accountant, 21 
Feb. 1991. 
Marreiros, Carlos, president, Macau Cultural Institute, Macau 
Government, 5 Feb. 1991. 
Mok Lai Meng Caterina, ch~ef, information radio department, Chinese 
channel, Teledifusao de Macau, 22 Feb. 1991. 
Ng Kwok Cheong, president, Macau Democracy ~evelopment Union, 4 Mar. 
1991. 
Povoas, Sebastiao, adjunct secretary for justice, Macau Government, 21 
Feb. 1991 .. 
Ramos, Joao de -Deus, adjunct secretary for transitional affairs, Macau 
Government, 14 Mar. 1991. 
* In addition to 'the people listed above, I also interviewed four 
Macau residents who asked to remain anonymous. 
Jorge Rangel, president, Macau Foundation, member Macau Basic Law 
Drafting Committee, 7 and 12 Feb. 1991. 
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Rocha', J .A. Oliveira, advisor, Cabinet for Legislative Modernisation, 
Macau Government and professor, Law and Public Administration Programme, 
University of East Asia, Macau, 15 Nov. 1990. 
Rui Rocha, deputy director, Service of Administration and Public 
Function, Macau Government, 6 Feb. 1991. 
Soares, Ana, advisor to the adjunct secretary for transitional affairs, 
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